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Abstract
The advancement of wireless communication has led to the problem of
growing spectrum scarcity due to an increasing demand. Cognitive radio
technology as a concept was introduced to solve the problem of spectrum
scarcity and improve spectrum utilization to support such growth in wireless
communication. Cognitive radio provides a key enabling function in next
generation (xG) mobile communication by being aware of the changes of its
surrounding environment and modifying its operating parameters dynamically
to adapt to such changes to solve spectrum scarcity issues. However,
the inherent properties of cognitive radio technology make such networks
more vulnerable to attacks compared to other traditional wireless networks.
Therefore, the security concerns of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have
attracted a great deal of attention in the literature recently to obtain maximum
benefits from the technology.
In the literature, several approaches have been proposed to defend against the
different types of attacks in CRNs, but the majority of these have focused on
specific vulnerabilities along with corresponding traditional countermeasures
such as cryptographic measures, secure routing and data aggregation etc.
Though some types of conventional attacks in CRNs can be countered by
applying such conventional mechanisms, there are some other types of attacks
that cannot be countered by them. These are the threats and attacks that are
xxvi
brought by unreliable or malicious nodes to the CRNs. These type of threats
are classified as soft security threats and in such scenarios, ‘trust’ plays an
important role to defend against them. In the literature, many solutions have
been proposed to address the non-conventional threats of malicious nodes in
CRNs by using the notion of trust, but no trust-based mechanisms have been
proposed in the literature to maintain secure communication between different
nodes in CRNs. Therefore, to address this gap, this thesis is an effort in such a
direction to assess, analyse and utilize trust to maintain secure communication
in CRNs.
In order to address the problem, this thesis develops a trust-based framework
and specific schemes by which trust can be established to solve the security
threats brought about by untrustworthy entities. It proposes a framework
that authenticates only trustworthy nodes to share spectrum securely and
increases CRN availability and reliability by selecting the trustworthy nodes
as the key nodes of the CRN. The proposed solutions provide reliable and
robust security infrastructure for facilitating secure communications in CRNs.
The functionality and features proposed in each approach are validated by
experiments and evaluated to highlight the effectiveness of the overall proposed
solution.
xxvii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
With the advancement of Information Communication Technologies, there
has been an exponential growth in mobile computing and the number of
interconnected digital devices in the world. Depending upon their location,
most of these devices communicate with one another wirelessly by using
distribution mechanisms and radio spectrum bands. As a result, there is
an ever-increasing demand for spectrum to support such growth of wireless
communication devices by orders of magnitude over the next decade. This
problem must be addressed via technology and regulatory innovations for
significant improvements in spectrum efficiency and increased robustness
and performance of wireless devices [1]. Keeping this in view, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has considered making the unused
licensed spectrum available to unlicensed users to continue smooth operation
[2]. Having this unused licensed spectrum usage will allow unlicensed users to
use the empty spectrum, under the condition that they cause no interference
1
to licensed users.
To address the problem of spectrum shortage, cognitive radio was pioneered
by J.Mitola [3] from software defined radio (SDR) [4] to improve spectrum
utilization. Cognitive radio is a new research area for wireless communication
in which either a network or a wireless node is able to change its transmission
or reception parameters to communicate efficiently by avoiding interference
with either licensed or unlicensed users [5]. Cognitive radio allows nodes
to find opportunities for communication using the “spectrum holes”and
transports the packets of communication on top of cognitive radio links
in order to successfully facilitate useful applications and services [6]. A
cognitive radio node senses available spectrum, occupies it for communication
and vacates the spectrum on sensing the return of the licensed user. A
mobile terminal with cognitive radio communication capabilities can always
sense the communication environments (e.g. spectrum holes, geographic
location, available wire/wireless communication system or networks, and
available services), analyze the environment and learn information from the
environment with the user’s requirements and reconfigure itself by adjusting
system parameters to conform to certain policies and regulations. Cognitive
radio nodes and the radio links form the cognitive radio network (CRN)
which uses several factors for active monitoring, either in the external or
internal radio environment, such as radio frequency spectrum, user behavior
and network state. In the literature, the future wireless network is termed
the ‘cognitive radio network’ (CRN), which is quite consistent with Haykins’s
definition of cognitive radio [4]: “Cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless
communication system that is aware of its surrounding environment (i.e.,
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outside world), and uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to learn
from the environment and adapt its internal states to statistical variations
in the incoming RF stimuli by making corresponding changes in certain
operating parameters (e.g., transmit power, carries-frequency, and modulation
strategy) in real time, with two primary objectives in mind: highly reliable
communication whenever and wherever needed and efficient utilization of the
radio spectrum”.
Even though a CRN is a wireless communication network, there are several
differences between cognitive and traditional non-cognitive wireless networks.
One notable difference between them is that nodes in CRNs need to be aware of
the dynamic environment, find a suitable frequency band for their operation
and adaptively adjust their operating parameters based on the interactions
with the environment and other users in the network. This is contrary to
nodes in the traditional wireless network which cooperate unconditionally in
a static environment for spectrum sharing and other management approaches
[7]. In other words, the major difference between the CRN and the traditional
wireless network is that it doesn’t operate on a fixed frequency spectrum i.e.
the frequency spectrum is being used dynamically [8]. However, such features
are beneficial and advantageous in certain studies. Figure 1.1 shows a basic
difference between wireless networks and CRNs, where in CRN, a cell phone
is able to identify a newly available communication cell through spectrum
opportunistic access to communicate and establish a connection with other
nodes in an emergency situation whereas it is not possible for a cell phone
in a traditional wireless network to identify a newly available communication
cell and establish a connection to make a call. This is achieved by the sense,
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Figure 1.1: Difference between wireless networks and CRNs
understand, adapt and decide capability of CRN. This is explained further in
the next section.
1.2 Characteristics of CRNs
1.2.1 CRN working process
As mentioned in Section 1.1 and as shown in Figure 1.2, a cognitive radio
senses the environment (cognitive capability), then analyzes and understands
the sensed information (self-organized capability), makes decisions (decision
capability) and adapts to the environment (reconfigurable capabilities). In
this subsection, for completeness, an overview is given of the different features
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Figure 1.2: Working process of CRNs
that come under each functionality.
1.2.1.1 Sense (Cognitive capability)
In this section, an overview of the various sensing capabilities of a CRN is
given.
• Spectrum Sensing : Spectrum sensing is a mechanism that allows a
cognitive radio node to sense spectrum by adopting different sensing
techniques [9–15] and detect “spectrum holes” which are those frequency
bands not used by licensed users or which have limited interference with
the surrounding nodes in the network.
• Spectrum Sharing : Spectrum sharing is a mechanism that helps to
share spectrum by adopting different sharing techniques [7, 16, 17]under
different terms of agreement and policies between a licensee and a third
party without the need for prior agreement between all parties.
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• Location Identification: Location identification is a mechanism that
allows a cognitive radio node to select the appropriate operating
parameters, such as power and frequency, depending on various location
technologies [6, 18, 19] to avoid interference.
• Network/System and Service Discovery : Network/system discovery is a
mechanism that enables a cognitive radio node to discover the available
networks around it to communicate between nodes via either directed
one-hop communication or multi-hop relay nodes [6]. Service discovery
mechanisms [20] that allows a cognitive radio terminal to discover a
service by identifying nearby Bluetooth, WiFi devices.
1.2.1.2 Understand (Self-Organized capability)
In this section, an overview of the various self-organizing capabilities of CRNs
is presented. Like wireless sensor networks (WSNs), CRNs have a limited
availability of energy supply and hence the CR nodes need to cooperate and
self-organize to provide smooth network operation by going into idle/sleep
mode and giving permission to other nodes to use the unused spectrum [21].
This is done by using the self-organizing capability of CRNs. The features
that come under this functionality are :
• Spectrum/Radio Resource Management: Spectrum management is a
process that allows cognitive radio nodes to manage and organize
spectrum holes information between them by adopting a reputed model
such as the Preemptive Resume Priority (PRP) M/G/1 queuing model
[22].
• Mobility and Connection Management: Mobility and connection
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management is a technique that allows cognitive radio nodes to detect the
available Internet access and support vertical hand-offs to select routes
and networks [6].
• Trust/Security Management: Trust/security management is a technique
which enables cognitive radio nodes to defend different types of attacks
introduced by the various heterogeneities nature of CRNs (e.g. wireless
access technologies, system/network operators). Security becomes a
very challenging issue in CRNs as different types of attacks are very
common to cognitive radio technology compared to the general wireless
network. In this case, trust is a prerequisite for securing operations in
CRNs. Different trust-based approaches are used in CRNs for better
performance.
1.2.1.3 Decide (Decision capability)
Decision capability enables unlicensed users to select a reasonable spectrum
channel from the licensed users, based on spectrum characteristics and other
quality of service (QoS) requirements. So, it is very important to have a sound
understanding of the CRN’s fundamental precondition before deployment with
a view to ensure reliable outcomes of the decision making process. Zheng and
Cao in [23] proposed a device-centric spectrum management scheme, and five
spectrum decision rules to regulate users’ access, trading off fairness, utilization
with communication costs, and algorithm complexity.
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1.2.1.4 Adapt (Reconfigurable capability)
Reconfigurable capability aims to enable the radio to be dynamically
programmed according to the radio environment and change the appropriate
operating frequency by selecting frequency agility, adaptive coding and
transmit power control for smooth communication[6] and to detect signals
from other radio frequency systems to avoid co-channel interference [24].
In the next subsection, the basic architecture of CRN and the different
network architectures for communication is discussed.
1.2.2 CRN architecture
A CRN is formed by a group of users (nodes/stations) who collaborate to share
a frequency band by using cognitive radio. CRN consists of various kinds of
communication systems and networks, and can be viewed as a heterogeneous
network. The basic components of CRNs shown in Figure 1.3 are as follows:
• Mobile Station (MS): A mobile station is the normal wireless node
equipped with a cognitive capability of cognitive radio for communication
with a mobile network. There are two types of mobile stations (users):
Primary User (PU) and Secondary User (SU). The PU is the licensed
user of a particular radio frequency band and the SU is an unlicensed
user who cognitively operates without causing harmful interference to
the PU [25].
• Base Station/Access Point (BS/AP): An access point (AP) is a
device that allows wireless devices to connect to a wired or wireless
network using Wi-Fi, or related standards. There are two types of base
8
Figure 1.3: Basic architecture of CRNs
stations: the Primary User Base Station (PUBS) and Secondary User
Base Station (SUBS).
• Backbone/ Core Networks: A backbone or core network is the central
part of a communication network that provides various services to the
users who are connected by the access network
These three basic components of CRN communicate with each other by
using any of the following network architecture [6]:
1.2.2.1 Infrastructure architecture
In the infrastructure architecture, as shown in Figure 1.4, an MS can access
a BS/AP only in a one-hop manner. MSs under the transmission range
of the same BS/AP communicate with each other through the BS/AP.
Communications between different cells are routed through backbone/core
networks. The BS/AP may be able to execute one or multiple communication
standards/protocols to meet different demands from MSs.
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Figure 1.4: Infrastructure
architecture
Figure 1.5: Ad-hoc architecture
1.2.2.2 Ad-hoc architecture
In ad-hoc architecture, there is no infrastructure backbone. If an MS
recognizes that there are other MSs nearby and are connectable through certain
communication standards/protocols, they can set up a link with both licensed
and unlicensed users [26] and thus form an ad-hoc network such as cognitive
maritime wireless ad-hoc network [27].
1.2.2.3 Mesh architecture
This architecture, as shown in Figure 1.6, is a combination of infrastructure and
ad-hoc architectures by enabling the wireless connections between BSs/APs,
which is similar to the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Networks [6].
The abovementioned architecture shows how the different nodes in a CRN
communicate with each other. Within each node, the communication process
goes through different layers as presented in the next subsection.
1.2.3 Layered architecture of CRN
The standard layered network architecture is usually used with some additional
modules to convert it into an architecture for the CRN.
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Figure 1.6: Mesh architecture
Figure 1.7: Standard layered architecture for CRNs [28]
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Figure 1.8: Main functions of different protocol layers in CRNs [29]
As shown in Figure 1.7, the cross-layer approach adds a new module to the
existing layered network architecture for incorporating cognitive functions of
all the layers [28].
Descriptions and key functionalities of different protocol layers of a CR
node are as follows:
• Physical Layer: This layer is the lowest layer in the layered architecture
and the essential component that enables CR users to identify a spectrum
hole [30].
• Link Layer: This layer is responsible for transferring data from one node
to other in a single hop. Specific tasks such as sensing scheduling,
sensing-access tradeoff design, spectrum-aware access control etc. are
performed by this layer of a CR node.
• Network Layer: The main objective of the network layer is end-to-end
packet delivery. Functions of the network layer are spectrum-aware
routing, flow control, error control and ensuring quality of service (QoS).
• Transport Layer: This is responsible for transferring data between two
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end hosts. It is responsible for flow control, congestion control and
end-to-end error recovery, reconfiguration and hand-off delay.
• Application Layer: This is the top most layer of the protocol stack.
Protocols that run at the application layer completely rely on the services
provided by the underlying lower layers.
The key functions of different protocol layers in CRNs are shown in Figure
1.8.
1.2.4 Application scenarios of CRNs in real-life
applications
In the literature, CRNs have been applied in various real-life applications, as
shown in Figure 1.9. Some of the applications are as follows:
• Emergency Management or Disaster Recovery: Cognitive radio
resolves problems in disaster situations [31, 32] by providing a significant
amount of bandwidth through Opportunistic Spectrum Access [33].
• Search and Rescue: The GPS capability of cognitive radio helps to
rescue the person by establishing a short range communication link, like
a beacon, without any central control [31, 34].
• Mining: CR chooses an appropriate waveform to establish a clear signal
between the adverse environment in the mine and the outside world [31].
• Traffic Control: Cognitive sensors at each signal location gather traffic
information and make appropriate decisions locally or via a central
location and send an alternate route to the mobile user [31].
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Figure 1.9: Cognitive radio applications
• Medical Applications: Cognitive radio uses cognitive ID tags to
intelligently detect abnormal tissues or blood cells in a human body and
intelligently inform the respective authority to take appropriate action
[31].
• Public Safety Networks: A public safety CRN provides a
substantially improved communication by providing more bandwidth
through Opportunistic Spectrum Access and allows interpretability
across different public safety services [33, 35].
These applications show the enormous advantages that CRN provides
in real-life applications. But apart from these advantages, an important
consideration for users to consider is the notion of security, as CRNs are
susceptible to various security threats and attacks. Therefore, proper security
mechanisms have to be used in order to keep networks secure. In the next
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section, the different security threats and attacks and the security requirements
that are needed to address these threats are described.
1.3 Security Challenges in CRNs
As mentioned in Section 1.1, CRNs are more flexible and exposed to wireless
networks compared to other traditional radio networks. Hence, there are
many security threats to CRNs because of their special characteristics, such
as intelligence functionality and dynamic spectrum access application, more so
than other traditional radio environments. Since cognitive radios can adapt to
their environment and change how they communicate, it is crucial that they
select an optimal and secure means of communication. Several survey papers
[36–40] have presented an analytical survey for the detection of several attacks
in CRNs and examine only a small number of general security requirements
of CRNs. In the next subsection, some of the security threats for CRNs are
summarized.
1.3.1 Security threats in CRNs
• Sensing Problem Threats: Cognitive radio technology provides more
opportunities for attackers due to its intrinsic nature. For example,
spectrum sensing is a key characteristic used in CRNs, which scans a
certain range of the spectrum to detect unoccupied spectrum [29, 41, 42].
Through this process, an unlicensed user can determine whether the
radio can be used. However, if the spectrum sensing result is modified
maliciously, normal network activities will be disabled; it is possible that
all network traffic may collapse. Other types of threats include spectrum
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decision threats, spectrum sharing and spectrum mobility threats.
• Hidden Terminal Problem Threats: Another important challenge
facing a cognitive radio system is to identify the presence of PUs over
a wide range of spectrum [42]. This process is very difficult as different
modulation schemes, employed by PUs, need to be identified. There
is also a need to identify different data rates and transmission powers
in the presence of variable propagation losses, interference generated by
other SUs, and thermal noise. For example, if the channel between the
primary transmitter and the sensing device is under a deep fade, it is
possible that the sensing device may not detect the primary signal. As a
result, the cognitive radio might transmit a signal in the corresponding
PU band, causing interference to the nearby primary receiver. This issue
is commonly referred to as the Hidden Terminal Problem.
• Policy Threats: In order to communicate more effectively in an
intelligent way, a cognitive radio node needs policies for reasoning in
different environments or under different conditions. Two types of
threats which are possible in the use of policies [36] are :(1) policies
may be modified by attackers who can obtain control of a CR, or
obtain permission from the policy database administration to modify
the internal policies; and (2) false policies also lead to security threats so
that attacker can try to inject false policies into the CR policy database
and thereby cause interference.
• Learning Threats: Some CRs are designed with the capability of
learning. These CRs can learn from past experiences or current situations
to predict the future environment and select optimal operations. But
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attackers can modify past statistics or spoof current conditions to prevent
the CR from predicting accurately [43].
• Parameter threats: An attacker can manipulate a CR to behave
maliciously and alter the parameters to conduct sub-optimal operations
for CRNs [36].
Apart from these overall threats, a CRN is also susceptible to various
threats and attacks on the protocol layers of CRN during communication.
This is explained in the next subsection.
1.3.2 Security attacks on protocol layers in cognitive
radio node
In this subsection, the attacks on various protocol layers of a cognitive radio
node are described. The motivations for attacks on CRNs are discussed in
[38], which classifies the motivation into two broad categories namely: selfish
attack and malicious attack [44].
1. Selfish Attack: A selfish attack occurs in a situation where the attacker
wants to use the spectrum with higher priority. This attack meets its
target by misleading other unlicensed users to believe that he is a licensed
user. As a result, the adversarial user can occupy the spectrum resource
as long as it wants. Since this selfish behaviour does not obey the
spectrum sharing scheme [29], this attack is called a selfish attack. The
CR network is vulnerable to selfish attacks, where selfish SUs increase
their accessing probability by changing the transmission parameters to
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Protocol Layers Attacks
Physical Layer International Jamming Attack; Primary Receiver Jamming
Attack; Sensitivity Amplifying Attack; Overlapping Secondary
User Attack; Primary User Emulation Attack; Objective Function
Attack; Common Control Data Attack
Link Layer Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attack; Denial of Service
Attack; Biased Utility Attack; Asynchronous Sensing Attack;
False Feedback Attack; Fabrication Attack
Network Layer Resource Hungry Attack; Network Endo-Parasite Attack;
Channel Ecto-Parasite Attack (CEPA); Low cOst Ripple effect
Attack (LORA)
Transport Layer Key Depletion Attack; Jellyfish Attack; Lion Attack; DoS Attack
Application Layer Any attack on physical, link, network or transport layers impact
adversely on the application layer as application layer is the final
layer of the communication protocol stack.
Table 1.1: Attacks on different protocol layers in CRNs
enhance their own utilities by degrading the performance of other users
that, in turn, degrades the CR network’s performance.
2. Malicious Attack: A malicious attack means that the adversary prevents
other unlicensed users from using the spectrum and causes a denial of
service (DoS). As a result, a malicious attack will drastically decrease
the available bandwidth and break down the whole traffic and turn the
cognitive radio into a jammer.
There are different types of attacks that come under each category. The
different types of attacks are named in Table 1.1 and a description of these
attacks is given in Table 1.2. It is important to note that the abovementioned
threats and attacks in Table 1.2 are not exhaustive and it is quite possible that
with the advent of new threats, there may be a new requirement that needs
to be improved to ensure the security in CRNs. In the next subsection, an
overview of security requirements that need to be established to facilitate and
enhance secure communication in CRNs is given.
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Name of Attack Description
Intentional Jamming
Attack
The malicious SU jams PU and other SUs by intentionally and
continuously transmitting in a licensed band [39]
Primary Receiver
Jamming Attack
This attack occurs whenever a malicious entity closer to the victim
primary receiver participates in a collaborative protocol and requests
transmissions from other SUs to be directed towards the malicious user
[39]
Sensitivity Amplifying
Attack
A malicious entity can amplify the sensitivity and hence increases the
number of missed opportunities and false detections by replaying the
primary transmissions [39]
Overlapping Secondary
User Attack
In both centralized and distributed architectures in CRNs, multiple
secondary networks may coexist over the same geographical region [39]
Primary User Emulation
Attack
The attacker may jam the licensed band and emulate the PU, thereby
limiting the CRN to operating in the unlicensed bands and limiting CRN
capacity [36]
Objective Function
Attacks (OFA)
An adversary forces a radio to use some high security level, thus the
system’s objective function decreases
Common Control Channel
Jamming
The attacker transmits periodical pulses in the control channel spectrum
and blocks probable communication between all cognitive radio nodes
Spectrum Sensing Data
Falsification Attack
An attacker may send false local spectrum sensing results to a data
collector, causing the data collector to make a wrong spectrum sensing
decision in CRNs [45]
Denial of Service Attack The attackers generate sensing results showing that the PU spectrum
band is occupied by PUs. If their sensing results are aggregated into
the final decision making process without proper filtering, they could
adversely influence the final decision, resulting in false alarm errors and
a loss of opportunity to utilize the PU spectrum bands when they are
actually available [46]
Biased Utility Attack A malicious SU may intentionally tweak parameters of the utility
function to increase its bandwidth [39]
Asynchronous Sensing
Attack
A malicious SU may transmit asynchronously instead of synchronizing
the sensing activity with other SUs in the network during sensing
operations
False Feedback Attack In CRNs, false feedback from one or a group of malicious user could
make other SUs take inappropriate action and violate the terms of the
protocol
Fabrication Attack A malicious SU deliberately reports inverted sensing results to a SU
base-station (SUBS) all the time and causes deterioration to the overall
performance of all the CRNs [46]
Resource Hungry Attack Malicious SUs always report to SUBS that the PU spectrum band is not
in use and this misdetection introduces undue interference to PU using
the same spectrum band
Network Endo-Parasite
Attack (NEPA)
In CRNs, the malicious nodes attempt to increase the interference at a
heavily loaded high priority channel but the neighbors are not informed
about the change [41]
Channel Ecto-Parasite
Attack (CEPA)
In CRNs, a compromised node launches CEPA by switching all its
interfaces to the channel that is being used by the highest priority link
[41]
Low cOst Ripple effect
Attack (LORA)
Misleading information about spectrum assignments is transmitted to
all the neighbors to push the network into a quasi-stable state [41]
Key Depletion Attack Transport layer sessions in CRNs last only for a short duration because
of frequently occurring retransmissions in the network [39]
Jellyfish Attack An attacker causes the cognitive node to switch from one frequency band
to another frequency band, thereby causing considerable delay in the
network and transport layers and reduces the throughput of the TCP
protocol [39]
Lion Attack Lion attack actually causes the jamming to slow down the throughput
of the Transmission Control Protocol by forcing frequency handoff [47]
Table 1.2: Name and description of different attacks in CRNs
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1.3.3 Security requirements in CRNs
As is the case in any interacting and facilitating medium, security in CRNs
is vital to ensure secure communication in CRN [37]. Although security
requirements may vary in different application environments, there are, in
fact, general requirements that provide basic safety controls, as follows [38]:
• Access Control: Access control is a security requirement for the
physical layer. Users must be guaranteed to have access to the network,
and they must obey their organization’s policy. Since different SUs
coexist in CRNs, collisions may happen if they simultaneously move to
and use the same spectrum band, according to their spectrum sensing
results [48]. Thus, an access control property should coordinate the
spectrum access of different SUs to avoid collisions.
• Integrity: Data that is in transit in the network needs to be protected
from malicious modification, insertion, deletion or replay. Integrity is
extremely important in a wireless network because, unlike their wired
counterparts, the wireless medium is easily accessible to intruders.
Hence, in wireless local area networks (WLANs), an additional layer
of security is added at the link layer to make the wireless links as secure
as wired links. The security protocol used in this layer is called the
CCMP [49] (counter-mode encryption with CBC-MAC authentication
protocol). The CCMP protocol uses a state-of-the art advanced
encryptions standard (AES) [50] in cipher block chaining mode [51] to
produce a message integrity check. Data integrity can be achieved by
applying higher cryptographic techniques in CRNs.
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• Confidentiality: Confidentiality is closely related to integrity. While
integrity ensures that data is not maliciously modified in transit,
confidentiality ensures that the data is transformed in such a way that
it is not understood to an unauthorized entity [39]. This issue is even
more pronounced in CRNs, where the SU’s access to the network is
opportunistic and spectrum availability is not guaranteed [39].
• Authentication: The primary objective of an authentication scheme is
to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to protected systems
[39]. In CRNs, there is an inherent requirement to distinguish between
PUs and SUs. Therefore, authentication can be considered as one of
the basic requirements for CRNs. The authentication problem occurs in
CRNs in the situation when a receiver detects signals at a particular
spectrum, but is not sure if the signal has infact been sent by the
primary owner of the spectrum or not. This situation outlines the
authentication problem in CRNs. Tan et al. [52] mentioned that it
is impossible to conduct authentication in CRNs other than on the
physical layer. For example, a cognitive radio receiver may be able to
receive signals from TV stations, process them at the physical layer,
but it may lack the component to understand the data in the signals.
Therefore, if the authentication depends on the correct understanding
of the data (done at upper layers), the cognitive radio receiver will be
unable to authenticate the PU. Tan et al. [52] proposed a method that
allows PUs to add a cryptographic link signature to its signal, so the
spectrum usage by PUs can be authenticated. Zhu et al. [53] proposed
an authentication mechanism for CRNs which is based on third-party
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Certification Authority (CA). However, in CRNs with a number of SUs
dispersed over a large geographical area, providing the functionalities of
a CA can be quite challenging [54].
• Identification. Identification is one of the basic security requirements
for any communication device. It is a method whereby an user
is associated with his name or identity [39]. For example, in
cellular networks, the mobile devices are provided with an equipment
identification device called an international mobile equipment identifier
(IMEI). A tamper-proof identification mechanism is built into the SU
(unlicensed) devices in CRNs. Miller et al. [20] described identification
in CRNs, saying that it would be advantageous for a CR to know how
many networks exist, how many users are associated with each network,
and even certain properties about the devices themselves. To achieve
this level of information, it is essential for a cognitive radio to gather an
accurate picture of the RF (Radio Frequency) environment. CRs identify
different network services (e.g. Bluetooth, WiFi), and devices. Service
discovery and device identification provide the necessary building blocks
for constructing efficient and trustworthy CRNs [20].
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation techniques prevent either the
sender or receiver from denying a transmitted message. In a cognitive
radio ad-hoc network setting, if malicious SUs violating the protocol
are identified, non-repudiation techniques can be used to prove the
misbehavior and disassociate/ban the malicious users from the secondary
network [39]. The proof that an activity has already happened should
be available in CRNs.
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• Availability: Availability refers to the ability of PUs and SUs to access
the spectrum in CRNs. For PUs, availability refers to the ability to
transmit in the licensed band without harmful interference from the SUs.
From the definition of dynamic spectrum access policies [2], spectrum
availability for PUs is guaranteed. For SUs, availability refers to the
existence of chunks of spectrum, where the SU can transmit without
causing harmful interference to the PU. In CRNs, one of the important
functions of this service is to prevent energy starvation and denial of
service attacks, as well as misbehaviour, such as selfishness [45].
The various types of attacks described in subsection 1.3.2 are classified
depending on whether their goal is to compromise the confidentiality of stored
data, alter the integrity of such data or disrupt the availability of the victim
communications. Table 1.3 shows different attacks according to their impact
on the basic CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability ) security model.
In the next section, the importance of trust management in the defense
against various security threats to enhance secure communication in CRNs is
described.
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Name of Attacks Confidentiality Availability Integrity
PUEA X X
OFA X X X
False Feedback Attack X
Lion Attack X
On-Off Attack X
DoS Attack X X
Resource Hungry Attack X X
Fabrication Attack X
Primary Receiver Jamming Attack X
CCDA X
Biased Utility Attack X
SSDF X
International Jamming Attack X
Key Depletion Attack X
NEPA X
CEPA X
LORA X
Jelly Fish Attack X
Table 1.3: Scope of attacks
1.4 Importance of Trust Management for
Ensuring CRN Security
Security threats to CRNs can be categorized into two, namely hard security
issues and soft security issues. Hard security issues are traditional threats
from outside users which aim to disrupt the normal functioning of the network.
Soft security issues are traditional threats from inside users with the same aim
i.e. to disrupt the normal functioning of the network, namely authentication,
integrity and availability. However, the issues related to both these security
categories are different and hence need to be addressed in order to improve
the authentication, integrity and availability of the CRN and ensure a secure
communication platform in CRN. But it is not easy to implement security
defences in CRNs. One of the major obstacles in deploying security on
CRNs is that the current CRNs have limited computation and communication
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capabilities and resource constraints such as power and memory [55] and it
is impossible to manually replace the battery due to the unattended nature
and hazardous sensing of environments. The constraints make the provision
of adequate security countermeasures even more difficult.
In such situations, ‘trust’ is an important concept to defend against soft
security threats in CRNs, especially when authentication has to be achieved
to ensure secure communication on the basis of believing that an SU using
the PU’s spectrum will not cause interference to the PU. In the literature, the
notion of trust is defined in two ways: the first one is related to the notion of
‘trusted computing’ which is formed by an alliance of Microsoft, Intel, IBM and
HP in providing a platform which can not be tampered with, and where the
applications can communicate securely with each other [56]. In the context of
trusted computing, trust refers to the interacting entity accepting the provided
security mechanisms adopted by the other entity in the interaction by which
it feels safe and not vulnerable to the outside forces which might hamper its
interaction. The other notion of trust is related to the level of confidence
that an entity has in the other entity’s ability to achieve its desired outcomes
through the communication. The role of trust in this context is defined in
CRNs as the belief that the security of a network will not be compromised
as a result of a user’s action after that user is permitted to share the PU’s
free spectrum. Ensuring authentication by establishing and understanding
trust relationships among different CR nodes is the foundation to implement
security in CRNs. Having such a trust-based authentication mechanism allows
only non-malicious SUs to gain access to the licensed spectrum and network
resources, thereby playing a complementary role in improving the overall
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security and creating a balance in the whole CRN. In other words, having
a trusted relationship among nodes assists security for improving the overall
performance of the CRN. Figure 1.10 shows how trust is used to protect soft
security issues in CRNs.
Figure 1.10: Defense of soft security issues using trust
However, the unique characteristics of CRNs render the trust management
schemes of wired and general wireless networks ineffective to be applied in such
instances. With this in mind, some researchers have begun to safeguard CRNs
with simplified and lightweight trust management mechanisms. Compared
with general trust management schemes, lightweight trust management
schemes provide security support with reduced overhead and thus are more
suitable for CRNs. Although considerable developments have been made in
trust management in general wireless networks, and researchers have begun
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to study the trust mechanism in CRN, most of them use it to solve only one
problem in certain processes instead of designing it to address from the overall
demand for CRN, hence research for the trust mechanism in CRN is still in
its infancy, and there is no complete trust management system for building,
assessment, and updating as yet. The position of trust management in a
general secured system is shown in Figure 1.11.
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Figure 1.11: Position of trust management in a secured system architecture
However CRNs are application-specific networks. Except for some common
features, a CRN for a specific application has some unique features and
correspondingly, has some unique security requirements. The solution
proposed for one particular application is unlikely to be readily applicable
to another environment. Suppose a cognitive radio-based sensor network
is deployed in the military surveillance environment and another in an
agricultural base; the requirements of security would be different, based on the
resource that the nodes possess and the risks they face. It is impossible to reach
a one-fits-all trust management solution. Trust management, including trust
establishment, trust update, and trust revocation, is much more challenging
in mobile networks than in traditional centralized environments [57]. For
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example, collecting trust information or evidence to evaluate trustworthiness
is difficult due to mobility induced changes in network topology. To date,
there has been no comprehensive analysis or discussion of security threats
caused specifically by cognitive radio techniques and the special characteristics
of cognitive radio in CRNs and there are still several gaps in CRNs research
which have not yet been addressed, resulting in there being no effective defense
mechanism against attacks in CRNs, as well as no guideline for the selection
of defense mechanisms. Theses issues motive me to propose a comprehensive
defense mechanism by incorporating trust to enhance secure communication
in CRNs.
SUs in CRNs cooperate with each other to make decisions in the spectrum
sensing and the channel allocation process, so SUs should be trustworthy
to PUs. In other words, the PUs need be provided with a trust guarantee
by the SUs. However, some untrustworthy, selfish and malicious users may
send false data or falsify the sensing data to damage the profits of the other
legitimate second users. These problems can be overcome by using trust and
reputation management-based security schemes to make the CRN much more
robust and secure by ensuring secure data transfer, authentication, secure data
aggregation, secure resource sharing etc., as shown in Figure 1.12.
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Figure 1.12: Architecture of trust management in secured CRN
Therefore, security in CRNs is a particularly challenging task and attracts
great interest from researchers world-wide. One of the ways by which some of
the security issues can be solved is by using the notion of trust. In the next
subsection, the gaps in the research into improving the security of CRNs from
the view point of trust are discussed.
29
1.5 Research Gaps in CRN Security
In this section, the current popular research interest in CRN security is
reviewed. It is important to note that this section only lists the current hot
research topics in the field of CRN security and highlights the importance
of trust management in the whole security framework, rather than giving
a comprehensive coverage of existing security techniques currently being
researched.
1.5.1 Trust management
Trust management can solve some problems in CRNs that traditional
cryptographic security mechanisms cannot deal with. For example, trust
mechanisms are effective in judging the quality and reliability of cognitive
nodes and wireless links, spectrum sensing, data aggregation, reliability and
correctness of sensing information and spectrum sharing. However, it is not
easy to build a good trust model within a CRN given the resource constraints
[58]. Many existing security mechanisms assume that a trust relationship
between CR nodes exists in advance.
Trust establishment techniques in cognitive networks are not new. Blaze
et al. [59] introduced the term “trust management” in mobile networks and
defined it as one of the components of security services in networks. Chen et al.
[45] defined trust by showing a mathematical framework in the CRN working
process. Although there is no concrete experiment that is carried out in [45],
it expresses a first attempt to theoretically introduce the idea of applying
trust and reputation modeling to CRNs. Qin et al. [46] also proposed a
30
novel trust-based spectrum sensing scheme which can identify misbehaving SUs
and make the overall sensing decision by filtering out their reported spectrum
sensing results.
Trust management usually involves computation overhead, so building an
efficient scheme for resource-constrained CRN is a very challenging task. A
typical public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme which achieves secure routing
and other purposes in typical ad-hoc networks is not enough to guarantee
the security of CRNs, given their limited communication and computation
resources as mentioned above. This gives rise to the need for a trusted
mechanism in CRNs, and authentication is a part of trust, along with other
technical or non-technical factors.
1.5.2 Authentication
Authentication guarantees that the entities with whom a CR node
communicates are the expected ones and the received data is the original
sent by the counterparts. Generally speaking, a trust management scheme
is required to authenticate messages in CRNs. However, due to the
resource constraints at the cognitive nodes, solutions based on trust have
intolerable storage and computation overheads on CRNs. Current research on
authentication in CRNs focuses on identity and location-based authentication.
Identity-based authentication is one of the key factors for ensuring secure
communications in CRNs. Zhu et al. [53] proposed a new authentication
mechanism for CRNs which is based on third-party Certification Authority
(CA). Zhao et al. [60] proposed an authentication scheme in the physical
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layer by identifying the transmitter in CRNs to differentiate between the PU
signal transmitter and the PUE attacker. Kuroda et al. [61] proposed a
radio-independent authentication protocol for CRNs that is able to support
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) transport. Observing the necessity
of a secure PU detection method, Liu et al. [62] proposed a novel approach
for authenticating the PU’s signal in CRNs in the presence of attackers by
integrating traditional cryptographic signatures and link signatures. Wassim
et al. [63] reported that cryptographic authentication mechanisms, such as
digital signatures, cannot be implemented in the PU’s identification because
of the FCC regulation that prohibits altering PU systems. Hence there is a
need to establish trust-based authentication in CRNs.
1.5.3 Secure routing
Routing protocols, to some extent, have received maximum attention from
researchers both in wired networks and wireless networks. Therefore, most
current research primarily focuses on providing the most energy efficient
routing scheme. In CRNs, routing is considered inherently fragile and can
easily be compromised by unknown attacks, malicious behaviors and even
unintentional misconfigurations. Zhu et al. [64] reported that many attacks
occur in CRNs, such as primary user emulation attacks [65], jamming attacks
[66], false reporting of sensing data in collaborative spectrum sensing [67],
denial-of-service attacks [68], and possibly some other attacks in the network
layer. So, it is essential to design secure routing schemes that can enhance
the security of routing in CRNs [36]. Clancy et al. [36] reported that trust
information about the broader network is used to develop policy about routing
and forwarding of traffic in a secure way in CRNs. Zhu et al. [64] mentioned
32
the routing technique as a mechanism that considers multi-hop packet error
probability and delay from the source to the destination as performance metrics
to be optimized in an adversarial and evolving environment populated by
jammers who can cooperate and deteriorate the performance. Hossain et
al. [69] reported that PUs can affect the spectrum opportunities available
for SUs, leading to dynamically changing network topology in multi-hop CR
networks. Therefore, a secure routing scheme should be implemented in CRNs
that allows SUs to obtain knowledge about their environment in a distributed
and dynamic fashion and use optimal routing decisions that can defend against
malicious attacks with a minimum level of compromise in performance [64].
As different types of attacks can degrade network performance and reliability
in an exponential way by attacking the routing techniques in distributed
wireless networks such as CRNs, there is an urgent need to enhance security
in routing in CRNs. Although some cryptographic techniques are employed at
the physical layer in CRNs, the routing is still vulnerable to attacks. This leads
to critical deterioration in the performance and reliability of CRNs. Zhu et al.
[64] proposed a dynamic routing algorithm that can guarantee a performance
level given by the value of the game in CRNs. Chen et al. [45] proposed
trust through a mathematical framework for secure routing in CRNs. So, it is
crucial to consider security issues at the beginning of a routing protocol design
in CRNs.
1.5.4 Spectrum management
CRNs are proposed in order to provide high bandwidth to mobile users via
heterogeneous wireless architectures and dynamic spectrum access techniques
[29]. This goal can be achieved only through dynamic and efficient
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spectrum management techniques and functions that address four main
challenges: spectrum sensing, spectrum decision, spectrum sharing, and
spectrum mobility.
Spectrum sensing enables CR users to adapt to the environment by
detecting spectrum holes without causing interference to the primary network.
Lee at al. [70] proposed an optimal sensing framework to avoid interference and
the sensing limitation problem in CRNs as well as to maximize spectrum access
opportunities. One of the major technical challenges in spectrum sensing is
the problem of precisely distinguishing incumbent signals from SU signals. To
distinguish the two signals, existing spectrum sensing schemes based on energy
detectors [71, 72] implicitly assume a “naive” trust model. When energy
detection is used, an SU can recognize the signal of other SUs but cannot
recognize the PU’s signal. When an SU detects a signal that it recognizes,
it assumes that the signal is that of an SU; otherwise, it concludes that the
signal is that of a PU. Under such an overly simplistic trust model, a selfish or
malicious SU (i.e. an attacker) can easily exploit the spectrum sensing process
[73].
Based on the spectrum availability, CR users allocate a channel depending
not only on spectrum availability but also on internal policies. Spectrum
decision depends on two factors: first, each spectrum band is characterized by
local observations of CR users and statistical information of primary networks.
Then, based on this characterization, the most appropriate spectrum band
can be chosen. But a CR user may select the wrong band or a sub-optimal
band, and communication may be impaired [43]. Akyildiz et al. [74] proposed
a spectrum capacity estimation method that takes into consideration the
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bandwidth and the permission power to mitigate this threat. Zheng et al.
[23] proposed a management system and specified five rules that regulate CR
users to act based on local observations and access the spectrum with limited
communication cost and low complexity. But none of the rules considers user’s
behavior under faulty conditions.
A policy management mechanism needs to be implemented in CRNs to
avoid harmful interference and misuse of the spectral bands caused by either
intentionally or unintentionally. But the unique characteristics of CRs causes
CRNs to face different challenges for spectrum sharing in CR networks. Baldini
et al. [75] describe policy management architecture to validate the spectrum
sharing approaches in the face of possible security threats and their reflection
on network behavior and performance. Wang et al. [76] proposed a basic
spectrum sharing scheme considering a model with one PU and multiple SUs
and analyzed important statistics including mean number of radio bands used
by the second users, deprivation rate and blocking rate of the second users,
and the utilization ratio of the spectrum. Based on the scheme [76], Patil et al.
[77] also proposed a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)-based spectrum
sharing scheme for CRNs and analyzed the same statistics in [76]. But both
schemes [76, 77] did not consider any threats or misbehaving during spectrum
sharing.
The function of spectrum mobility is to ensure a seamless connection
when a CR vacates a channel and moves to a better channel. After a CR
captures the best available spectrum, PU activity on the selected spectrum
may require the user to change their operating spectrum band(s), which is
referred to as spectrum mobility [74]. Spectrum mobility introduces a new type
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of handoff in CR networks which is termed ‘spectrum handoff’. The intrinsic
characteristics of a CR network give rise to research efforts to address the
problems of spectrum handoff during spectrum mobility. The mobility-based
handoff mechanisms that have been already investigated in cellular networks
may serve as the groundwork in this area but there are still open research
topics that need to be investigated.
In this thesis, some of these identified gaps in the research to enhance
CRN security by incorporating trust-based mechanisms will be addressed. In
the next section, the main research objectives of this thesis are discussed.
1.6 Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on developing trust-based schemes to improve the security
in CRNs. The aim of this thesis is to design, specify, and analyze trust
management frameworks in CRNs to ensure secure communication and
enhance the system availability.
The main research objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. To present the security requirements and challenges of CRNs. Based
on the acquired information and with a clear understanding of the
challenges involved in implementing security mechanisms, a security
model is defined according to the security requirements and will work as a
performance metrics to evaluate the proposed trust-based schemes. The
development of security metrics, measurements, and evaluation based on
the trust of approaches is of great importance in order to establish a
scientific methodology for the field of entire cognitive network security
36
research.
2. To propose a methodology to establish trust between different CR nodes
in the network for authentication purposes so that it can effectively
prevent malicious and selfish users’s interaction in the network.
3. To propose a conjoint trust assessment approach (combining trust
assessment from the Primary User Network and Secondary User
Network) in CRNs to solve the security threats brought about by
untrustworthy entities, such as selfish, malicious, and faultless nodes,
and to ensure secure spectrum sharing in CRNs.
4. To propose multiple back-up Certificate Authority (BCA)-based system
architecture and enhance system availability and reliability by reducing
the downtime cost due to an attack on the CRN’s key nodes.
5. To propose a methodology where nodes can join and leave the
network securely without introducing any selfish behaviors in the
network and show how the trust value can be updated according to their
manners.
6. To validate the aforementioned proposed approaches to improve secure
communication in CRNs.
1.7 Scope of the Thesis
This thesis presents a methodology that will enable a trusting relationship to
gain access to the network resources in CRNs after trust has been determined
and established. The scope of this thesis can be specified as follows:
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1. Trust is not a separate component of security architecture for CRNs.
Trust management provides a security infrastructure for other security
services. At the same time, it relies on other security services.
Trust management and other security services together make up the
security architecture of CRNs (shown in Figure 1.11). A comprehensive
consideration is compulsory when designing a trust management scheme
for a CRN. However, to limit the scope of this thesis, only secure
communication in CRNs is focused from the view point of trust. The
existence of other security aspects, such as Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) and secure routing are not considered.
2. This thesis is concerned with the development of trust-based mechanisms
for secure communication in CRNs. It should be noted that the
methodology proposed in this thesis relates purely to the domain of
trust. It encompasses trust calculation in different ways which focuses on
issues involving trust establishment, maintenance, and update. Related
topics, including algorithm selection for the highest trusted node for
CA and BCA selection, are also included in this thesis to ensure secure
communication in CRNs. The proposed trust establishment algorithm
can be applied to different applications where the threshold value may
change according to the system criteria. As the threshold value depends
on the specific application domain, the method of determining it is out
of scope of this thesis.
3. The proposed trust-based mechanisms in this thesis for secure
communication in CRNs focuses on small scale networks which do not
require any additional resources as the trust calculation process is carried
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out by using the computational capacity which is present in each node.
Other processing relevant factors such as cost, memory, time etc are not
considered within the scope of this thesis.
4. The proposed methodologies in thesis are verified by considering different
case studies. Validation of the proposed algorithms on a synthetic real
world CRN is beyond the scope of the thesis.
5. This thesis focuses on trust-based spectrum sharing in CRNs. The trust
in spectrum sensing, spectrum mobility is not provided in this thesis. It
is assumed that the SUs will use existing spectrum sensing approaches
presented in the literature.
1.8 Significance of the Research
1.8.1 Social and economic significance
The significance of the proposed research, from a social and economic point of
view, includes:
1. Saving resources: Current spectrum management schemes consume
valuable resources such as memory, network bandwidth, and power. The
proposed approaches are efficient and can reduce the consumption of
resources and thus can be used in large-scale CRNs.
2. Low-cost network maintenance: The introduced authentication schemes
make the establishment of trust over an unreliable network possible.
Hence, it can address the network maintenance problem without
increasing hardware costs.
39
3. Provision of lightweight trust management: The application of CRNs
calls for corresponding security mechanisms. The lack of a matching
lightweight security mechanism hinders the wide application of CRNs.
However, the challenges of CRNs render most security mechanisms
infeasible. The trust-based schemes in this research pave the way for
access control and establishment of secure communication channels in
CRNs.
1.8.2 Scientific significance
The significance of the proposed research, from a scientific point of view,
includes:
1. proposing trust-based authentication schemes in CRNs which fix the
security problems brought by untrustworthy users in CRNs and can be
seamlessly used to enhance secure communication in CRNs.
2. proposing multiple back-up of the Certificate Authority (BCA) scheme
which increases system availability and reliability and decreases the
downtime cost of the system. This thesis also proposes a trust-based
election procedure to select the CA and back-up CA in the system to act
as the key nodes in CRNs.
3. proposing a trust-based spectrum sharing scheme for secure
communication in CRNs. This is the first time a trust-based spectrum
sharing scheme has been developed and the first its experimental details
have been explored. It also proposes mechanisms to determine the right
balance of multiple nodes for spectrum sharing in CRNs to ensure a
smooth communication.
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1.9 The Structure of the Thesis
As mentioned earlier, in this thesis, a trust-based methodology is proposed
and developed for secure communication in CRNs whereby trust can be
established, distributed and updated with lightweight overhead. Incase,
an attack occurs during transmission, the multiple back-up mechanism can
proceed in a fault-tolerant manner. In order to achieve the aforementioned
objectives, this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, an in-depth survey of the state-of-the-art techniques for
trust-based security in CRNs is presented. The proposed techniques in
the literature is reviewed in terms of each aspect and summarized the
weaknesses and existing problems in each aspect. The literature review
in this chapter provides the foundation for the problem definition in the
following chapter.
• In Chapter 3, the problem definition is formally presented. The problem
definition is divided into different research issues. The terms and
terminologies are also defined in this chapter that will be used while
solving each issue.
• In Chapter 4, an overview of the solution to each of the issues identified in
Chapter 3 is presented. Chapter 4 also provides pointers to the chapters
containing the overview of the solutions for the identified research issues.
• In Chapter 5, a trust-based framework is proposed for establishing trust
between CR nodes that authenticates SU’s request of CRN to access the
network resources on the level of belief that the security of a network
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will not be compromised as a result of that user’s action after it joins
the network.
• In Chapter 6, trust-based secure spectrum sharing mechanisms are
proposed to solve the security threats brought about by untrustworthy
entities, such as selfish, malicious, and faulty nodes, and to ensure secure
communication through trustworthy spectrum sharing in CRNs.
• In Chapter 7, system availability enhancement mechanisms are proposed
in CRNs by selecting the key nodes based on the level of trust and
proposing trust-based secure node joining and leaving process in the
network.
• In Chapter 8, the thesis concludes with a summary of the work developed
in this thesis and the potential further work is identified.
The structure of the chapters and the relationship between the chapters is
shown in Figure 1.13.
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1.10 Conclusion
The proliferation of CRNs has driven research into CRN security, with
trust being the cornerstone of the research area. In this chapter,
a comprehensive overview of CRN security, including the application,
architecture, vulnerabilities, security requirements, and current hot research
topics in the field of CRN security is provided. The overview helps in
understanding of the characteristics of CRNs and the importance of trust in
CRN security research. Then, the motivation is introduced that drives me
to carry out this research, followed by a description of the significance of my
work. The scope and objectives of this study were identified and discussed and
the structure of the thesis was presented.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, security was highlighted as a crucial issue in cognitive radio
networks (CRNs) due to its inherent network characteristics. One of the
ways by which it can be addressed is by using the notion of trust. In this
chapter, an overview of the existing literature on trust-based security issues in
CRNs is presented. Substantial progress has been made on providing a sound,
practical basis for a number of problems that are associated with trust for CRN
security. A number of trust management techniques has been documented in
the literature. In the following sections, the work that has been previously
undertaken to solve some of the issues related to security and trust in CRNs
are discussed. The research areas investigated in this thesis can be grouped
into the following categories:
1. Challenges and threats in CRNs
2. Countermeasures for various attacks on CRNs
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3. Secure spectrum management scheme for CRNs
4. Trust-based schemes for CRN security
5. Authentication-based schemes for CRN security
This research focuses on trust-based schemes for ensuring security in CRNs.
Different types of trust-based schemes are proposed in order to meet security
requirements in CRNs and these will be discussed in this chapter with the
aim to highlight their drawbacks. A discussion on the challenges and threats
related to various functionalities in CRNs is given in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
describes the different countermeasures in CRNs. Existing approaches in the
literature to secure each phase in spectrum management is given in Section
2.4. In Section 2.5, the key aspect for improving the security using the notion
of trust in different phases in spectrum management in CRNs is discussed.
Section 2.6 describes the authentication-based schemes in the literature to
improve security in CRNs. In Section 2.7, an integrative view of all these
approaches from the literature is discussed with a view to ascertaining the
trust to be utilized for ensuring secure communication in CRNs. Finally, 2.8
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Challenges and Threats in the Various
Functionalities of CRNs
In this section, the different types of challenges and threats that are common
to CRNs are described.
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2.2.1 Spectrum Sensing
A CR is considered to be aware of and sensitive to changes in its surroundings,
which makes spectrum sensing an important requirement for the realization
of CRNs. Spectrum sensing enables CR users to adapt to the environment by
detecting spectrum holes without causing interference to the primary network.
This task can be accomplished by a real-time wide band sensing capability
to detect weak primary signals within a broad spectrum range. Generally,
spectrum sensing techniques can be classified into three groups: primary
transmitter detection, primary receiver detection and interference temperature
management [29].
2.2.1.1 Spectrum sensing challenges
Several open research challenges currently exist which must be investigated for
the development of spectrum sensing techniques [29]:
• Interference temperature measurement: Due to the lack of interaction
between primary networks and CR networks, generally a CR user is
not aware of the precise locations of the primary receivers. Thus,
new techniques are required to measure or estimate the interference
temperature at nearby primary receivers.
• Spectrum sensing in multi-user networks: The multi-user environment,
consisting of multiple CR users and primary users (PUs), makes
it more difficult to sense spectrum holes and estimate interference.
Hence, spectrum sensing functions should be developed which take
into consideration the multi-user environment. In multi-user CRNs,
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different users share their sensing results and collaboratively decide
on the presence of the licensed band. To address these challenges,
different sensing schemes in multi-user networks have been proposed.
Ghasemi et al. [78] discussed the effectiveness of collaborative sensing in
multi-user CRNs. In multi-user CRNs, CR users can achieve the desired
performance through collaborative sensing, even if individual users do
not meet the minimum SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio) requirement. Shahid
et al. [15] proposed a new cooperative spectrum sensing scheme in
multi-user CRNs where each users contribution is weighted by a factor
that depends on received power and path loss.
• Spectrum-efficient sensing: In CRNs, CR users cannot perform sensing
and transmission at the same time, which inevitably decreases their
transmission opportunities. This problem is termed the so-called sensing
efficiency problem. Hence, CR users should stop transmitting while
sensing. For this reason, balancing spectrum efficiency and sensing
accuracy is an important issue. Moreover, because sensing time directly
affects transmission performance, novel spectrum sensing algorithms
must be developed so that the sensing time is minimized within a given
sensing accuracy. To solve this sensing efficiency problem, Lee at al. [70]
proposed an optimal sensing framework to avoid interference and the
sensing limitation problem in CRNs as well as to maximize spectrum
access opportunities. To solve the interference problem in spectrum
sensing, Shahid et al. [79] proposed a new method of agile spectrum
evacuation through the formation of a set of users that are able to detect
the return of PUs while SUs continue to use the spectrum band in a
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cooperative manner.
• Hardware Attachment : Spectrum sensing in CRNs requires a high
sampling rate, high resolution analog to digital converters (ADCs) with
large dynamic range, and high speed signal processors [9]. Cognitive
radio terminals are required to process transmission over a larger, wider
band for searching and utilizing any opportunity. So, a cognitive radio
node needs to capture and analyze a large band to determine the
spectrum opportunity. This large operating bandwidth adds additional
requirements, such as antennas and power amplifiers, etc. and increases
the cost.
• Hidden Primary User Problem: This problem is a well known problem
in CRNs. Cognitive radio devices cause unwanted interference to the PU
as the primary transmitter’s signal can not be detected because of the
location of devices.
• Detecting Spread Spectrum Primary Users: PUs that use spread
spectrum signaling are difficult to detect as the power of the PU is
distributed over a wide frequency range.
• Security: In CRNs, a selfish or malicious user can alter its air interference
to the PU. So, it can give false information to the networks regarding the
PU’s spectrum sensing performance. This problem is termed a Primary
User Emulation (PUE) attack. It is very difficult and challenging to
develop countermeasures when an attack is already identified. A PU
identification method is proposed, based on the public key encryption in
[25] to prevent SUs masquerading as PUs.
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2.2.1.2 Spectrum sensing threats
One of the major technical challenges in spectrum sensing is the problem
of precisely distinguishing the incumbent signals from the SU signals. To
distinguish the two signals, existing spectrum sensing schemes based on energy
detectors [71, 72] implicitly assume a “naive” trust model. When energy
detection is used, an SU can recognize the signal of other SUs but cannot
recognize the PU’s signal. When an SU detects a signal that it recognizes,
it assumes that the signal is that of an SU; otherwise, it concludes that the
signal is that of a PU. Under such an overly simplistic trust model, a selfish
or malicious SU (i.e., an attacker) can easily exploit the spectrum sensing
process [73]. The malicious SU can send false information and mislead the
spectrum sensing results to cause collision or inefficient spectrum usage. For
example, some SUs always report the existence of the PU so that they can
occupy the spectrum themselves [80]. The problem of dishonest users in
distributed spectrum sensing is discussed in [81]. From the literature review
[34, 36, 37, 39, 43], it can be seen that some attackers can seriously affect the
spectrum sensing scheme in CRNs, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
2.2.2 Spectrum decision
CRNs need to be able to decide which of the available bands is the best
spectrum band according to the QoS requirements of the applications. This
notion is called spectrum decision and constitutes an important topic in
CRNs. A spectrum decision is closely related to the channel characteristics
and operations of PUs. Furthermore, a spectrum decision is affected by the
activities of other CR users in the network. A spectrum decision usually
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Figure 2.1: Security threats in CRNs sensing
consists of two steps: first, each spectrum band is characterized, based on
not only local observations of CR users but also statistical information of
primary networks. Then, based on this characterization, the most appropriate
spectrum band can be chosen. The challenges and threats in spectrum decision
phase are discussed in the next section.
2.2.2.1 Spectrum decision challenges
In the development of the spectrum decision function, there are several
challenges still need to be addressed:
• Decision Model: Spectrum capacity estimation using signal-to-noise
(SNR) is not sufficient to characterize the spectrum band in CRNs. Also,
applications require different QoS requirements. Thus, the design of
application and spectrum-adaptive spectrum decision models is still an
open issue.
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• Cooperation with reconfiguration: CR techniques enable transmission
parameters to be reconfigured for optimal operation in a certain spectrum
band. For example, even if the SNR is changed, bit rate and bit error
rate (BER) can be maintained by exploiting adaptive modulation instead
of spectrum decision technique.
• Spectrum decision over heterogeneous spectrum bands: Currently, certain
spectrum bands are assigned to different purposes, whereas some bands
remain unlicensed. Thus, a CR network should support spectrum
decision operations on both licensed and unlicensed bands.
2.2.2.2 Spectrum decision threats
CRNs need to be able to decide which is the best spectrum band to use from
the available bands, according to the QoS requirements of the applications.
The threats come from the possibility of false or fake spectrum characteristic
parameters. The false or fake parameters affect the outcome of spectrum
decisions. So, a CR may select the wrong band or a sub-optimal band, and
communication may be impaired [43]. Akyildiz et al. [74] proposed a spectrum
capacity estimation method that takes into consideration the bandwidth and
the permission power to mitigate this threat.
2.2.3 Spectrum sharing
Spectrum sharing is one of the main challenges of CRNs. Its techniques
actually follow two types of architecture: spectrum sharing inside a CR
network (intra-network spectrum sharing) and among multiple coexisting CR
networks (inter-network spectrum sharing) [31]. There are two main reasons
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for the challenges of spectrum sharing in CRNs: (1) co-existence with licensed
users; and (2) a wide range of available spectrum.
2.2.3.1 Spectrum sharing challenges
There are many open challenges for spectrum sharing in CRNs such as:
• Common Control Channel: A common control channel (CCC)
is associated with many spectrum sharing functionalities. But
implementation of a fixed CCC is infeasible because a channel must be
vacated whenever a PU chooses it.
• Dynamic radio range: The cognitive radio nodes, as well as their
neighbours, often change the operating frequency because of the
interdependence between radio range and operating frequency. So far,
no prior work has addressed this important issue of spectrum sharing in
CRNs.
• Location Information: In most of the existing work, it is assumed that
SUs are always informed about the PU’s location and transmission
power. Such an assumption is always valid [29]. The authors in [82]
proposed a protocol which uses location information as a key factor to
authenticate each other to provide privacy and confidentiality in CRNs.
2.2.3.2 Spectrum sharing threats
Different users can share the same spectrum bands in CRN technology. A
policy management mechanism is implemented to avoid harmful interference
and misuse of spectral bands caused by malicious users. Malicious users can
deny spectral bands to other CR networks and devices for selfish reasons and
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disrupt the communication of other wireless networks. So, the security in
spectrum sharing in CRNs is treated as one of the crucial problems in cognitive
environments. Baldini et al. [75] described policy management architecture
to validate the spectrum sharing approaches in the face of possible security
threats and their reflection on the network behavior and performance.
2.2.4 Spectrum mobility
After a CR captures the suitable available spectrum, PU activity on the
selected spectrum may require the user to change its operating spectrum
band, which is referred to as ‘spectrum mobility’. Spectrum mobility is
associated with ‘spectrum hand-off’, where the users transfer their connections
to an unused spectrum band in CRNs and ensure smooth communication
during spectrum hand-off. Whenever the CR user tries to modify the
operating frequency, the network protocol needs to be modified according to
the operating parameters as well. The challenges and threats in this area are
as follows:
2.2.4.1 Spectrum Mobility Challenges
The following are the open research issues for spectrum mobility in CRNs.
• Spectrum mobility in time domain: CR networks always adjust to the
wireless spectrum, based on the availability of the free bands. As these
free available channels alter over time, this makes QoS in this spectrum
sharing environment a challenging issue.
• Spectrum mobility in space: The availability of the bands also changes
as the CR user can move at any time from one place to another in the
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network. Hence, continuous spectrum allocation in CRNs is a major and
challenging issue.
2.2.4.2 Spectrum mobility threats
The function of spectrum mobility is to ensure a seamless connection when
a CR vacates a channel and moves to a better channel. According to [43],
in CRNs, one should vacate the current spectrum band whenever the PU is
active. In order to establish smooth communication as soon as possible, the
SU needs to select a new appropriate spectrum band, and move to the band
immediately. This process is called “spectrum hand-off”. During hand-off,
the security threats are serious. An attacker can induce a failed spectrum
hand-off by means of: compelling the CR to vacate the current band by
masking the PU, jamming to slow the process of selecting a new available band
or causing a communication failure, etc. To mitigate this kind of threat, an
SU can randomly hop over multiple channels. This opens a trade-off between
choosing good channels and evading an attacker’s jamming when different
channels have different qualities (e.g. the probability of being idle, propagation
characteristics, etc.). The interaction between the SU and the attacker has
been called a ‘dogfight’ in the spectrum due to the dynamics of pursuit and
evasion [66]. In [66], Li et al. analyzed one-stage and multi-stage cases by
numerical simulation results, showing that the performance of an SU was
improved when the number of channels was increased or the channel state
certainty was reduced.
In the next section, the different countermeasures for various attacks in
CRNs are discussed.
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2.3 Countermeasures for Various Attacks on
CRNs
In this section, the various possible countermeasures to potential attacks
on CRNs are discussed. The authors in [55] proposed various possible
countermeasures on different attacks in CRNs.
2.3.1 Jamming countermeasures
Most of the attacks targeting CRNs are associated with jamming specified
frequencies. Security protocols can mitigate many of the attacker’s goals
but cannot effectively deal with DoS or channel degradation due to jamming
[47]. Therefore, it is essential to identify the source of attack. An Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) has the ability to identify which nodes are suspicious
or malicious, and supply this information to other protocols of the node such
as routing and aggregation. So IDS is considered an important tool for
detecting attackers. In CRNs, feedback from the CR devices can enhance
the efficiency of IDS. The redundancy of the network is used as an advantage
because the feedback of many participants can lead to easier detection of the
jamming source [47]. The authors in [83] proposed a new model for intrusion
detection and response for mobile, ad-hoc wireless networks in a distributed
and cooperative manner. The same idea could be applied to CRNs where
cooperation is an integral part of their architecture. The best approach is
probably based on the detection of abnormal operation through traffic analysis
and cooperation [47].
IDS must be executed in every networking layer in a cross-layer manner
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with a view to performing this task. There are many IDS approaches
[16, 83–85], which are adequate for other wireless networks but not sufficient
for CRNs. Filho et al. [86] described two types of CRN intrusion detection
mechanisms, namely the localization mechanism (LM) and the reputation
mechanism (RM). LMs of malicious users in CRNs will make possible the
determination of the radio’s geographical positioning. RMs are necessary to
validate the confidence of the data supplied for the radios. The architecture
of an IDS entity for distributed systems is based on its basic elements: a local
packet monitoring module that receives the packets from the neighborhood,
a statistics module that stores the information derived from the packets and
information regarding the neighborhood, a local detection module that detects
the existence of the different attacks, an alert database that stores information
about possible attacks, a cooperative detection module that collaborates with
other detection entities located within the neighborhood, and a local response
module that makes decisions according to the output of the detection modules
[87]. Focusing on the detection modules used in these IDS for CRNs, they
must make use of first-hand information, second-hand information, statistical
data, and the data acquired by the CRs during its normal operation. These
modules can then use this data to distinguish between normal and abnormal
activities, thus discovering the existence of intrusions.
2.3.2 Primary user emulation attack countermeasures
The prevention of a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) in CRNs is
vital. A detection technique to verify the authenticity of primary signals is
an essential issue for protection against PUEA. The authors in [47] proposed
various techniques to counter this attack in CRNs. The simplest way is to
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embed a signature in an incumbent signal or to use an authentication protocol
between primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) [47]. However, these
approaches do not ensure the requirement established by the FCC [51] which
states that no modification to the incumbent system should be required to
accommodate the opportunistic use of the spectrum by secondary users. The
authors in [65] proposed a technique to use signal energy level detection in
accordance with the location of transmitters to deal with PUEA in CRNs. This
approach is based on the existence of a set of nodes known as Location Verifiers
(LV) in CRNs, these nodes being responsible for measuring the received signal
strength (RSS). But the authors in [47] criticized this approach as it does
not work in network environments where PUs are not fixed and transmit
with low transmission, such as wireless microphones. There are alternative
countermeasures against PUEA in CRNs such as radio frequency fingerprinting
(RFF), which has been broadly discussed in the literature as a method of
transmitter identification [88].
2.3.3 Objective function attacks countermeasures
Objective function attacks (OFAs) attempt online learning of the AI protocol
used by CR devices. OFAs always modify the behavior of the wireless media
by jamming at specific times and frequencies in respect to a policy-defined
parameter, such as the security level, and thus change the learning curve to
make it favorable to the attacker. As a result, low level security is achieved in
this case. The authors in [47] proposed a naive solution for updatable radio
parameters for the selection of threshold values. This scheme can prevent the
situation where only one or a set of parameters do not meet the predefined
threshold requirements.
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2.3.4 Lion attack countermeasures
As explained previously in the section on Lion Attack, TCP throughput
becomes lower because of frequency hand-offs as the transport layer is not
informed about the physical/link layer information and this situation causes a
network disconnection due to network congestion. The authors in [89] proposed
several cross-layer solutions in order to obtain better TCP performance in
the context of wireless networks, especially ad hoc networks. These TCP
performance improvement techniques can be used as directions to develop
new protocols which are appropriate for CRNs with a view to increasing
efficiency and making them strong enough against cross-layer attacks. In the
next section, the schemes in various activities during spectrum management
to ensure security are discussed.
2.4 Secure SpectrumManagement Schemes in
CRNs
2.4.1 Secure spectrum sensing scheme
One of the functionalities of CRNs is to detect spectrum holes by spectrum
sensing which continually monitors a given spectrum band and captures the
information. CR users may temporarily use the spectrum holes without
creating any harmful interference to the PUs. However, CRs must periodically
sense the spectrum to detect the presence of incumbents and quit the band
once detected. The detection techniques which are often used in local sensing
are energy detection, matched filter, and cylcostationary feature detection.
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However, few studies have considered a novel security threat of spectrum
sensing which is called spectrum sensing data falsification [38], whereby an
attacker or malicious user sends false local spectrum sensing results to a data
fusion center which causes the data fusion center to make an incorrect spectrum
sensing decision. This kind of security attack was first mentioned in [90] and
further considered in [38, 81]. In [81], the spectrum sensing data falsification
problem was solved by a Weighted Sequential Probability Ratio Test which
gives good performance. However, this method requires knowledge of the
physical location of sensing terminals and the position of the PU in order
to obtain some required prior probabilities. This is inappropriate to apply to
a mobile CR system, and to such systems in which the information about the
PU is completely unknown.
In other work [91], the authors proposed a robust secure distributed
spectrum sensing scheme that uses robust statistics to approximate the
distributions for both hypotheses of all nodes, discriminatingly, based on
their past data reports. The achieved parameters are used for the testing
of malicious users and calculating the necessary information for data fusion by
means of D-S theory. This scheme has the powerful capability to eliminate
malicious users due to the abnormality of distribution of malicious users
compared with that of legitimate users. Their algorithm, taking advantage
of an appropriate method of data fusion and the benefit of robust statistics
for outlier testing based on two estimated distributions separately, can
operate without needing knowledge of primary systems, even in very adverse
circumstances where there are numerous malicious users. After sensing, each
CU (CR User) sends its own received power data to a DFC (data fusion center)
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where the global sensing decision is made. For the purpose of improving
security and cooperative sensing gain, the proposed robust secure distributed
spectrum sensing scheme by Nhan et al. [91] is depicted in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Secure spectrum sensing scheme [91]
In the proposed scheme [91], the authors consider two kinds of malicious
nodes: the “always-yes” node and the “always-no” node. The “always-no”
node always reports the absence of a primary signal, whereas the “always-yes”
node always informs of the presence of the LU (Licensed User). “Always-yes”
users increase the probability of false alarm Pf while “always-no” users
decrease the probability of detection Pd. A malicious user will have abnormal
estimated parameters. Based on this feature, it can easily detect consistent
malicious users by the following test condition: |µˆ1i − µˆoi| < ε1 where N=
2TW where T and W are detection time and signal bandwidth, respectively,
and ε1 is the detection thresholds which is predefined based on N so that
the malicious users can be removed completely [91]. This test is used for
detecting “consistent malicious” nodes which generate false sensing data from
one hypothesis. An “always-yes” or “always-no” node will have very small
difference between two hypotheses means and deviations since its data set
{xEi|H0} and {xEi|H1} are derived from one hypothesis distribution or even
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from a constant value. If a node has a smaller distance between two mean
values of two hypotheses than a minimum tolerable value, it is considered a
consistent malicious user.
Several studies address the security issues of spectrum sensing in CRNs.
Primary user emulation attack is analyzed in [65, 92]. In this attack, malicious
users transmit false signals which have features similar to those of a primary
signal. In this way, the attacker can mislead legitimate SUs to believe that
a PU is present. The defense scheme in [65] is designed to identify malicious
users by estimating location information and observing received signal strength
(RSS). In [92], signal classification algorithms are used to distinguish between
primary and secondary signals. Primary user emulation attack is an outsider
attack, targeting both collaborative and non-collaborative spectrum sensing.
Another type of attack is insider attack that targets collaborative spectrum
sensing. In current collaborative sensing schemes, SUs are often assumed to
report their sensing information honestly. However, it is quite possible that
wireless devices are compromised by malicious parties. Compromised nodes
can send false sensing information to mislead the system.
A natural defense scheme [90] is used to change the decision rule. The
revised rule is: when there are k − 1 malicious nodes, the decision result
is based on there being at least k nodes being reported on. However, this
defense scheme has three disadvantages. First, the scheme does not specify
how to estimate the number of malicious users, which is difficult to measure
in practice. Second, the scheme will not work in soft-decision cases, where
SUs report sensed energy levels instead of binary hard decisions. Third, the
scheme has a very high false alarm rate when there are multiple attackers.
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The problem of dishonest users in distributed spectrum sensing is discussed in
[81]. The defense scheme in this work requires SUs to collect sensing reports
from their neighbors when a confirmatory decision cannot be made. Moreover,
the scheme is applied only to hard-decision reporting cases. Finally, current
security issues in CRNs, including attacks and corresponding defense schemes,
are summarized in [36].
2.4.2 Secure spectrum decision scheme
The main benefit of introducing security in the spectrum decision process is a
stronger guarantee that the service of PUs will not be significantly disrupted.
At no additional cost, the resilience of the spectrum decision against malicious
attackers protects the secondary network as well. For instance, the DoS types
of attacks presented in [68] will not be applicable if the spectrum decision is
secure. The authors proposed a protocol designed to provide secure spectrum
decisions in a clustered infrastructure-based network where spectrum decisions
are made periodically and independently in each cluster. The proposed
protocol guarantees that a malicious outsider and a limited number of corrupt
insiders (i.e., nodes that participate in the protocol) cannot have a significant
impact on the spectrum decision. The protocol is provably secure, and it is
more efficient than the straightforward solutions involving digital signatures
or key establishment protocols.
Many existing dynamic spectrum access protocols make spectrum decisions
based on the assumption that all parties involved in the spectrum decision
are honest and there is no malicious outsider that can manipulate the
spectrum decision process. The authors [93] assume that there is some sort
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of synchronization among the nodes in the cluster in the network. The time
is divided into equal length intervals (or cycles). The nodes know when each
cycle begins and ends, and they are also aware of the schedule of events during
a cycle (e.g., which node sends its channel availability data, which channels it
uses, etc.). There are three main events that are handled in a given cycle: one
or more nodes may join the spectrum decision process in a given cluster, the
nodes of the cluster send their spectrum sensing data, and the cluster head
sends to the other nodes the final channel assignment. They also describe how
each of these operations can be accomplished in a secure and efficient manner.
But they do not deal with the details of the data sent by the nodes during
the spectrum decision. They simply present techniques that enable secure
transmission.
2.4.3 Secure spectrum sharing scheme
As spectrum sharing is one of the most important functions in CRNs, which
allows CRNs to fairly share the available spectrum bands among the coexisting
cognitive radios, it is very important to ensure security for spectrum sharing
in CRNs. In the existing literature, it appears that, to date, no work has been
done to ensure security during spectrum sharing in CRNs, although, some
work has been done on spectrum sharing mechanisms in CRNs only.
Wang et al. [76] also proposed a spectrum sharing scheme for CRNs. In
their model [76], they assume a CRN consists of one PU and N SUs. PUs
are licensed users whereas SUs are unlicensed users. PU’s spectrum band
is divided into N sub-bands by maintaining the properties of Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing technology. The proposed spectrum sharing
scheme is based on the following statistics:
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• The arrival of the PU to access the spectrum is a Poisson process with
rate λp
• The time of the PU occupying the spectrum is a random variable that
follows a negative exponential distribution with mean time 1
µp
• The inter-arrival time of SUs accessing the spectrum is a random variable
that follows a negative-exponentially distributed with mean time 1
λs
• The time of each SU using a radio band is a random variable obeying
negative-exponential distribution with mean 1
µs
The proposed spectrum sharing scheme [76] evaluated and discussed different
network parameters such as mean number of radio bands used by the SUs,
deprivation rate of the SUs, blocking rate of the SUs, and utilization ratio of
spectrum.
Patil et al. [77] proposed a spectrum sharing scheme in CRNs based on
the Continuous Time Markov chain (CTMC) model. In their model [77], they
assume a CRN consists of two PUs and 2N SUs. PUs are licensed users whereas
SUs are unlicensed users. They considered two licensed frequency bands fx
and fy, licensed to PU1 and PU2, respectively. Each band is divided into
N sub-bands by maintaining the properties of Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing technology. So the 2N SUs can use the sub-bands in parallel when
the PUs are not using their own spectrum. All the SUs have to stop using the
radio bands and vacate them when the PU comes back to use the spectrum.
The proposed spectrum sharing scheme is based on the same assumption in
[76]. The proposed spectrum sharing scheme [77] also evaluated and discussed
different network parameters such as the mean number of radio bands used
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by SUs, the deprivation rate of the SUs, the blocking rate of the SUs, and
the utilization ratio of the spectrum. Although some work has been done
in spectrum sharing, none considers security issues during spectrum sharing.
This thesis is the first attempt to address security in spectrum sharing.
2.4.4 Secure spectrum mobility scheme
The protocols of different layers of CRNs must be able to adapt to the channel
parameters of the operating frequency. As well, they must be apparent
to the spectrum hand-off and related latency. An algorithm should be
implemented and the best available spectrum should be chosen, depending
on the channel characteristics of the available spectrum and the Quality of
Service requirements of the CR user. There is no work on secure spectrum
mobility in CRNs. Only a few studies have addressed spectrum mobility in
CRNs.
Chen et al. [94] developed a cross-layer protocol for both spectrum
mobility and handover in long-term evolution (LTE) cognitive networks. They
developed a cross-layer handoff protocol considering the Poisson distribution of
spectrum resources with the minimum expected transmission time in cognitive
LTE networks. They considered two cases during their protocol development:
• The first case is that the SU’s initial location is not in the overlapped
area. If a PU appears and attempts to use its own spectrum which
is temporarily occupied by the SU, the SU performs spectrum mobility
processing to select a new spectrum hole, move to the new spectrum hole
to continue its transmission, and vacate the occupied spectrum for the
PU.
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• The second case is when the SU’s initial location is in the overlapped
area, as it continually moves between two adjacent networks.
In the next section, the trust-based scheme for addressing security in CRNs
is discussed.
2.5 Trust-based Schemes to Ensure Security
in CRNs
A variety of techniques by which security can be achieved in CRNs has been
proposed in the literature. But sometimes these security protocols are difficult
to implement due to severe resource constraints in bandwidth, memory size,
battery life, computational power, and unique wireless characteristics such as
openness to eavesdropping, high security threats or vulnerability, unreliable
communication, and rapid changes in topologies or memberships due to user
mobility or node failure [57]. To address this, Blaze et al. [59] introduced
the term “trust management” in mobile networks and defined it as one of
the components of security services in networks. However, in the context of
CRNs, ’trust’ is an important concept to consider when authentication has to
be achieved to ensure secure communication on the basis of believing that an
SU, using the PU’s spectrum, will not cause interference to the PU. Trust in
this context is defined as the belief that the security of a network will not be
compromised as a result of a user’s action after that user has been permitted
to share the PU’s free spectrum. Having such a trust-based mechanism allows
only non-malicious SUs to access the licensed spectrum and network resources.
Trust management, including trust establishment, trust update, and trust
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revocation, is much more challenging in mobile networks than in traditional
centralized environments due to its various characteristics [57]. For example,
collecting trust information or evidence to evaluate trustworthiness is difficult
due to mobility-induced changes in network topology. The idea of applying
trust and reputation modeling in CRNs has attracted research interest.
Chen et al. [45] define trust by showing a mathematical framework in the
CRN working process in the following ways:
(a) A cognitive radio node senses a spectrum hole and to dynamically access
the spectrum for transmission requires “trust” from the originally existing
system, i.e. primary system (PS) and regulator, without creating interference
to the PS.
(b) A cognitive radio node may want to leverage another existing cognitive
radio node to route its packets, even though another CR is not the targeted
recipient terminal. It requires “trust” from another CR.
(c) A cognitive radionode can even leverage the PS to forward its packets to
realize the goal of packet switching networks. It needs “trust” from the PS, not
only at the network level but from the service provider (or network operator).
Detailed definitions of trust in CRNs are defined under the trusted routing
context. Although there is no concrete experiment that is carried out in [45],
it expresses as a first attempt to theoretically introduce the idea of applying
trust and reputation modeling to CRNs.
The proposed approach suffers from the following drawbacks:
• The authors do not show trust measurement for spectrum sensing or
decisions. They only show trust for trusted routing in CRNs.
• The authors do not provide any performance evaluation for how trust
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mechanisms could improve the security in CRNs.
• The authors define different types of attacks but they do not show how
trust evaluation can defend against these attacks to ensure security in
CRNs.
• The authors do not propose a methodology by which trust can be
determined at the node level for both networks in CRNs.
Pei et al. [95] proposed a trust management model through the whole
cognitive cycle for centralized CRNs to solve the security threats brought by
untrustworthy entities, such as selfish, malicious, and faultless nodes. The
cognitive base station (CBS) is actually responsible for taking the charge of the
establishment and management of the trust mechanism to ensure the safety and
reliability of the cognitive cycle. The base station is responsible for monitoring
the overall performance of the SUs in the network, and implementing the
appropriate incentive or punishment mechanisms to ensure the safety and
reliability of the cognitive cycle. The base station can distinguish between
legitimate users and malicious users based on the long-term behavior records
of the users. Their trust mechanism consists of four parts: trust initialization,
updating of reputation, trust assessment and a reward mechanism.
• Trust initialization: The base station establishes the trust list for SUs.
The reputation for SUs i is denoted as Ri. At first, the reputation of
each SU who passed the authentication is initialized as indefinite.
• Updating of reputation: Reputation is updated using the following
equation:
Ri(updated) = ρ1Ri(past) + ρ2ri (2.1)
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where Ri(updated) is the updating reputation of user i,
Ri(past) is the historical reputation of user i recorded by base station,
ri is the current trust evidence of user i observed by base station,
ρ1, ρ2 is the fading factor, ρ1 + ρ2 = 1. ρ1, ρ2 can be changed according
to the security requirements of the network.
• Trust assessment: When the SU gains access to the channel after
successful spectrum sensing along the cognitive cycle round, the cognitive
base station updates the reputation of that user once. After updating the
reputation, the base station classifies it into the corresponding interval
of trust to identify the trust state of the user, and then records it in the
list of trust.
• Reward mechanism: After the trust mechanism is established, SUs
continue to operate along the cognitive cycle. Based on these operations,
their reputations and trust states are recorded and updated. The
cognitive base station takes appropriate decision depending on the trust
assessment result to adjust their strategies within the network so that
the network maintains a trend of equal treatment to fair treatment from
the beginning to ensure a secure network environment.
The proposed approach suffers from the following drawbacks:
• The authors do not propose any trust-based framework for detecting and
solving security threats brought by untrustworthy entities.
• The authors only show the trust value for different types of misbehaving
nodes but they do not propose any mechanism to defend against these
nodes.
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In the next subsection, trust in different working phases in spectrum
management is discussed.
2.5.1 Trust-based schemes in secure spectrum sensing
in CRNs
Qin et al. [46] proposed a novel trust-based spectrum sensing scheme which
can identify misbehaving SUs and make an overall sensing decision by filtering
out their reported spectrum sensing results. In their scheme [46], SUs send
the sensing results to the Secondary User Base Station (SUBS) and the SUBS
aggregates the sensing results depending on each SU’s confidence level, θ using
equation 2.2.
Rp = θΓBS + (1− θ)
∑M
i=1 τipΓip∑
i = 1Mτip
(2.2)
where RP is the overall sensing result for PU spectrum band p;
θ is the confidence level of the SUBS;
ΓBS is the sensing result provided by the SUBS;
τip is the trustworthiness of SU i in the context of the PU spectrum band p;
Γip is the sensing result for PU spectrum band p provided by SU i;
M is the number of SUs whose trustworthiness with respect to PU spectrum
band p is above a predefined threshold η.
The final decision Dp is made based on the sign of Rp for spectrum usage using
equation 2.3.
Dp =


1, Rp < 0
0, Rp = 0
1, Rp > 0
(2.3)
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Qin et al. [46] showed their proposed trust-based approach is able to
defend against fabrication attack, on-off attack, denial of service attack,
resource hungry attack but the proposed approach does not have a trust-based
framework to calculate the node’s level of trustworthiness to determine whether
it is able to detect and defend against these kinds of attacks.
Kaligineedi et al. [42] also proposed trust-based methods for secure
cooperative spectrum sensing in CRNs by detecting the malicious nodes in
CRNs which have a significant effect on the performance of the cooperative
sensing system. They assign a trust factor λ[u; k] for each user, u ∈ 1, 2, 3, .....U
in CRNs.
U∑
u=1
λ[u; k] = 1 (2.4)
The trust factor denotes the measurement of reliability of a particular user.
Trust factors are used as the weighting factors for calculating the mean of the
energy values received from various users. The final decision is made using the
trust factors as follows:
U∑
u=1
λ[u; k]e[u; k] ≷H1H0 eT (2.5)
where
eT is the threshold;
e[u; k] represents the outputs of the energy detectors at various nodes at time
instant k for user u = 1, 2, 3, ....U ;
hypothesis H0 indicates the absence of the primary signal and
hypothesis H1 indicates the presence of the primary signal. No prior work has
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been done on collaborative spectrum sensing under attacks due to the mobility
of CR nodes in CRNs. The proposed approach has the following shortcomings:
• The authors use trust-based methods only for spectrum sensing but they
do not show how trust is used in spectrum sensing in CRNs.
• The authors maintain security for spectrum sensing but they do not
consider secure communication.
• The authors do not discuss anything about the spectrum availability
based on spectrum sensing results.
Jana et al. [96] proposed trusted collaborative spectrum sensing under
different path-loss and fading conditions in CRNs using two trust parameters,
Location Reliability and Malicious Intention (LRMI), to detect malicious users
in CRNs. Location Reliability (LR) reflects the path loss characteristics of the
wireless channel and Malicious Intention (MI) captures the true intention of
SUs, respectively. Each SU sends spectrum sensing information to the fusion
center. The reports for one particular SU at the fusion center are evaluated
based on two sources of evidence associated with each report: LR and MI. If the
reliability of the user assigned by fusion center drops below a certain threshold
(ξ), the user is considered a malicious user. But the proposed approach does
not show the complete framework to avoid the malicious user’s behavior.
2.5.2 Trust-based spectrum decision schemes in CRNs
Pang et al. [97] also proposed a trust-based spectrum decision scheme to
secure cooperative spectrum sensing in CRNs. In their scheme [97], each
SU executes spectrum sensing by itself and sends the spectrum sensing
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information to a DC (Data Collector) which uses an appropriate data fusion
technique to make a final spectrum sensing decision. Nodes which send
false information to a DC are identified and their effect is discarded on the
cooperative spectrum sensing system. By detecting and analyzing behaviors
of SUs in cooperative sensing, the DC can establish a trust model with a PID
(Proportional-Integral-Derivative) which can acquire relatively high speed to
track the behaviors of neighbors. There are two hypotheses for detecting the
PU in a data fusion technique: H1 and H0. (H1 means a PU exists, and
H0 means the channel is free. The problems of existing data fusion techniques
have been overcome by the proposed newWeighted Bayesian Detection (WBD)
technique. This scheme is able to defend against three types of spectrum
spoofing attacks: always-false, always-busy and always-free. An always-false
attacker always sends spectrum reports that are opposite to its real local
sensing results, an always-busy attacker always indicates that the spectrum
is busy while an always-free attacker always reports contrary results. The
proposed approach suffers from the following drawbacks:
• The authors determine trust only for cooperative spectrum sensing.
• The authors use trust to analyse anomalous behaviors of selfish nodes
but they do not propose any framework to defend against these types of
attacks to prevent selfish nodes taking part in CRN communication.
• The prior probability values in the behavior analysis model play a key
role, but this calculation needs many priori messages about the CR
networks which may limit the deployment of secure cooperative sensing
techniques.
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2.5.3 Trust-based schemes in secure spectrum sharing
in CRNs
Qin et al. [98] proposed a novel trust-aware resource allocation scheme in
a centralized CRN in which trustworthiness is measured as a key factor for
detecting misbehaving SUs, filtering out their sensing results and allowing
trustworthy nodes to gain access to the system resources. The proposed scheme
maximizes the total bit rate of SUs by utilizing a system level trust measure.
In their scheme, the SUs trustworthiness is first measured and then, depending
on the sensing result, the SUBS will decide whether the requesting SUs will
be given access to the resources or not. In fact, the SUBS decides whether
the PU spectrum band is active or not active. If the PU spectrum band is
active, then it will not allocate resources to SUs. If the SUBS decides that the
PU spectrum band is inactive and the SUBS is not in a shutdown (penalty)
period, it will allocate resources to SUs. But the proposed approach does not
include a framework to calculate the trustworthiness of nodes in CRNs nor
does it discuss security aspects. Very little work has been conducted on trust
used during spectrum sharing to ensure security in CRNs. In the next section,
authentication-based mechanisms to ensure security are discussed.
2.6 Authentication-based Schemes for CRN
Security
An SU in a CRN always searches for PU’s free spectrum for communication.
But an attacker or a selfish SU may express itself as a PU to other SUs to gain
illegal access to radio channels. Therefore, a secure PU detection mechanism
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is necessary in CRNs to distinguish the PU’s signal from an attacker’s signal.
2.6.1 Location-based authentication schemes
Kuroda et al. [61] proposed a radio-independent authentication protocol for
CRNs that is able to support EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
transport. This protocol uses user-specific information, such as location
information, as a key factor. The factors for authentication and encryption
are derived from the historical location registry of a mobile terminal. As
the position of the mobile user always varies, the location information is
frequently updated. Location information is used in this protocol as the basis
for extracting secrecy, and can reduce the costs of AAA consultation using a
long-term credential during switchover. The key factor of this protocol is a
location-carousel, which is a data structure that represents the unique location
information of every mobile terminal as well as the notion of synchronization
between location-carousels at the mobile device and the corresponding network
node. The key management protocol assumes user-specific information as
an initial bootstrap, and subsequent keys for authentication and encryption
are derived from the location-carousel. This protocol supports light weight
mutual authentication and could be implemented on a mobile node that has
limited memory and power. This protocol is able to defend against man-in-the
middle attacks. However, Kuroda et al.’s [61] protocol is based on the strong
assumption that consumer premise equipment should be registered in the
co-located CRN offline via a robust and secure method and does not consider
privacy issues. Therefore, the protocol cannot be applied to the IEEE 802.22
Wireless Regional Area Network (WRAN).
In order to overcome Kuroda et al.’s [61] shortfall, Hyun Sung Kim [82]
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proposed a location-based authentication protocol using the location-carousel
as a secret credential in CRNs. This protocol was constructed on the
assumption that there is no secure channel between entities in a CRN and BS
and the home agent (HA) has a key pair based on the public key cryptosystem
and a certificate for it. Additionally, it is also assumed that the BS should be
fully trusted in the CRN. The protocol has 9 steps as follows and the overview
of the protocol is depicted in Figure 2.3:
• step 1 : BSi sends an identity request to CPEi.
• step 2 : CPEi responds back to BSi for the identity request.
• step 3 : BSi asks for the carousel of CPEi to HA
• step 4 : HA responds to BSi with the encrypted carousel of CPEi.
• step 5 : BSi sends a challenge message to CPEi.
• step 6 : CPEi answers back to BSi with a response message.
• step 7 : BSi responds to the authentication request with either an
authentication success message or an authentication fail message.
• step 8 : BSi notifies the new location-related information of CPEi to
HA by using the previously derived authentication key.
• step 9 : HA resynchronizes the carousel for CPEi
Zhang et al. [99] proposed a node-to-node authentication scheme based
on location-based keys for designing compromise-tolerant security mechanisms
for sensor networks. This location-key based authentication scheme has the
following properties:
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Figure 2.3: Location-based authentication protocol [82]
• First, location-based keys (LBKs), each of which is addressed to a nodes
unique location ID deployed in a large geographical area.
• Second, a node-to-node neighborhood authentication scheme using
LBKs, which is not only able to localize the impact of compromised
nodes within their vicinity, but also to establish pairwise shared keys
between neighboring nodes at the same time.
• Third, LBKs’s effectiveness to act as efficient countermeasures against
different types attacks on sensor network routing protocols.
In a secure location-based authentication scheme [99], one node, A, sends
an authentication request, including its location posA =< xA, yA > and a
random nonce nA, to its neighboring node. Upon receiving A’s request, node
B with location posB =< xB, yB > first needs to confirm that the requesting
node A’s position is in its transmission range by checking equation 2.6
(xA − xB)
2 + (yA − yB)
2 ≤ R2 (2.6)
where ‘R’is the transmission range.
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If the check is successful, node B sends a reply message including its own
location posB =< xB, yB > and a random nonce nB to node A, otherwise
node B ignores node A’s request because node A is by no means a neighboring
node. This position checking is necessary because otherwise an adversary
intentionally might send an authentication request to B, including the location
of one compromised node, say D, who is out of the transmission range of B, by
boosting the transmission power. In this case, B might be tricked into believing
that D is its authentic neighbor as D has the correct LBK corresponding to
the claimed location so that it can pass the authentication process [99].
Chen et al. [65] proposed a transmitter verification scheme, called LocDef
(localization-based defense), which verifies the PU’s signal by utilizing both
the signal characteristics and location of the signal transmitter. This scheme
is able to detect PUE attacks and defend against PUE attackers. The
localization scheme utilizes an underlying wireless sensor network (WSN) to
collect snapshots of received signal strength (RSS) measurements across a
CR network. By smoothing the collected RSS measurements and identifying
the RSS peaks, one can estimate the transmitter locations. LocDef
can be integrated into existing spectrum sensing schemes to enhance the
trustworthiness of the sensing decisions.
2.6.2 Identity-based authentication schemes
Identity-based authentication is one of the key factors for ensuring secure
communications in CRNs. Zhu et al. [53] proposed a new authentication
mechanism for CRNs which is based on third-party Certification Authority
(CA). The mechanism integrates EAP-SIM and EAP-TTLS, adopts SIM
authentication for terminal CR users and secure tunnel +certificates for
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servers. CA solves the identity authentication problem of base stations and
ensures secure communication between the base station and CA by establishing
a security tunnel in core networks. This mechanism consists of 15 steps as
shown in Figure 2.4. Zhao et al. [60] proposed an authentication scheme in
the physical layer by identifying transmitters in CRNs to differentiate between
the PU signal transmitter and the PUE attacker. In their scheme, [60], the
verifier extracts the signal from the frequencies of interest by using a band-pass
filtering technique and obtains the time domain samples of the transmitted
signal. Then, the time domain samples are converted to frequency domain
samples, which contain the transmitter location fingerprint information, by
implementing the power spectrum density (PSD) estimation technique. These
samples are used as the input of the wavelet transform, then the characteristics
of the transmitter fingerprints can be extracted.
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Figure 2.4: Improved identify authentication process [53]
In the proposed authentication schemes, cryptographic techniques have
been proposed to ensure security in CRNs, but most of them work in the
digital domain and encryption techniques require too much processing power
and memory to be used by the cognitive radio nodes. Therefore, it is infeasible
to use cryptographic-based authentication schemes to ensure security in CRNs.
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2.7 Critical Evaluation of the Existing
Approaches to Maintain Secure
Communication in CRNs
In this section, a critical evaluation of the approaches discussed in the literature
related to trust and security in CRNs is analysed. The aim in this section
is to draw an integrative overview in order to discover and identify the
main issues in the literature that need to be addressed so as to maintain
trustworthy relationships in CRNs to ensure secure communication so that
no untrustworthy, misbehaving or selfish node is able to take part in the
communication. To ensure trust-based communication for security purposes,
there is a need to have a ‘complete methodology’ which would highlights
and represents the various aspects that are required for activities such as
trust establishment, spectrum sharing, authentication checking and system
availability enhancement which assists the CRN’s operation to make an
informed decision about its communication.
As can be seen from the discussion in the literature, various researchers
have proposed different techniques for determining the level of ‘trust’ and
using it to maintain secure communication between nodes in different areas.
For example, trust has been analysed from a security aspect to maintain secure
communication in wireless communication such as WSNs etc. But none of
them provides a complete methodology which represents and models all the
aspects required for establishing trust and using if for secure communication.
There are still gaps in the research on approaches which measure and maintain
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trust for secure communication in CRNs. For example, Chen et al. [45]
defined a mathematical framework to describe trust for CRN communication
but this framework does not propose a complete methodology to establish
trust to ensure security in CRNs. Qin et al. [46] proposed a novel trust-based
spectrum sensing scheme which can identify misbehaving SUs and make an
overall sensing decision by filtering out their reported spectrum sensing results,
but their approach didn’t show how trustworthy nodes could take part in
spectrum sharing in CRNs. Jana et al. [96] proposed a trust-based approach
for collaborative spectrum sensing in CRNs but they didn’t show how this
trust-based approach could enhance security in CRNs. Kaligineedi et al. [42]
also proposed trust-based methods for secure cooperative spectrum sensing
in CRNs but they did not show how security aspects are improved to ensure
secure communication in CRNs. Qin et al. [98] proposed a novel trust-aware
resource allocation scheme in a centralized CRN in which trustworthiness is
measured as a key factor for SUs to gain access to the system resources. The
scheme can detect misbehaving SUs and filter out malicious attacks while
maximizing the total bit rate of SUs but their approach did not propose
a framework for a trustworthiness measurement to ensure secure spectrum
sharing in CRNs. Pei et al. [95] proposed a trust management model through
the whole cognitive cycle for centralized CRNs to solve the security threats
brought by untrustworthy entities, such as selfish, malicious, and faultless
nodes, but they didn’t show how spectrum decision making takes place in a
spectrum sharing mechanism.
Authentication is one of key factors to ensure security. Subsection 2.6
summarizes the different authentication mechanisms in CRNs but most of these
approaches [61, 82] use cryptographic techniques which need more processing
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power and memory. No approach proposes a light weight cryptographic-based
authentication scheme to ensure secure communication in CRNs which requires
less processing power and memory.
Hence, the main inadequacy of the approaches, from the literature discussed
above, in proposing a complete methodology which represents all the aspects
of trust-based security in CRNs for ensuring secure communication, can be
summarized as:
• No guidelines for a security model definition: Current spectrum
management schemes lack a formal security model in CRNs. The existing
literature assumes only a hierarchical security model or distributed
security model according to the corresponding network topology. There
is no quantization in security model and hence the security proof is only
a heuristic description.
• Lack of trust-based authentication scheme: A variety of
techniques have been proposed [53, 61, 82] by which authentication can
be achieved. But, all of these approaches are based on cryptographic
techniques which require much processing power and memory. However,
in the context of CRN, ‘trust’ is an important concept to consider
when authentication has to be achieved on the basis of believing that
a new user joining the group will not cause security issues. Trust,
in this context, is defined as the belief that the security of a network
will not be compromised as a result of a user’s action after the user is
permitted to join the network. Having such a trust-based authentication
mechanism allows only non-malicious SUs to access the licensed spectrum
and network resources; thereby playing a complementary role or an
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inside-out role in improving overall security and creating a balance in
the whole CRN. In the current literature, even though the importance
of trust during the process of authentication has been discussed, no
trust-based framework in CRNs has been proposed based on which users
are authenticated to access the network. To summarize the problem,
there is no methodology proposed in the literature by which trust can
be established for authentication checking to ensure security in CRNs.
In Chapter 3, the problem associated with trust establishment for
authentication in the existing literature is formally identified and defined
and in Chapter 4, a solution overview for the defined problem in the
existing literature is presented.
• Lack of a trust-based spectrum sharing mechanism: Spectrum
sharing is one of the major functionalities of CRNs. Several approaches,
such as the Game-Theory approach [7] and the auction-based approach
[17], have been proposed for spectrum sharing in CRNs but none of them
consider security during the spectrum sharing mechanism. The spectrum
sharing mechanism between the primary and secondary networks in
a CRN requires SUs obey the opportunistic access rules. Selfish and
malicious users may send false data or falsify the sensing data, or may
want to use a PU’s spectrum and fail to vacate the spectrum, even if
the PU wants to reclaim its own spectrum. These are termed ‘soft
security threats’ and are addressed by using the notion of trust. So,
PUs need to be provided with a trust guarantee from the SUs to allow
them to use their free spectrum. However, such a trust-based spectrum
sharing mechanism has not been proposed in the literature to overcome
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the soft security threats in CRNs. To summarize the problem, there is
no methodology proposed in the literature by which spectrum can be
shared in a secure way in CRNs.
In Chapter 3, the problem associated with secure spectrum sharing in
CRNs in the existing literature is formally identified and defined and in
Chapter 4, a solution overview for the defined problem in the existing
literature is presented.
• Deficiencies of the Availability Enhancement Scheme: According
to CRN architecture, the key nodes [53] generate and store all of the
important data such as the different keys that are used to communicate
in the network and perform the major responsibilities for maintaining the
security of the network. There is not much work in the literature which
selects a node as the key role to facilitate system security. However, it
is possible that malicious nodes may attack the key nodes of the CRN,
forcing the whole network to perform at a degraded level or even take
it offline. If attackers attack the network with a view to degrading the
system performance, the system availability and reliability will fall in a
dramatic way and the whole network will collapse. However, there is no
methodology currently proposed for availability enhancement in CRNs
for smooth and robust communication.
In Chapter 3, the problem associated with system availability
enhancement in CRNs in the existing literature is formally identified and
defined and in Chapter 4, a solution overview for the defined problem in
the existing literature is presented.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a survey of the existing literature is carried out. The
existing literature is evaluated critically with a view to analyzing and assessing
each category to ensure security in CRNs, and found that no proposal in
the literature presents a complete method of using trust to ensure secure
communication in CRNs, according to its characteristics. In the next chapter,
the problems are defined that need to be addressed in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, due to the significant advances in pervasive
computing and wireless communication technology, cognitive radio networks
(CRNs) have gained wide application. However, some unique features of CRNs
make them more vulnerable to security attacks than their wired counterparts.
Security countermeasures should be taken to resist these attacks and improve
security aspects in CRNs. As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the ways by which
this can be achieved is by using an inside-out notion of improving the security;
that is by strengthening the notion of trust.
By undertaking a comprehensive critical analysis of the existing technology
and approaches, it was found that, despite the significant contributions which
have been made over the decades in wireless security, very few practical
approaches, especially in terms of trust-based security solutions for CRNs,
have been proposed in the literature. In addition, as discussed in Chapter
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2, some important auxiliary properties of trust based schemes, such as
trust-based authentication, trust-based spectrum sharing and trust-based
system availability enhancement have not been addressed in the current
approaches to improve the overall performance of CRNs in a secure way.
To address these shortcomings in the literature, in this chapter, the problem
that this thesis intends to address is identified and outlined. In Section 3.2,
the set of definitions that will be used throughout the thesis is given. In
Section 3.3, the motivation for the research and the definition of the problems
to be addressed in this thesis are outlined. In Section 3.4, the main problems
are broken down into different research issues to propose a solution to the
identified problems. In Section 3.5, the research method adopted in this thesis
is introduced. Finally, in Section 3.6, the chapter is concluded.
3.2 Key Concepts and Preliminaries
In this section, the key concepts and preliminaries which will be used in this
chapter to formulate the problem and subsequently throughout the thesis to
propose a solution to the defined problem are explained.
3.2.1 Trust
As explained in Chapter 1, in the literature, there are two understandings
of the definition of trust: 1) trusted computing which trust refers to the
interacting entity accepting the provided security mechanisms adopted by the
other entity by which it feels safe and not vulnerable to the outside forces
which might hamper its interaction; 2) the level of belief that the two agents
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have in each other for the achievement of desired outcome. In this thesis,
the second understanding of trust is considered. Trust is defined in wireless
networks as a particular level of subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action.
Trust is defined as a function “Trust(A,B, F, C)” that node A has in an agent
B to perform an action F in a context C [100].
3.2.2 Security
The security of a system is defined as the degree of assurance that a system
provides in offering its normal functionality in a correct way with no harmful
outside effects which can affect the system. The security of a wireless network
is defined by Hu et al. [101] as the protection mechanism of the system which
is able to prevent the system from unauthorized modification, destruction, or
disclosure.
3.2.3 Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is defined as the likelihood of an agent completing a certain
task. The trustworthiness of an agent is determined from an agent’s own past
interaction.
3.2.4 Authentication
Authentication is a service related to identification. This function applies
to both entities and the information itself. Two parties entering into
communication should identify each other. Authentication ensures that the
entities with whom one communicates are the expected ones and the received
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data is the original data sent by the counterparts.
3.2.5 Availability
Availability is one of the fundamental requirements for any type of network.
Network availability is referred to as data availability (user information,
routing tables, etc.) of the network. The availability of a system provides
assurance that the services of the system are available at all times and are not
denied to authorized users [101]. Availability in wireless networks is expressed
as the availability of the wireless transmission medium, whereas in the context
of cognitive networks, availability refers to the ability of primary and secondary
users to access the spectrum to continue its communication [102].
3.2.6 Unavailability
Unavailability refers to the functionality of a system when it fails to perform
its normal functionality because of either a planned or an unplanned event.
3.2.7 Reliability
Reliability is defined as the probability that a given demand vector is achieved
in order to increase network effectiveness quantitatively, and help network
designers tune CR network parameters (for example, the number of channels
and radios) for better performance.
3.2.8 Downtime
Downtime refers to a period when a system is unavailable and thus fails to
provide or perform its normal functionality. During downtime, the system
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introduces an extra system cost which is termed downtime cost.
3.2.9 Trusted Third Party(TTP)
A trusted third party (TTP) is an entity which maintains the interaction
record between two parties, both of whom trust the third party. The third
party reviews all critical data transactions in the communications between the
parties, based on the ease of creating fraudulent digital content.
3.2.10 Trust Repository
The trust repository acts as a mechanism to store and publish trust values that
have been provided by the provider to secure communication. The properties
of the trust repository are as follows:
• Keeps the trust values secure
• Makes the trust values are available to the appropriate communicating
party
• Sends the trust values to the appropriate party based on the request
• Maintains authenticity at a low cost
3.2.11 User/Node
The term user refers to a member in a network which is attached to the network
and is capable of processing, gathering information and communicating with
other connected members in the network. The terms ‘user’ and ‘node’ are used
interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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3.2.12 Deprivation rate
The deprivation rate is the rate at which a secondary user (SU) is forced to
vacate the band on the reappearance of the primary user (PU).
3.2.13 Blocking rate
The blocking rate is the rate at which all the sub-bands are occupied by the
SUs in the network.
3.2.14 Utilization ratio
The utilization ratio is defined as the ratio of the radio bands that are used by
the PUs and SUs to the total number of radio bands that are available in the
system.
3.3 Problem Definition
As mentioned in Chapter 1, different security threats in CRNs need to be
addressed by enhancing different aspects of security, such as authentication
checking by using trustworthiness, mechanisms for secure spectrum sharing,
and mechanisms for improving the system availability. Chapters 1 and 2
discussed that one of the ways to improve these aspects of security for secure
communication in CRNs is by incorporating trust. By using trust in CRNs,
the base station or other nodes can identify and classify malicious and selfish
nodes as “untrustworthy” based on their trust label in the network and take
the necessary steps to avoid or stop communication with these malicious nodes
which intentionally send false data to the network or do not follow the spectrum
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usage policies of the network in order to degrade the network performance.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature shows that significant
advancements have been made in the area of trust management for CRN
security. But most existing schemes have drawbacks which result in unsolved
problems that merit in-depth research. In this section, several problems related
to CRN security are discussed in the following three areas :
• Trust-based schemes to authenticate users for improving secure
communication in CRNs
• Mechanisms for secure spectrum sharing in CRNs
• Mechanisms for improving system availability in CRNs
In each of these areas, a discussion is presented from two perspectives,
namely: existing solutions in the literature, and the research gaps in these
solutions which form the key requirements in defining the problems that will
be addressed in this thesis.
3.3.1 Trust-based authentication schemes for improving
secure communication in CRNs
3.3.1.1 Existing solutions of trust establishment in CRNs
In the literature, trust has been considered as one of the most suitable ways
to ensure security in wireless networks [103–105]. As shown in Figure 3.1,
a standard trust establishment scheme has four stages, namely: establish
communication between nodes, gather experience and recommendations,
calculate trust and update trust values.
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Establish 
communication 
between nodes
Experience Recommendation
Trust value 
enough?
Maintain secure 
communication
Stop 
communication
Update trust value
Trust 
Calculation
Yes
No
Figure 3.1: The general process of a standard trust establishment paradigm
Using this scheme, when a node A, for example, needs to interact with
another node B, they will establish communication link between them. Node
B will check its previous experience with node A and the recommendations of
the surroundings nodes for node A will be also checked. After receiving those,
node B will calculate the total trust value for the communication with node
A. If the calculated trust value is enough to set up a secure communication
link between the nodes, then node B will interact with node A and update A’s
trust value after the interaction, otherwise node B will stop communication
with node A.
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature that establish trust
in CRNs [45]. For example, a trust-based spectrum sensing scheme is proposed
to identify misbehaving SUs and make the overall sensing decision by filtering
out their reported spectrum sensing results [46]. Trust-based mechanisms have
been proposed to: (a) secure cooperative spectrum sensing in CRNs [97]; (b)
defend against False Alarm attack and False Alarm Miss Detection attack by
detecting untrustworthy malicious nodes, according to their reporting histories
[67]; (c) detect suspicious SUs; (d) defend against PUEA attack [106]; and
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(e) enable cognitive radios to access the distributed computation, storage,
and resources available in the cognitive radio environment by combining the
requirements of the trustworthiness and the QoS of the links with the route
[107]. Almost all trust establishment schemes for CRNs follow the general
trust management paradigm, or a variant. However, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, none of the approaches consider the trust establishment
process according to specific assessment criteria and the dynamic nature of
the interaction when determining the trustworthiness of a CR node for secure
communication in CRNs and therfore have the following drawbacks:
3.3.1.2 Research gaps in existing trust establishment schemes in
CRNs
• In a CRN, by using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Dynamic
Spectrum Access (DSA) functionalities, PUs share their unused or
under-utilized spectrum with SUs for the efficient utilization of the radio
spectrum. Although such functionalities provide advanced and flexible
communication options, they also render the CRN vulnerable to security
attacks, both from local and outside threats. For example, it is quite
possible that the SUs could be malicious or selfish at any time due to
the unique characteristics of CRNs and spread different security threats
in the network which will hinder the network’s normal performance. In
order to avoid such security threats and the problems, there is a need for
a trust establishment framework that is able to detect the malicious or
selfish nodes, based on their level of trust, to avoid their selfish behaviour
and allow only the trustworthy nodes to access the network resources.
Although some research [45], [46], [65], [107] has been conducted on using
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trust in CRNs, most have only been used for trusted routing in CRNs,
and trust as a mechanism has not been used before for authentication
checking during spectrum sharing, spectrum detection or for measuring
spectrum availability. The omission of trust establishment for such
spectrum management aspects causes CRNs to become more vulnerable
to security threats and attacks by malicious nodes.
• One of the main drawbacks of the proposed trust establishment schemes
in the literature is “biasing” by other nodes. As a result of this drawback,
there is a chance that cognitive radio nodes may be compromised by other
surrounding malicious nodes through a biasing technique which always
recommend a biased trust value for the candidate node. In other words,
if any cognitive radio node is compromised through biasing, this can
lead to the assignment of false trust values for the candidate node. This
problem calls for the development of a proper trust-based mechanism to
check the candidate node’s actual trust value and avoid the problem of
biasing.
• Approaches have been proposed in the literature that discuss different
types of attacks in CRNs but they do not show exactly how a node’s
trustworthiness level is able to detect and defend against these attacks.
For example, in the literature, trustworthiness is used to secure spectrum
sensing and decisions by integrating a transmitter verification scheme,
called LocDef (localization based defense), into the existing spectrum
sensing scheme [65]. But this approach is only able to defend PUEA
attacks in CRNs. In other work, trust and reputation are integrated
to mitigate the threat of Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF)
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attacks on CRNs in [38]. However, it does not propose any trust modeling
scheme for CRNs. A trust-based malicious user detection algorithm
is developed, based on the trust value, to detect suspicious users in
CRNs [80], but this method is only able to detect one malicious node.
Trust-based approaches [46] are able to defend against different types
of attacks but they do not show exactly how a node’s trustworthiness
level is able to detect these attacks. Therefore, there is a need to develop
trust establishment schemes in CRNs in order to identify suspicious nodes
based on their level of trust.
3.3.1.3 Existing solutions in authentication mechanisms in CRNs
Once trust is established between different nodes, the next step is to
authenticate the node’s request based on its level of trust. Authentication
is an important tool which is used to distinguish the valid user’s signal from
an attackers signal in CRNs. It is necessary to have a secure authentication
mechanism in CRNs to authenticate the PU’s signal and hence ensure overall
system security. The current research on authentication mechanisms in CRNs
has been examined from various aspects, such as location-based authentication,
identity-based authentication, cryptographic-based authentication, filtering
false data, PKC-based authentication, and lightweight authentication.
A radio-independent authentication protocol based on user-specific
information, such as location information, as a key factor, is used to support
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) transport in CRNs [61]. The
location-based authentication protocol uses the location-carousel as a secret
credential to ensure security in CRNs [82]. An authentication method uses
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a location verification scheme, called LocDef (localization-based defense) and
received signal strength (RSS) measurements to detect an attacker’s signal
and identify the PU’s signal in secure spectrum sensing in CRNs [65]. A
simple but efficient PU identification scheme, based on public key ciphers,
uses digital signatures for authentication purposes to enhance CRN security
[25]. An authentication scheme provides secure verification of the spectrum by
integrating cryptographic signatures and wireless link signatures that enable
PUs to detect the presence of PUE attackers and hence improve system security
[108]. Another integrated authentication approach is proposed to authenticate
the PUs signal by integrating cryptographic and link signatures in CRNs [109].
The PU authentication approach adds a helper node which is placed physically
closer to the PU to detect the primary signal [62]. However, most approaches
are used only to detect and identify the PU’s signal, they are lacking from
detecting malicious users in CRNs.
3.3.1.4 Research gaps in authentication mechanisms in CRNs
In the literature, most cryptographic primitives work in the digital domain,
it may not be possible to integrate them into analogue TV signals as in
the CRN domain. A typical public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme which
achieves secure routing and other purposes in typical ad-hoc networks cannot
adequately guarantee the security of CRNs, given the limited communication
and computation resources. Although several mechanisms [65], [82] have been
proposed to defend against specific attacks and authenticate PUs using a
location carousel as a secret credential, these approaches are not suitable for ad
hoc/distributed scenarios in CRNs, in which the PU and SU have comparable
power levels. To avoid these problems, there is a need for a trust-based
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authentication framework which authenticates the users in a CRN, based on
a trust value, to avoid the adverse impact of malicious and selfish nodes and
to enhance the security of communication in CRNs.
3.3.2 Mechanisms for secure spectrum sharing in CRNs
3.3.2.1 Existing solutions in spectrum sharing in CRNs
In the literature, different approaches have been proposed for spectrum sharing
in CRNs. Of these, the Game-Theory approach [7] and the Auction-based
approach [17] are the most popular and efficient. However, very few work is
concerned about secure spectrum sharing in CRNs in which malicious users
are identified and excluded from the network so that they cannot access to
the PU’s free spectrum. A combinatorial auction-based spectrum sharing
approach is proposed in [110] where SUs have the flexibility to bid for a bundle
of frequencies at different times. The TRuthful doUble Spectrum aucTions
(TRUST) framework, which aims to achieve truthfulness and enable spectrum
reuse, assists multiple sellers and buyers to trade spectrum dynamically
[111]. A new cognitive radio spectrum sharing scheme is developed, based
on the trust-based bargaining model which dynamically adjusts bargaining
powers and adaptively shares the available spectrum in a real-time online
manner [112]. A spectrum sharing scheme in CRNs has been developed
based on the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) model, using the
properties of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing technology [77].
Policy management architecture is used to validate the spectrum sharing
approaches in the face of possible security threats on the network behaviour
and performance [75]. However, none of the approaches consider security
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during spectrum sharing in CRNs.
3.3.2.2 Research gaps in secure spectrum sharing in CRNs
In the literature, there is still some research gaps which are not identified such
as follows:
1. The SU needs to vacate the spectrum when the PU needs it, which
disrupts its service until it finds another free spectrum. If it cannot find
another free spectrum, then its communication is dropped. Therefore,
there is a need for a framework which minimizes the problem of the SU’s
service disruption during spectrum sharing.
2. It is possible that malicious SUs in CRNs search for free spectrum and
intentionally hold it without being willing to vacate it, even if a PU later
wants to reclaim his own spectrum. This misbehaviour paralyzes the
whole network performance. To identify and avoid such threats and
misbehaviour, there is a need for a trust-based framework that will
assess the trust value for the requesting authenticated SU from both
primary and secondary networks in CRNs to assign spectrum based on
the trustworthiness label so that no malicious or untrustworthy nodes
have access to the spectrum to ensure secure communication through
trustworthy spectrum sharing in CRNs.
3. Sometimes, SUs either need to wait a long time to obtain access to
another free spectrum or they cannot find another free spectrum band
after vacating the spectrum on the reappearance of the PU, as all the
spectrum bands are either being used by PUs or SUs. In such scenario,
their communication is always blocked. In order to maintain smooth
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communication in CRNs and to avoid all dropping and blocking, there is
a need for a framework which will balance the number of SUs and PUs
in a CRN so that spectrum is always available for the SUs to continue
their communication instead of being blocked or dropped.
Although some research [110], [112], [77], [75] has been conducted on
spectrum sharing in CRNs, most contain the abovementioned research gaps
and no solution to date has addressed the security issues during spectrum
sharing in CRNs.
3.3.3 Mechanisms for improving system availability in
CRNs
3.3.3.1 Existing solutions in system availability in CRNs
Availability is an important aspect of a secure system. The current research on
system availability in CRNs has been examined in terms of channel utilization,
deprivation rate, blocking rate, etc. The availability of CRNs depends on the
PU’s traffic and other attributes. The availability and service of SUs also vary
with PU’s traffic. The amount of available service that can be achieved from
the free bands in a spectrum accessed by PUs is called the capacity of SUs.
Co-operative spectrum sensing is a key function of CRNs to prevent
harmful interference with licensed users and identify the spectrum availability
to improve the network functionality [113]. The CTMC is used in spectrum
access models to increase spectrum utilization in CRNs [114]. The proposed
scheme is a non-random access method to remove the forced termination states
in CRN system models to reduce the probability of call dropping and blocking.
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A distributed cluster agreement algorithm called Spectrum-Opportunity
Clustering (SOC) is proposed to increase the availability of common idle
channels in cluster-based CRNs [115]. In the proposed approach, the control
channel can migrate from the current occupied channel via the PU to another
free channel without the need to form a re-cluster. In collaborative spectrum
sensing, a number of cognitive radio nodes form a network and the final
decision regarding the availability of spectrum opportunity for the CRN is
based on the information received from all the cognitive radio nodes [116].
The availability of spectrum for SUs is identified using the Probability Mass
Function (PMF) in an OFDMA-based cognitive radio system for different
request distributions [117]. The neural network concept is adopted to predict
the availability of spectrum for cognitive radio users where the training data
is assumed to be available, hence, the accuracy of the spectrum prediction
by the SU can be improved significantly [118]. The CTMC-based spectrum
access model can increase spectrum utilization in CRNs [114] but the authors
did not demonstrate any correlation between system availability and spectrum
utilization, nor did they show how the system availability can be increased
by reducing the probability of call dropping and blocking. However, most
approaches only consider spectrum availability in CRNs, but do not show the
system availability.
3.3.3.2 Research gaps in system availability in CRNs
Apart from the solutions discussed above in system availability enhancement,
there are still some research gaps such as follows:
• According to CRN architecture, there are several key nodes which are
responsible for storing all the important data and performing the major
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tasks of the network such as maintaining and updating the trust value
of all member nodes in the network. However, if a malicious node is
successful in becoming the key node then it can compromise the network
and easily obtain the network’s data and intentionally change both
the data and the network parameters, such as routing information, to
degrade the network’s performance. There is not much existing work
in the literature on a feasible process for selecting a node to perform
the key role of facilitating system security. Therefore, there is a need
for a framework that is able to select the most reliable and trustworthy
nodes as the key nodes which will not be easily compromised by attackers
and will undertake the major responsibilities in the event of any attack
or error to ensure the smooth continuation of communication in the
network.
• Although having a trusted relationship between nodes assists in having
an outside-in role for improving the overall performance and security
of CRNs, it is quite possible that in the event of a security attack,
malicious nodes may attack the key nodes of the CRN and force the
whole network to perform at a degraded level or even take it offline, thus
decreasing system availability and increasing downtime. Therefore, there
is a need for a framework that will increase the system availability and
reliability and decrease the downtime cost by performing all the major
tasks in cases where the key nodes have been compromised and ensure
smooth communication by providing continuous service to all users.
Although some research [114, 115] have been conducted on increasing
channel availability or utilization in CRNs, no prior work has been done
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to enhance system availability.
• In the event of an attack, malicious nodes could join the network by
falsifying their identity and use free spectrum to jam the network by
continuously sending false data packets and preventing other SUs from
using vacant band. As a result, the network performance is degraded in
an exponential way by these malicious nodes joining the network. The
same thing is possible in the case of a member node leaving the network
in a malicious way. If a member node leaves the network abnormally
without notifying the other member nodes about its leaving, then the
node which has been compromised by the malicious users can reveal
all the network information to the malicious users, making the network
vulnerable. Furthermore, when nodes are attacked by malicious users,
they can also join and leave the network abnormally, without notifying
the other nodes in the network and jam the whole network. Several
research studies have been conducted on nodes joining and leaving in
CRNs. Normal and abnormal node joining and leaving processes are
considered as either good manners or bad manners, respectively, in
relation to updating the trust value in the model [119]. The Trust-value
Updated Model [120] has been proposed to authenticate the nodes
when they join and leave the network in ad-hoc network. However,
in the existing literature, there is no framework in CRNs that ensures
a trust-based joining and leaving process to enhance system security.
Therefore, there is a need for a framework that is able to allow the
nodes to join and leave the network in a secure way to avoid the security
threats brought by malicious nodes and update the trust value depending
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on their performance.
Hence, based on the above discussion, the problem that will be addressed
in this thesis is defined as follows :
To develop a trust-based framework to maintain secure communication in
cognitive radio networks in which a trust relationship can be established between
different nodes to authenticate the node’s request. The trust value is used to
select the key nodes to perform the key responsibilities and to secure spectrum
sharing by avoiding malicious users’ behavior and to improve the system’s
availability through the automatic reconfiguration in the network.
In the next section, the research issues that will be addressed to solve the
abovementioned problems in CRNs will be discussed.
3.4 Research Issues
In the previous section, three problem areas were defined, with the current
solutions and the research gaps arising from each solution. Deliberations on
these research gaps have raised several issues which need to be addressed in
order to provide a solution to the broadly defined problem. In the following
subsections, each issue and its relevance to the research gap addressed in this
thesis is discussed.
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3.4.1 Issue 1: Propose a trust-based authentication
framework which improves the security of
communication
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the main focus of using trust in CRNs is to
defend against soft security threats, especially when authentication has to be
achieved to ensure secure communication. Trust-based approaches [46], [80]
are proposed to detect and defend against suspicious users, and different types
of attacks in CRNs. However, most trust-based mechanisms have only been
used for routing schemes in CRNs. Therefore, a trust establishment framework
is proposed to establish trust between different nodes in CRNs to avoid their
malicious behaviors, exclude them from accessing the network resources and
to authenticate only trustworthy user’s request to use the network resources
from either the primary or secondary network.
Untrustworthy malicious users can break down the network’s normal
activities by accessing the network and creating a ‘biasing’ problem by
assigning a false trust value for a node. In order to solve these problems, there
is a need for a trust establishment framework that solves the ‘biasing’ problem
to determine the node’s actual trust value in the network, thus ensuring secure
communication in CRNs.
This thesis aims to highlight the need to have a trust establishment
framework for authenticating users and to solve the biasing problem in
CRNs. To achieve this, Chapter 4 briefly describes the proposed trust-based
authentication framework which is further elaborated in Chapter 5. The
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scheme improves the overall security by authenticating only trustworthy user’s
request to access the network, thereby avoiding the damaging behaviors caused
by untrustworthy entities, such as selfish or malicious nodes by preventing their
request and access to the network’s resources.
3.4.2 Issue 2: Propose a trust-based spectrum sharing
scheme for secure communication in CRNs
The objective of this thesis is to propose an approach to ensure secure
communication by using the notion of trust in CRNs. Selfish and malicious
users always intentionally send false data or falsify sensing data to obtain access
to the PU’s spectrum and once they have access, they may not be willing to
vacate the spectrum on the return of the PUs. Trust-based authentication of
the requesting node, as mentioned in research ‘Issue 1’, only ensures that
the request is coming from a valid node. However, this does not ensure
the commitment of that node to various CRN policies such as vacating the
spectrum when the PU needs it again, ensuring fairness in sensing result etc.
Therefore, trust-based solution needs to be proposed in spectrum sharing so
that untrustworthy nodes are not given access to share the spectrum which
causes the network performance to degrade.
This thesis highlights the need for a trust-based spectrum sharing scheme
in CRNs to ensure secure and trustworthy communication. Chapter 4 briefly
describes the proposed secure spectrum sharing mechanism which is elaborated
further in chapter 6.
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3.4.3 Issue 3: Propose a model for minimizing
disruption to an SU’s service during spectrum
sharing in CRNs
According to the CRN working principles, as an SU needs to vacate the
spectrum when the PU needs it again, the SU’s service is disrupted until
it searches or access another free spectrum. Therefore, its service is either
dropped or blocked during spectrum sharing and results in the SU’s service
being disrupted. To solve this problem, there is a need for an approach which
can ensure minimum service disruption when it has to vacate a spectrum it
has been using.
This thesis highlights the need for such a framework that proposes a state
transition diagram showing the states through which an SU should go to
minimize the disruption to its service during spectrum sharing. Chapter
4 briefly describes the proposed working states of the diagram which is
elaborated further in chapter 6.
3.4.4 Issue 4: Propose a scheme for balancing the
number of SUs and PUs during spectrum sharing
in CRNs
If there are more SUs in a CNR than PUs, some SU’s communication may be
dropped or blocked due to spectrum band being unavailable, which may lead
to service disruption when all the sub-bands are occupied by either other SUs
or PUs. Therefore, to solve this problem, a scheme needs to be proposed to
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balance the number of SUs and PUs during spectrum sharing in CRNs. This
thesis highlights the need for such a model which balances the number of SUs
and PUs in CRNs and ensures spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and
SUs. Chapter 4 briefly describes the proposed working states of the diagram
which is elaborated further in chapter 6.
3.4.5 Issue 5: Propose a trust-based mechanism for
node selection and secure node joining and leaving
the network
In order to address the issue of selecting the key nodes from the member nodes
in the network to perform the major responsibilities, a trust-based framework
needs to be established which selects the key nodes based on the highest level of
trustworthiness. The proposed framework provides guidelines for the member
nodes to follow in relation to joining and leaving the network securely, so that
untrustworthy or malicious users do not degrade the network performance by
attacking the key nodes or by joining or leaving the network in a non-secure
manner. For the selection of key nodes, the trust values of the member nodes
need to be updated depending on their various behaviours.
This thesis aims to highlight the need for a trust-based mechanism to select
the key nodes and backup key nodes and ensure that member nodes join and
leave the network securely. Chapter 4 briefly describes the proposed processes
for node selection and the secure node joining and leaving mechanism which
is further elaborated in chapter 7.
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3.4.6 Issue 6: Propose a framework for system
availability enhancement in CRNs
Although it is possible to ensure the secure use of available spectrum by
establishing a trusted platform in CRNs, some malicious nodes always attack
the key nodes of the CRNs in order to obtain all the important data and
disrupt and degrade network performance in a dramatic way. Therefore, there
is a need for a framework that will increase system availability and reliability
by proposing a model that will allow backup key nodes to perform all major
responsibilities of the main key node in the event of any errors or attacks in
the main key node.
This thesis highlights the need to increase system availability and reliability
by proposing the model in which the backup key nodes are responsible for
performing all the major responsibilities of the main key node when required.
Chapter 4 briefly describes the proposed system availability enhancement
framework which is elaborated further in chapter 7.
3.5 Research Methodology
3.5.1 The science and engineering-based research
method
In addressing the stated technical problem, this thesis focuses on the
development of trust-based mechanisms to ensure secure communication in
CRNs. In order to propose a solution for the research issues described in
the previous section, a systematic scientific approach must be followed to
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ensure that the methodology developed is scientifically based. A science and
engineering-based research approach is adopted in this thesis. Science and
engineering research leads to the development of new techniques, architecture,
methodologies, devices or concepts which can be combined to form new
theoretical frameworks. This research approach identifies problems and
proposes solutions to these problems. Particularly in the engineering field,
the spirit of “making something work” is essential [121, 122]. These authors
decompose science and engineering based research into three main levels:
• Conceptual level (level one): creating new ideas and new concepts
through analysis.
• Perceptual level (level two): formulating new methods and approaches
through designing and building the tools, environment or system through
implementation.
• Practical level (level three): carrying out testing and validation through
experimentation with real world examples. The process of testing and
verifying a working system provides unique insights into the benefits of
the proposed concepts, frameworks and alternatives.
3.5.2 Research stages
The research stages in this thesis are based on the three levels of the science
and engineering research approach.
• Literature Review: Firstly, relevant research papers on CRN security
are reviewed in order to obtain full understanding of the characteristics
and security requirements of CRNs. Secondly, the reviewed security
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issues in spectrum sharing in CRNs reviewed as spectrum sharing
is a key characteristic in CRNs. Thirdly, trust management is
overviewed, including trust establishment and trust maintenance in
CRNs which enables open problems related to trust establishment for
secure communication in CRNs to be identified. In addition, the
following are also reviewed: other lightweight cryptographic primitives;
combinatorial mathematics and graph theory; and simulation techniques
that will aid in the design and evaluation of frameworks in CRNs.
• Conceptual Framework for Trust-based Mechanisms for Ensuring Secure
Communication in CRNs: Figure 3.2 shows that trust establishment
and maintenance are not separate components of ensuring security in
cognitive radio architecture. Secure communication provides a security
infrastructure for other security services, while at the same time, relying
on other security services. Trust and other security services together
make up the trust-based security architecture for secure spectrum sharing
to enhance system availability in CRNs. Therefore, a comprehensive
consideration of these factors is essential when designing trust-based
secure architecture for spectrum usage for CRNs. In this thesis,
a conceptual framework for trust-based mechanisms to ensure secure
communication in CRNs (Figure 3.2) is proposed. The conceptual
framework provides a guidelines to establish secure communication by
proposing trust-based mechanisms in the next stage.
1. As previously mentioned that CRNs are application-specific
networks. Except for certain common features, a CRN for a
specific application has several unique features and thus security
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Figure 3.2: A conceptual framework for secure trust-based communication in
cognitive radio networks
requirements. Depending on the application and the architecture
of CRNs, a framework for the system will be set up. Both primary
and secondary networks’ security requirements should be different
based on the resources that cognitive nodes can use and the risks
they face. Therefore, the first step is to fully understand the
application’s background and extract the network model for the
system. The acquired information in this step includes the number
of users and the size of the network, the available hardware and
software resources, and specific knowledge that can be used in a
particular real time scenario, such as location information.
2. This step describes the various possible attacks on CRNs. An attack
on CRNs is any activity that results in (a) unacceptable interference
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to the licensed PUs; or (b) missed opportunities for SUs. As there is
no existing literature which gives a comparatively full taxonomy of
attacks for CRNs, this thesis will consider any kind of threat, which,
despite involving a minimal number of adversaries performing a
minimal number of operations, it may cause maximum damage/loss
to either the PUs or SUs in the network.
3. This step describes the techniques available to enhance secure
communication in CRNs. These techniques are defined according
to security requirements and will work as performance metrics for
the proposed trust-based mechanisms for secure communication in
CRN. Detecting attackers in CRNs for spectrum management such
as during spectrum sharing, spectrum sensing, the development
of secure spectrum sharing schemes and the evaluation of various
approaches is of great importance in establishing a scientific
methodology for the entire CRN security research area. To the best
of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first time that a trust-based
mechanism has been designed to ensure secure spectrum usage and
sharing by detecting untrustworthy users, thereby ensuring secure
communication in CRNs.
4. This step initializes the system parameters. The trust-based
mechanisms that need to be established in CRNs to ensure secure
communication according to different communication requirements,
cognitive capabilities and aggregation mechanisms are fixed in
this step, including which types of primitives are used for secure
communication in CRNs such as for spectrum sharing, or any
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predefined policies or recommendations specified for the current
network.
5. The outcome of this research is explained in this step 5.
Several trust-based schemes have been proposed for securing
communication in CRN. Each of these schemes has certain unique
characteristic according to the application background. It is not
my final goal and it is impossible to design a single protocol that
will outperform all others for all possible models. Instead, this
thesis concentrates on designing a secure communication scheme
in CRNs which matches the abstracted security model in Figure
3.2. The notion of trust between PUs and SUs has been adopted
in the development of these components. Trust-based mechanisms
for a secure communication suite in CRNs involves 6 modules: (1)
establishing trust between different nodes in CRN to check the
node’s authentication and detect malicious users; (2) trust-based
secure spectrum sharing to only authenticated users to avoid
untrustworthy users’ access to the spectrum; (3) balancing the
number of SUs and PUs in CRNs to minimize the disruption to
the SUs’ service and enhance spectrum sharing when there are
multiple PUs and SUs in the network; (4) trust-based node selection
to choose the key nodes to enhance the system reliability; (5)
trust-based secure node joining and leaving the network to prevent
malicious users from accessing the network; (6) system enhancement
by having multiple back up CA options in the network. This
stage corresponds to perceptual level of the science and engineering
research method.
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Based on the conceptual framework proposed in the first research
stage, the main task in this stage is to design several trust-based
mechanisms for ensuring secure communication in CRNs. So, trust
is calculated and established between different nodes in CRNs to
select the key nodes and authenticity is checked based on the trust
value. Then, the free spectrum is detected and allocated to the
requesting authenticated SUs for secure spectrum sharing so that
untrustworthy entities, such as selfish, malicious, and faulty nodes
can not obtain access to the free spectrum. The system’s availability
is increased by proposing multiple backup key nodes to perform the
major functionalities in the even of an error to the key node.
6. Both theoretical analysis and simulation are good tools to test the
designed schemes. By using these tools, the validity of the schemes
can be proven and at the same time, their deficiencies identied.
Steps 4, 5, and 6 are completed in turn. They form a loop and are
performed numerous times before an efficient and secure sharing scheme
is obtained. This stage corresponds to the practical level of the science
and engineering research method.
• Evaluation and Verification of the Schemes and Protocols: In this section,
evaluation includes security evaluation and performance depending on
the trust level. The theoretical analysis is based on the effectiveness of
the security primitives used in the proposed schemes, with the help of
the Cognitive Radio Network Simulator, JAVA and MATLAB software
and whether or not the schemes satisfy security requirements with
reasonable overheads and against different attacks will be verified. It
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would be useful to have comprehensive guidelines to evaluate a specific
protocol and to compare it with others. However, no previous scheme
has been proposed for secure spectrum sharing, spectrum availability
checking or system availability enhancement in CRNs. Based on the
proposed security model, appropriate performance metrics will be used
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed protocol. The
framework should evaluate the goodness of the network as a whole and
provide metrics to measure the effects of the design on the operation of
the network (by evaluating, for example, trustworthiness, availability,
reliability etc). In order to quantify the effects of a compromise on
security architecture, Tao Qin et al. in [46] investigate the inherent
tradeoffs involved in total utility loss, band usage and security robustness
in CRNs. The security of the trust-based schemes will be demonstrated
by mathematical security proof.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the set of definitions that will be used throughout the thesis
was firstly outlined. Then, the research gaps arising from the literature in
terms of key aspects were summarized, and the problem to be addressed in
this thesis was defined and decomposed into six research issues, which form the
key requirements for the development of an individual new solution. Further,
a science and engineering-based research approach which will be utilized in
this thesis for the proposed solution development was discussed. Mainly, this
chapter identified the problem this thesis aims to address and gave a brief
overview of each of the research issues which will enable the research problem
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to be solved. The next chapter will give an overview of the proposed solutions
for the problem that will be addressed in this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Solution Overview
4.1 Introduction
As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, several research studies have been
conducted on improving security by using the notion of trust in cognitive
radio networks (CRNs). However, as evident from the discussion in these
chapters, the literature does not provide a methodology for trust establishment,
mechanisms for trust-based network resource sharing such as spectrum sharing
or mechanisms for system availability enhancement for maintaining smooth
and secure communication in CRNs. In Chapter 3, six research issues that
need to be addressed in order to solve these pivotal problems were identified.
In this chapter, an overview of the proposed solutions is given, as shown in
Figure 4.1. The overview of each solution is further explained in detail in
Sections 4.2-4.4 before Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the solutions proposed in this thesis
4.2 Solution Overview for Trust
Establishment Between Different Nodes
in CRNs
The solution for trust establishment between different nodes in CRNs is divided
into two sub-solutions as follows :
• Establishing trust for the authentication of a secondary user’s (SU’s)
request to access network resources.
• Solving the biasing problem to obtain a node’s actual trust value.
A detailed overview of these solutions is given in the next subsections.
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4.2.1 Overview of the solution for establishing
trust-based authentication
To solve this problem, it is proposed that whenever the SU wants to use the
network resources, either from the secondary network or the primary network,
it is necessary for the corresponding base station to check the SU’s trust value
to authenticate its request so that no selfish or untrustworthy users has access
to the network. The proposed solution for establishing such a trust-based
authentication scheme in CRNs is as follows:
• Propose that the two networks (the primary network and the secondary
network) in CRNs and their base stations, namely: Secondary User Base
Station (SUBS), Primary User Base Station (PUBS) are connected to the
CA (Certificate Authority) which has a trust repository that contains the
trust value of every cognitive radio node.
• Propose three different ways to calculate the trust values between the
different nodes in the network. A direct trust calculation is used to
compute the trust value if a past interaction experience exists between
the nodes. In the absence of any direct past interaction experience
between the nodes, an indirect trust calculation is used to establish
the trust value between the nodes based on recommendations from
surrounding nodes. In situations where both direct and indirect trust
values exist, the base station can combine both according to the
preferences of the nodes to compute the trust value. This is done by
the integrated trust calculation method.
• The request of the SU will be authenticated based on these trust values
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for using free spectrum and other purposes in the network. The SU, who
has a trust value above the predefined threshold, will have its request
authenticated by the network. If the computed trust value is less than
the predefined threshold, then its request is not authenticated.
4.2.2 Overview of the solution for solving the biasing
problem
The proposed solution for solving the biasing problem in a secondary network
in CRNs is as follows:
• It is proposed that the CA entity which is connected to the base stations
and the nodes, performs as the key node in the network. It is also
proposed that the CA is also maintains the trust repository to keep a
record of all nodes’ trust values in the network.
• When an SUBS receives a request from an SU to access the network
resources, it calculates its trust value based on the recommendation
received from its member nodes and compares it with the trust value
of the requesting node stored by the CA.
• If the computed trust value from the SUBS is similar to the received
value from the CA, then the SUBS is assured that the recommending
node did not bias the trust value of the candidate node.
• On the other hand, if the computed values between the SUBS and CA do
not match, then the SUBS is assured that there has been some biasing
from the recommending nodes. In such cases, the SUBS identifies the
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recommending node who puts the biased value for the candidate node
and excludes it from the network.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution is depicted in Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Overview of trust establishment scheme
In chapter 5, the proposed methodology by which the trust-based
authentication scheme is established for maintaining secure communication
in CRNs is explained in detail, with an aim that no selfish or malicious user
will have access to the network resources and also to avoid the biasing problem
in secondary network in CRNs.
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4.3 Solution Overview for Secure Spectrum
Sharing Mechanisms in CRNs
The proposed solution for secure spectrum sharing mechanisms in CRNs is
divided into three sub-solutions as follows :
• Defining the different working activities of an SU to minimize the
disruption in its service when it has to vacate the PU’s spectrum and
search other free spectrum.
• Proposing a conjoint trust assessment mechanism which allows an SU to
use a PU’s free spectrum securely.
• Balancing the CRN based on the multiple PUs and SUs and the
sub-bands available for spectrum sharing.
A detailed overview of these solutions is given in the next subsections.
4.3.1 Overview of the solution to minimize disruption
in the SU’s service
An overview of the solution to minimize the disruption of an SU’s
communication during spectrum sharing in CRNs is as follows:
• During spectrum sharing, it is proposed that an SU needs to go through
five different states: search state, access state, interrupt state, vacate
state, and dropped state in order to avoid interference with the primary
users (PUs).
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• At first, the node searches the free spectrum in the search state and when
it finds a spectrum, its request to access it is either accepted or rejected
based on its trust value. This will be further discussed in Section 4.3.2.
• In the access state, the SU establishes connections with others for
communication by using a PU’s free spectrum band.
• Whenever the PU returns to the network, the communication of the SU
will be interrupted. When this occurs, the SU goes to the interrupt state
upon the arrival of the PU.
• As soon as the SU is interrupted by the PU, it will go to the vacate
state and will vacate the channel according to the CRNs policies. After
vacating the channel, the SU will go to the search state and try to search
for another free spectrum. If unsuccessful, then its communication will
be dropped and it enters the dropped state.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution for the different working states
in the SU to minimize disruption in its service during spectrum sharing in CRN
is depicted in Figure 4.3.
The different working states of an SU are modeled using a state transition
diagram shown in Chapter 6 to demonstrate the minimization of the disruption
in its service when it goes through the abovementioned defined states,
compared to the existing working approach in CRNs.
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4.3.2 Overview of the solution for a conjoint trust
assessment mechanism for secure spectrum
sharing
An overview of the solution allowing only the trustworthy users in CRN to
securely use the PU’s free spectrum is as follows:
• Trust assessment for the spectrum requesting candidate node from the
secondary network.
• Trust assessment for the spectrum requesting candidate node from the
primary network.
• Conjoint trust assessment of the requesting node from both networks to
ascertain its overall trustworthiness to make sure that no untrustworthy
malicious or selfish node can access the free spectrum and paralyze the
network’s normal performance.
A detailed overview of the proposed secure spectrum sharing approach in
CRNs is as follows:
• Whenever an SU senses a PU’s free spectrum [9], it sends a message to
the SUBS requesting access to that spectrum.
• SUBS and PUBS first authenticate its request based on its trust value
to ensure that the request is coming from a valid node.
• After this, the SUBS asks its member nodes to send the trust value for
the authenticated requesting SU.
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• The SUBS accumulates the trust values that it receives from its member
nodes and sends it to the PUBS.
• Once the PUBS receives the trust value of the requesting node from the
SUBS, it asks its member nodes to assign a trust value for the requesting
SU.
• Upon receiving the recommended values from the member nodes, the
PUBS accumulates them and combines them with the trust values
received from the SUBS.
• If the conjoint trust value of the requesting node is equal to or above
a predefined threshold, the requesting SU will be granted permission to
use the PU’s free spectrum band, otherwise its request to access the
spectrum is denied.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution is depicted in Figure 4.4
129
SU sends request to 
secondary base 
station 
Secondary base station accumulates the requesting 
          node’s trust value from its member nodes
Secondary base station sends the accumulated trust value 
                         to    primary base station
Primary base station accumulates the requesting 
secondary  node’s trust value from its  member  nodes
Primary base station then conjoins both accumulated 
trust values  received from both networks  
Is the trust value 
enough to assign 
spectrum ?
Yes
Spectrum is assigned 
to requesting 
secondary user
No
Request to access the 
spectrum is rejected
Start
  Does the
 requesting node
 pass the authentication 
process from both 
   base stations?
No
Request is rejected
Yes
End
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4.3.3 Overview of the solution for balancing the CRNs
for multiple PUs, SUs and sub-bands
A detailed overview for balancing the CRN and analyzing the system statistics
of a balanced network during spectrum sharing is as follows:
• Identify the number of SUs, PUs and the available sub-bands.
• The number of SUs in a balanced CRN depends on either the number of
PUs or the number of sub-bands into which each PU’s licensed band is
divided.
• If the number of PUs or the number of sub-bands in each licensed band
is increased, more sub-bands are available. Therefore, more SUs are
allowed to use the sub-bands in a balanced network.
• Analyze system statistics by analyzing criteria such as blocking rate,
deprivation rate, utilization ratio etc during spectrum sharing while
multiple SUs and PUs are used in a CRN to ensure a balance is
maintained between them.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution is depicted in 4.5
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Figure 4.5: Overview of secure spectrum with multiple users in a balanced
network
In Chapter 6, the three sub-solutions for secure spectrum sharing in CRN
will be described in detail.
4.4 Solution Overview for System Availability
Enhancement Mechanisms in CRNs
The proposed solution for enhancing system availability in CRNs, is
sub-divided into the following three sub-solutions :
• Selecting the key nodes of CRNs based on their trust value.
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• Proposing a process for a secure node joining and leaving process for the
network and their effects on the node’s trust value.
• Increasing the system’s availability and reliability by introducing
multiple back up CAs in the network.
A detailed overview of these solutions is given in the next subsections.
4.4.1 Overview of the solution for selecting the key
nodes in CRNs based on their trust value
An overview of the solution for selecting the key nodes such as Certificate
Authority (CA) and Backup Certificate Authority (BCA) which serve as
trusted third parties in the network based on the trust value is as follows:
• Each node’s trust value is calculated by other nodes in the CRN
depending on the different activities and the trust value given to it for
each activity.
• If the node has the highest trust value and its trust value is above the
trust threshold, then the node is selected as the CA. If the node has the
second highest trust value and its trust value is above the trust threshold,
then that node is selected as the first candidate to be the BCA. This
process is repeated for each node whose trust value is above the trust
threshold.
• If the node has a trust value which is below the trust threshold, then it
works as a normal node.
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A pictorial overview of the proposed solution for selecting the key nodes
based on trust values is depicted in Figure 4.6
Each node’s trust 
value is calculated 
by other nodes and
 finally the PUBS 
 calculates the final 
    trust value
Start
Yes
If 
No Works as normal 
node
N
t threshold>
?
Node with the highest 
trust value is selected 
as the CA
Node with the third 
highest trust value is 
selected as the 
second BCA
Node with the second 
highest trust value is 
selected as the first 
BCA
Node with the Nth 
highest trust value is 
selected as the  (N-1)th 
BCA
End
1N N= +
N=number of nodes=1,2,.......n
N
t = trust value of N node
Figure 4.6: Overview of the node selection scheme
4.4.2 Overview of the solution for the process of secure
node joining and leaving the network and its effect
on the trust value
An overview of the solution for the secure node joining and leaving process in
CRNs is as follows:
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• In the proposed approach for secure joining the network, the new node
broadcasts its certificate and random number to all the member nodes
in the network as well as to the base station. The base station and the
member nodes verify the validity of the new node’s certificate. After
verifying the validity, the node is either permitted to join the network or
otherwise. If the node successfully passes the joining process, its trust
value is incremented by 0.05.
• For secure leaving the network, the node will send the normal leaving
message to the base station. This is treated as ‘normal leaving’, otherwise
it is treated as ‘abnormal leaving’. For normal leaving, the node’s trust
value is incremented by 0.05, otherwise its trust value is decremented.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution for secure node joining and
leaving the network is depicted in Figure 4.7
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Figure 4.7: Overview of secure node joining and leaving process
4.4.3 Overview of the solution for increasing system
availability and reliability by introducing multiple
backup CAs in CRN
A detailed overview of the proposed solution to increase system availability
and reliability is as follows:
• Propose a system that has multiple BCAs, and which can switch its
functionality from a CA to BCA in response to the detection of an error
in a CA or in the case of a CA being biased and under attack by other
malicious nodes.
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• Propose different working states in the working of a CA and BCA in a
multiple BCA system through which they need to go according to their
present state in order to enhance system availability.
• If the CA is considered a malicious CA due to an attack, then
reconfiguration techniques are applied to correct it.
• During the time the reconfiguration techniques are being applied, the
first backup CA takes over the role of the CA.
• If the reconfiguration techniques work well for the affected CA, then it
is reinstated as the CA from the BCA in the CRN; otherwise, the CA’s
activities will be taken on by the BCA.
• A similar process is applied when the BCA is under attack by other
malicious nodes.
• The effect of the solution to system availability and reliability
enhancement is evaluated by using different metrics such as downtime
cost, trustworthiness etc.
A pictorial overview of the proposed solution for enhancing availability by
introducing multiple BCAs in the system is depicted in 4.8
In Chapter 7, the three sub-solutions to enhance the system’s performance
by increasing its availability and reliability will be described in detail.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a solution for each of the six research issues that were identified
in Chapter 3 was proposed. Finally, the solution overview to the problem that
is being address in this thesis was presented.
In the next chapter, a framework for trust establishment between different
nodes for authentication checking in CRN is proposed, which was identified in
this chapter as being the first step of the trust-based methodology to maintain
secure communication in CRNs.
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Chapter 5
Framework for Trust-based
Secondary Node Authentication
in Cognitive Radio Networks
5.1 Introduction
In the current literature, even though the importance of trust in cognitive radio
networks (CRNs) has been discussed, the proposed approaches using trust are
insufficient for a secure system due to the following drawbacks:
• Most trust-based schemes consider trust only for trusted routing in CRNs
and not for securing spectrum access from untrustworthy users.
• One of the main problem of establishing trust in CRNs is ‘biasing’ by
other malicious nodes. So, in such scenarios, it is not possible to obtain
the actual trust value for authentication purposes. No approach has been
proposed to address this.
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• No trust-based authentication framework has been proposed in the
literature to enhance security in CRNs.
Due to the abovementioned drawbacks, three possible security threats may
arise which may disrupt the process of secure communication in CRNs:
1. Any selfish or malicious node could access the network and break down
normal network activity by using the network resources in a selfish way.
2. Malicious users may use the primary user’s (PU’s) free spectrum to jam
the network which inhibits secondary users using this spectrum.
3. Any member node can be biased by other malicious users who can
increase or decrease any member node’s trust value in the network. So,
it is not possible to obtain the actual trust value for the member node.
In order to solve these abovementioned security threats, a Trust-based
Secondary Node Authentication (TSNA) framework is proposed in this
chapter. The proposed framework authenticates a secondary user’s (SU’s)
request for it to be considered to use PU’s free spectrum and other network
resources based on its trust values to ensure that the request is coming from
a valid trustworthy node in the network and no malicious or selfish user can
gain access to the network and paralyze the network activity. The proposed
framework provides solutions and sufficient proofs for:
• authenticating an SU’s request to access PU’s free spectrum and other
network resources based on their level of trust.
• solving the biasing problem brought by malicious users in the network
by checking the requesting node’s actual trust value.
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This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, the system architecture
and working of the proposed TSNA framework is discussed. In Sections 5.3 to
5.5, each phase of the proposed framework is explained in detail. In Section
5.6, an example is given to calculate the trust value for authenticating an SU’s
request. Experimental results are shown in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes
the chapter.
5.2 Proposed Framework for Trust-based
Secondary Node Authentication (TSNA)
in CRNs
5.2.1 System model and architecture
The system model of the proposed TSNA framework to ensure secure
communication in CRN is shown in Figure 5.1.
Legend :
PU-Primary User
SU-Secondary User
CA-Certificate Authority
PUBS-Primary User Base Station
SUBS-Secondary User Base Station
PU1
SUBS
SU2
SU1
SU4
PUBS
PU3
PU2
CA
Trust 
Repository
Trust Repository
Private 
Repository
Public 
Repository
Primary 
Network
Secondary 
Network
Figure 5.1: System model of the TSNA framework
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The key components of the framework are:
• Base Station: A base Station is defined as the central point of contact
between the two different types of users, namely primary users (PUs) and
secondary users (SUs). There are two types of base stations considered in
the proposed architecture, namely Primary User Base Station (PUBS)
and Secondary User Base Station (SUBS). PUs are connected to the
PUBS whereas SUs are connected to the SUBS.
• Certificate Authority: A certificate authority (CA) is an entity which
is connected to the PUBS and SUBS in the network and is responsible
for maintaining the member node’s trust values for both networks by
managing the trust repository. In the proposed architecture, the CA is
an authorized agent which is responsible for providing a node’s actual
trust value to solve the biasing problem and set up a communication
link for authentication purposes in the CRN. The CA is also responsible
for updating the trust values of the nodes in the trust repository if they
change. The respective base station (SUBS or PUBS) will inform the
CA of any change, who will then update the trust value in the trust
repository.
• Trust Repository: The trust repository stores the trust values of
different users. Each user has two types of trust values stored in the
repository, the first being the public trust value and the second being
the private trust value. Both of these repositories are controlled by the
CA. The public trust value of a user is available publicly to other users
and is provided to them by the CA, when a request is placed. The private
trust value of an user is only visible to the CA and is computed and stored
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to ensure the integrity of the public trust value. If any malicious user
in the network intentionally alters the public trust value, the CA can
check the private trust value and obtain information about which node’s
trust value has been changed by the malicious users. It then broadcasts
a message to the corresponding base station to remove the malicious user
from the network.
5.2.2 Working of the proposed TSNA framework in
CRNs
In this section, the working of the proposed TSNA framework for
authenticating an SU’s request to confirm that the request is coming from
a valid and trustworthy user to use the spectrum and other network resources
based on their trust values in the network is presented. As mentioned in
Section 4.2, this framework can prevent a malicious node from accessing the
network by authenticating a node’s request based on its trust value. It also
solves the biasing problem by cross checking the member node’s trust value
with the trust value stored in the trust repository which plays an important
role in spectrum decision making and other purposes in CRNs. Figure 5.2
presents a flowchart diagram of the working of the proposed framework. The
sequence of steps in the proposed framework are as follows:
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Figure 5.2: Flowchart illustrating steps performed by the TSNA framework
145
5.2.2.1 Trust calculation between different nodes
The trust calculation phase between different nodes in the proposed TSNA
framework is as follows:
1. Whenever an SU wants to use the network resources either from the
primary network or secondary network, the requesting or candidate SU’s
trust value is calculated by the SUBS to decide whether the request
is coming from a valid SU or not. Here, the requesting SU is termed
either the ‘requesting node’ or ‘candidate node’. During this step, the
requesting SU sends a request to the SUBS to use either a PU’s free
spectrum or network resources from the secondary network.
2. The SUBS then sends a request to all of its member nodes, asking them
to assign a trust value to the candidate node.
3. All the member nodes in the secondary network assign or recommend a
trust value to the candidate node, based on their previous cooperation
with the candidate node, as mentioned in Section 5.3.
4. The SUBS aggregates the received recommendations and calculates
the final trust value of the candidate node and, if it is selected as a
trustworthy node by the process mentioned in 5.2.2.2, then the SUBS
either authenticates the candidate node’s request to use its network
resources or forwards the candidate node’s request to the PUBS to
authenticate the candidate node’s request to the primary network.
5. In the scenario of the requesting node wanting to access the PU’s free
spectrum, the request is forwarded to the PUBS by the SUBS. The PUBS
146
also calculates the candidate node’s trust value to decide whether its
request is authenticated or not.
6. The process which the PUBS follows is similar to that of the SUBS. The
PUBS sends a request to all of its member nodes, asking them to assign
or recommend a trust value to the candidate node. All member nodes
in the primary network recommend the candidate node using the trust
calculation method mentioned in Section 5.3 and sends the trust value
to the PUBS.
7. The PUBS calculates the candidate node’s final trust value by
aggregating the received response and makes a decision as to whether
to authenticate its request or not.
8. Both base stations send the calculated trust value of the candidate node
to the CA for record keeping purposes.
5.2.2.2 Authenticating an SU’s request
The phase for authenticating an SU’s request in the proposed TSNA framework
is as follows:
1. If the request of the candidate node is to use the secondary network’s
resources, the SUBS compares the computed trust value against the
predefined threshold value to decide whether it is authenticated to use
the requesting service or not. If the calculated trust value is greater
than the predefined threshold, the requesting SU’s request to access the
network resources is accepted. Otherwise the SUBS rejects the SU’s
request.
147
2. If the request of the candidate node is to use PU’s free spectrum,
then after passing the authentication process in the secondary network,
the SUBS forwards the request to the PUBS who also computes its
trust value from the members of its network and then compares its
final trust value with the predefined threshold value. If the final trust
value is greater than threshold value, the candidate node’s request is
authenticated, ensuring that its request is from a valid trustworthy node
in the secondary network, otherwise its request is not authenticated.
After authenticating the candidate node’s request, a decision is made
as to whether to assign the spectrum to it or not by using the process
proposed in Chapter 6.
5.2.2.3 Solution to avoid the biasing problem
The phase for solving the biasing problem that occurs only in the secondary
network in the proposed TSNA framework is as follows:
1. Whenever a node wants to obtain other member node’s trust value in
the secondary network, it sends a request to the SUBS.
2. The SUBS sends a message to the CA as a query to learn the candidate
node’s trust value. In the meantime, the SUBS also collects the trust
value from other member nodes (using the above trust calculation
method in 5.2.2.1) and computes the candidate node’s final trust value.
3. The CA checks the candidate node’s trust value by comparing the trust
value from both (public and private) repositories and sends a response
to the requesting SUBS.
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4. The SUBS compares the computed trust value with the value received
from the CA. If both are identical, then the SUBS is sure that the
candidate node’s trust value is not biased by the member nodes,
otherwise the candidate node’s trust value is biased in the network.
5. If the trust value of the candidate node is biased, the SUBS then checks
the candidate node’s trust value received from every individual member
node in the network at a period of time before and after the biasing
problem happens. If there exists any dissimilarity between these values
for any particular member node, the SUBS reports the member node as
either a ‘malicious user’ or ‘biased by a malicious user’.
6. The SUBS then broadcasts a message to all of its member nodes not to
communicate with the malicious node and excludes this malicious node
from the network.
In the next sections, the working of each of these steps defined in the
proposed framework is discussed in detail:
5.3 Trust Calculation Methods Between
Different Nodes in the TSNA Framework
As discussed in Section 4.2, trust is used to authenticate a SU’s request to
allow it to use a PU’s free spectrum or other network resources and avoid
malicious behaviors in the network. There are three different ways by which a
node’s trust value in the proposed framework is calculated, as shown in Figure
5.3. They are:
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Direct trust calculation: Direct trust calculation is used to compute
the trust value of a node by other member nodes if a past interaction
experience exists between them. This is denoted by TDirecttrust. Referring
to Figure 5.3, node 2 is the candidate node. As both node 1 and node 2
have a direct communication link with the candidate node, they use the direct
trust calculation method (using its past communication link) to compute the
candidate node’s trust value.
Indirect trust calculation: In the absence of any direct past interaction
experience between the member nodes and the candidate node, the indirect
trust calculation is used to establish the trust value of the candidate node.
This method determines the candidate node’s trust value based on the
recommendations from the other surrounding member nodes. The computed
trust value is denoted by TIndirecttrust. In other words, if the member node does
not have any past behavioral history or any experience with the candidate
node, the member node sends a request to other surrounding member nodes,
soliciting for recommendations about the candidate node. In this case, trust
is calculated indirectly for the candidate node. Referring to Figure 5.3, node
3 has no direct communication link with the candidate node but node 3 has
a direct relation with node 1 and node 4 who can make a recommendation
about the candidate node. Therefore, node 3 uses the indirect trust calculation
method to compute the candidate node’s trust value.
Integrated trust calculation: In situations where both direct and the
indirect trust values exist between two nodes, the member node combines
them to compute the candidate node’s trust value. This is denoted by the
integrated trust calculation method and the computed trust value is denoted
by TIntegtrust. Referring to Figure 5.3, node 4 has both a direct and an indirect
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communication link with the candidate node. Therefore, node 4 uses trust
values from both links to compute the candidate node’s trust value.
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Figure 5.3: Different trust relationships between the candidate node and
member nodes
Figure 5.4 illustrates the steps performed by the TSNA framework for the
trust calculation between different nodes in the network.
The trust value calculated by each of the abovementioned methods is in
the range of 0 and 1, where a value of 0 represents complete distrust and a
value of 1 represents complete trust [55]. In the next sub-sections, a detailed
explanation of the process by which the trust value of a candidate node is
calculated by other member nodes in each scenario is presented.
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5.3.1 Direct trust calculation
The direct trust value of a candidate node is determined by the other member
nodes with whom the candidate node’s past cooperation exists. Since the
conditions of a node are always changing, the base station constantly needs
to check the trust values of the member nodes, based on their multi-attribute
trust values. Han et al. [123] relate reliability with trust, where reliability
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is defined as the capability of a node performing a given task as required
and the outcome is based on the number of successes and failures in past
cooperation record. Trust can be defined by the reliability that the trusting
entity has in the trusted agent [124]. Trust is the subjective probability by
which node A depends on node B to fulfil its promises in performing an
action; ; after which node A considers node B as a reliable node [125]. In
CRNs, a node needs the service provided by other nodes for communication
between different nodes. A cognitive radio node can provide some cognitive
services to others by cooperating different attributes such as sensing functions,
sensing communication, showing sensing result consistency etc. When the
cooperation process among the nodes finishes, the trust relationship is set
up among the different nodes based on the historical cooperation records
which determines them as either reliable or unreliable nodes. The cooperation
records include different functionalities such as packet forwarding probability,
encryption capability, energy, etc. If a node has a high reliability or trust
value in a criterion such as packet forwarding probability then it will be
regarded as a trustworthy node and vice versa. The trust value of a node
can be calculated based on its reliable or unreliable capability in different
functionalities and the trust model establishes the trust relationship during
the interaction process by using these values among the nodes. Information
about past cooperation is assembled in a table of cooperation records among
the users, as shown in Table 5.1. Each member node stores this cooperation
record in the network. Whenever a member node wants to assign the candidate
node’s trust value, it monitors its cooperation record with that candidate
node and calculates the trust value for the candidate node. As referred to
by Han et al. [123], each attribute has three relevant values: the number
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of successes (Si, i = 1, 2....n) which indicates the reliability of the node, the
number of failures (Fi, i = 1, 2...n) which indicates the unreliability of the
node and the amount of cooperation (Ci, i = 1, 2, ....n) . It is assumed that
cooperative/non-cooperative behavior is of equal value during the interaction
process between the users.
Table 5.1: Cooperation record table
Attributes Success Failure Cooperation Sum
A1 S1 F1 C1
A2 S2 F2 C2
.... .... .... ....
An Sn Fn Cn
In Table 5.1, the cooperation sum is the summation of the number of
failures and the number of successes for an event and is represented by Ci =
Si + Fi, i = 1, 2, ...n. The trust value for attribute Ai can be computed based
on the values in Table 5.1 as follows:
TAi =
Si
Ci
(5.1)
Thus, the overall trust value for the candidate node with n attributes Ai, i =
1, 2, ..n (denoted by TDirecttrust) can be computed using TAi as follows:
TDirecttrust =
n∏
i=1
TAi
n∏
i=1
TAi +
n∏
i=1
(1− TAi)
(5.2)
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5.3.2 Indirect trust calculation
In the absence of member nodes having direct interaction with the candidate
node, the member node solicits for recommendations about the candidate
node from other surrounding member nodes. It may receive replies from
nodes who can be broadly categorized in three different types, namely reliable
nodes, unknown nodes and unreliable nodes. Reliable nodes are known to be
trustworthy nodes to the member node. In other words, the member nodes
have solicited recommendations from these nodes in the past and found them
to give trustworthy recommendations. The trust value recommended by such
reliable nodes is represented as (Treliable). Unknown nodes are those from whom
the member node has not solicited recommendations in the past. The trust
value recommended from these nodes is represented by (Tunknown). Unreliable
nodes are those from whom the member node has solicited recommendations
in the past and has found them to give incorrect recommendations. The
trust value recommended from these nodes is represented by (Tunreliable).
While calculating the trust value using the indirect method, it is assumed
that the member node considers only the recommendations from reliable
and unknown nodes and ignores the recommendations from unreliable nodes.
However, to give more weight to the recommendations from the reliable nodes
compared to the unknown nodes, the member nodes assign a weight value
(utility/importance factor) based on the events that were monitored and
quantified.
In order to obtain the indirect trust value of the candidate node, the
trust values of Treliable and Tunknown need to be calculated. The member node
combines all kinds of trust values received from the recommenders to compute
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the candidate node’s trust value. At first, the member node retrieves the trust
values from the reliable nodes, evaluated by themselves, which is stored locally
and also receives the trust values of the candidate node from the reliable nodes
and computes Treliable using equation 5.3.
Treliable =
nreliable∑
i=1
TMRi × TRCi
nreliable
(5.3)
where TMRi denotes the trust value from member node (M) to i th reliable
node (R);
TRCi denotes the trust value from reliable node (R) to candidate node (C) and
nreliable denotes the total number of reliable nodes.
Similarly Tunknown is calculated using equation 5.4.
Tunknown =
nunknown∑
k=1
TUCk
nunknown
(5.4)
where TUCk denotes the trust value from kth unknown node to candidate node
and
nunknown denotes the total number of unknown nodes.
Trust value Treliable is assigned a weight Wreliable and trust value Tunknown
is assigned a weight Wunknown. These weights, Wreliable and Wunknown, can
be assigned using different approaches. In the approach used in this thesis,
weights were assigned according to the member node’s own criteria, based on
the events that were monitored and quantified.
Thus, the indirect trust value can be calculated using the traditional
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weighted approach [123, 126, 127] as follows:
TIndirecttrust = TreliableWreliable + TunknownWunknown (5.5)
where Wreliable +Wunknown = 1 and Wreliable,Wunknown ∈ [0, 1]
5.3.3 Integrated trust calculation
In the proposed framework, integrated trust is calculated in the case where
both a direct and indirect communication link exists between the member
nodes and the candidate node. In such a scenario, the member nodes can
automatically assign different weight values based on the requirements of
a certain task. Thus, the integrated trust value can be calculated using
the traditional weighted approach [123, 126, 127]. The weight of the direct
trust is denoted by Wdirecttrust, the weight of the indirect trust is denoted by
Windirecttrust. The integrated trust value can be calculated by the following
equation:
Tintegtrust =Wdirecttrust × Tdirecttrust +Windirecttrust × Tindirecttrust (5.6)
where Wdirecttrust +Windirecttrust = 1
and Wdirecttrust,Windirecttrust ∈ [0, 1]
When cooperation between the different nodes has taken place, based on
above calculation methods in the network, every member node records and
updates the trust value of its cooperation node.
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Using the abovementioned trust calculation methods, the SUBS can
determine the trust value of an SU and make a decision as to whether its
request is authenticated either to use the secondary network’s resources or
for spectrum sharing (as discussed in detail in Chapter 6) from the primary
network. However, in cases where an SU is a new user to the CRN, it may
have a certain trust value in the secondary network which it has achieved
by the secure joining process (this is discussed in further detail in Chapter
7) but it may not have a trust value with either the PUBS or the other
PUs. In such scenarios, the abovementioned trust calculation mechanisms
will clearly disadvantage its authentication request to access the free spectrum
from the primary network. To address such a scenario, in the next subsection,
an approach is proposed to bootstrap the newly joined SU node.
5.3.4 Bootstrapping of a new SU in the primary
network
Using the proposed approach, the PUBS can bootstrap a newly joined SU
in two ways, namely (a) the triangular trust calculation method and (b) the
reference trust calculation method. The steps for bootstrapping a new SU in
CRNs are as follows:
1. New SU joins the network and sends a request to the SUBS to use the
PU’s free spectrum. The SUBS assigns a trust value to this newly
joined node based on its joining process to the secondary network
and its behaviour is monitored for a certain period. If it passes the
authentication process in the secondary network, its request is passed to
the PUBS.
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2. Once its request is received from the SUBS, the PUBS needs to calculate
the SU’s trust value to authenticate its request in the primary network.
3. As the SU node does not have any trust value with either the PUBS or
the other PUs, the relationship between the PUBS and SUBS is taken
into consideration to determine the trust value of the new SU by using
either the triangular or reference trust calculation method.
4. If the PUBS and SUBS have a trust relation between them, the PUBS
uses the triangular trust calculation method to calculate the SU’s trust
value. If there is no trust relation between the SUBS and PUBS, but if
the PUBS trusts some member nodes in the secondary network, then in
this particular case, the PUBS uses reference trust calculation method
to calculate the new SU’s trust value.
The detailed process of triangular and reference trust calculation are explained
next.
5.3.4.1 Triangular trust calculation
The triangular trust calculation method is used to determine the trust value
of the newly joined SU when it has a relationship with the SUBS by a certain
amount but not with the PUBS. In such cases, the triangular relationship is
formed considering the trust relationship between PUBS −→ SUBS; SUBS
−→ SU1 to calculate the trust value of the SU node, as shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Triangular trust calculation to bootstrap a new SU node
The trust value of the PUBS for the SU1 is denoted by TPUBS,SU1. Suppose
the trust value between the PUBS and SUBS is 0.7, TPUBS,SUBS = 0.7 and
that between the SUBS and SU1 is 0.6 TSUBS,SU1 = 0.6, the resultant trust
value between the PUBS and SU1 is determined as:
TPUBS,SU1 = TPUBS,SUBS ∗ TSUBS,SU1 = 0.7 ∗ 0.6 = 0.42
However, it is possible that in some cases there may not be a trust value
relationship between the PUBS and SUBS. In such cases, the newly joined SU
is bootstrapped using the reference trust calculation.
5.3.4.2 Reference trust calculation
The reference trust calculation uses recommendations from other users to
calculate the trust value of the new SU. But the solicited recommendations
by the PUBS are from the SUs and not from the PUs as occurs in the indirect
trust calculation method.
In the reference trust calculation, the average of the recommended trust
values received for a newly joined SU is used to determine its trust value. For
instance, if the trust relationship between different nodes is as shown in Figure
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5.6, it can be seen that the PUBS trusts SU2 and SU3 with a value of 0.5 and
0.6, respectively. But both SU2 and SU3 know the new SU with a trust value
of 0.5 and 0.4, respectively.
PUBS
SU3
SU1
SU2
0.5
0.5
0.6 0.4
0.25
Figure 5.6: Reference trust calculation to bootstrap a new SU node
So, the average trust value between the PUBS and SU1 is determined as:
TPUBS,SU1 =(TPUBS,SU2 ∗TSU2,SU1+TPUBS,SU3 ∗TSU3,SU1))/2 = (0.5 ∗ 0.5+
0.6 ∗ 0.4)/2 = 0.249 =⇒ 0.25
For both cases, if the computed trust value of the newly joined SU is greater
than the predefined threshold value (Tthreshold), then the PUBS considers that
node as a trustworthy node to authenticate its request. On the other hand,
if the computed trust value is below the predefined threshold, then the PUBS
declines the request of the SU.
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5.4 Authenticating an SU’s Request in the
TSNA Framework
In this phase, the authenticity of the requesting SU is checked based on the
trust value in order to accept its request. Figure 5.7 illustrates the flowchart
of this phase.
Computed trust 
value (T)  of a 
node
Trust value is checked with 
the predefined threshold 
value (             )
Yes
Node’s request is 
authenticated 
No
Node’s request is 
not authenticated
T
threshold
?T
threshold
T ≥
Reported as malicious 
node if the node’s request 
is not authenticated more 
than 15 times within a time 
period.
Start
End
Figure 5.7: Flowchart of the authentication checking step performed by the
TSNA framework
The work flow of this step is as follows:
1. The requesting SU’s trust value is computed by the trust calculation
method described in Section 5.3.
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2. The computed trust value T of the requesting node is compared with the
system defined threshold value (Tthreshold)
3. If T is greater than or equal to Tthreshold, the requesting node’s request
is authenticated to be considered as a valid and trustworthy user to use
the secondary network’s resources or even to use the PU’s free spectrum.
This then leads to the process of deciding whether to allow the SU’s
request to use the spectrum. The detailed spectrum sharing process of
the primary network after the SU’s request is authenticated is described
in Chapter 6.
4. If T is less than Tthreshold, then the requesting node’s request is declined
and it is not considered as an authenticated user in the network.
5. In the proposed approach, if the node’s request is declined fifteen times
within a time period, then the node is not trustworthy at all and is
reported as a malicious node for its suspicious behaviour. This is out of
the scope of this thesis.
5.5 Solution to Avoid the Biasing Problem
During Trust Recommendation
A malicious node could change the candidate node’s trust value as an effect of
malicious behaviour, thus the biasing problem arises in the secondary network
in CRNs during the trust value recommendation of a node. Another threat
is that member nodes in the secondary network, being biased by malicious
nodes, can assign a false trust value for the candidate node. As discussed in
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Section 4.2.2, to solve this problem, the certificate authority based framework
is proposed in this chapter. The working steps of this phase are shown in
Figure 5.8.
Node wants to know 
other node’s trust 
value
in the secondary 
network
Sends request 
to the SUBS
SUBS calculates the 
trust value of the 
candidate node 
depending on the  
recommendations 
received from other 
nodes
SUBS sends query 
to the CA to know 
the candidate 
node’s trust value
If both are the 
same?
CA sends 
the result to 
the SUBS
CA checks public 
and private records 
about the candidate 
node’s trust value 
from the repository
Yes
Public repository 
has been 
changed
No
SUBS compares  the 
computed trust value 
and received trust 
value from the CA 
If both are the 
same?
Node’s 
trust 
value is 
not 
biased 
Yes
Node’s 
trust value 
is biased
No
SUBS checks which 
node assigns a 
biased value 
Detects the member 
node that assigns the 
biased trust value to 
the candidate node 
SUBS excludes the 
biased node from the 
network 
SUBS sends message   to other member nodes  
that the detected node has been compromised 
by the malicious node to assign a biased value 
to the candidate node  
CA corrects the public 
repository by copying values 
from the private repository
Start
End
Figure 5.8: Flowchart for the biasing problem solution phase performed by
the TSNA framework
The work flow of this step is as follows:
1. Whenever a node wants to obtain another member node’s trust value in
the secondary network, it sends a request to the SUBS. In some scenarios,
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the SUBS may also want to know any other member node’s trust value.
2. The SUBS sends a query to the CA node to obtain the candidate node’s
trust value. The SUBS also collects the trust value from other member
nodes and computes the trust value for the candidate node.
3. The CA node checks both repositories for the candidate node’s trust
value. If both are identical, then CA sends the trust value of the
candidate node to the SUBS as a response to the query. If both are
not similar, the CA confirms that the public repository has been hacked
by some malicious node. To address this problem, the CA corrects the
public repository by copying the trust values for all the member nodes
in the network from the private repository and replacing them with the
values in the public repository. After addressing this issue, the CA sends
the trust value of the candidate node to the SUBS.
4. The SUBS receives the result from the CA node. It then compares the
trust value that it has computed for the candidate node with the result
received from the CA. If both are the same, the SUBS is sure about the
candidate node’s actual trust value. If both are not same, the SUBS is
sure that the candidate node’s trust value has been biased by malicious
users in its network. The SUBS checks and compares the trust values
assigned by every individual member node before and after the biasing
problem occurs in the network. If there is any dissimilarity between these
values, the SUBS reports these nodes as either being ‘biased by malicious
nodes’ or as ‘malicious nodes’. Member nodes biased by malicious nodes
always assign a biased trust value for the candidate node. To solve this
malicious behaviour, the SUBS excludes these member nodes from the
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network and broadcasts a message to the network not to communicate
with such biased nodes.
5.6 Example of Trust Calculation to
Authenticate an SU’s Request in CRNs
In this subsection, an example is given as to how the trust value is calculated
to authenticate an SU’s request. In the example, there are two networks in
the CRN, namely the primary network and the secondary network, and all the
member nodes of each network have direct communication with one another
as well as with their base stations.
5.6.1 Example of direct trust calculation
In this example, there is direct communication between the member node and
the candidate node. The member node has a history of cooperation with the
candidate node, as shown in Table 5.2. In this example, there are three criteria
against which a candidate node’s trust value is determined by the member
nodes. Table 5.2 represents the cooperation records of the past behaviour of
the candidate node in each of these three criteria in different time periods (Tn).
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(a) Cooperation records for criteria C1 (b) Cooperation records for criteria C2 (c) Cooperation records for criteria C3
Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure
Time T1 1 0 T1 1 0 T1 1 0
T2 1 0 T2 1 0 T2 0 1
T3 0 1 T3 0 1 T3 0 1
T4 0 1 T4 1 0 T4 1 0
T5 1 0 T5 1 0 T5 1 0
T6 1 0 T6 1 0 T6 0 1
T7 0 1 T7 0 1 T7 0 1
Table 5.2: Cooperation record table for direct trust calculation
Using equation 5.1, the trust value between the candidate node and the
member node for criterion C1 is determined as follows:
TAi =
Si
Ci
=
4
7
= 0.57 (5.7)
Similarly, the trust values for criteria C2 and C3 are 0.71 and 0.42,
respectively. Using equation 5.8, the overall trust value of the candidate node
is calculated as follows:
TDirecttrust =
n∏
i=1
TAi
n∏
i=1
TAi +
n∏
i=1
(1− TAi)
=
0.57 + 0.71 + 0.42
(0.57 + 0.71 + 0.42) + (1− 0.57) + (1− 0.71) + (1− 0.42)
=
1.7
3
= 0.56 (5.8)
Therefore, the member node computes the candidate node’s trust value
TDirecttrust using the direct trust calculation and its value is 0.56.
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5.6.2 Example of indirect trust calculation
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, it is possible that a member node and a
candidate node do not have a direct communication link, as shown in Figure
5.9. In this particular case, the member node uses the indirect trust calculation
method to compute the candidate node’s trust value.
List of reliable 
nodes
List of unknown 
nodes
Member 
node
Candidate 
node
.
.5
.33
.7
.45
.5
.5
.6
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
0.45
0.6
0.
0
0.45
0.5
0.
0.5
Trustworthiness
Figure 5.9: Example of indirect trust calculation
Firstly, the member node receives the recommendations for the candidate
node from the reliable nodes and computes the candidate node’s trust value
using equation 5.9.
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Treliable =
nreliable∑
i=1
TMRi × TRCi
nreliable
=
0.45 ∗ 0.5 + 0.6 ∗ 0.45 + 0.5 ∗ 0.7
3
=
0.22 + 0.27 + 0.35
3
= 0.28 (5.9)
Then, the member node receives the recommendations for the candidate
node from the unknown nodes and computes the candidate node’s trust value
using equation 5.10.
Tunknown =
nunknown∑
k=1
TUCk
nunknown
=
0.33 + 0.5
2
= 0.41 (5.10)
Therefore, the member node computes the candidate node’s trust value
using the indirect trust calculation as follows:
TIndirecttrust = 0.7 ∗ 0.28 + 0.3 ∗ 0.41 = 0.196 + 0.123 = 0.319 (5.11)
where 0.7 and 0.3 is assigned a weight value for reliable trust and unknown
trust, respectively.
5.6.3 Example of integrated trust calculation
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, where the member node has both the direct and
indirect communications with the candidate node as shown in Figure 5.10, the
member node uses the integrated trust calculation method to determine the
candidate node’s trust value.
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Node 4
Node 3
Node 2
0.3
0.6
0.2
Member
 node
Candidate 
node
Figure 5.10: Example of integrated trust calculation
As shown in Figure 5.10, the member node wants to know the candidate
node’s trust value. The member node has a direct relationship with the
candidate node by a trust value of 0.6 and it also has a direct relationship
with node 3 by a trust value of 0.3 who can recommend the candidate node
by a value of 0.2. Therefore, the trust value of the candidate node from the
member node can be calculated using equation 5.6 as follows:
Tintegtrust = 0.8 ∗ 0.6 + 0.2 ∗ (0.2 ∗ 0.3) = 0.72 (5.12)
where 0.8 and 0.2 are the assigned weight values for the direct trust and
indirect trust, respectively.
5.7 Verification of the TSNA Framework
A system is designed to verify the proposed TSNA framework, using the JAVA
programming language version 1.5 and the standard JAVA SDK libraries and
third party graphing libraries. JAVA is an object-orientated programming
language and the use of objects is ideal in representing a real-world problem
such as this. JAVA is also able to be run OS independent using a virtual
machine, so it is a good candidate for implementation. The platform used for
coding, compilation, debugging and execution is NetBeans IDE (Integrated
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Development Environment) version 5.5. NetBeans was used in the engineering
because of the ease with which it can build the Graphical User Interface (GUI).
The aim of using a networking tool in Java is to simulate the implementation
and operation of the proposed methodology for establishing trust in the
network and then utilizing it for making a decision as to whether the requesting
node’s request will be authorized to use network resources or not.
5.7.1 Phases in the trust-based SU authentication
framework verification
Verification for the TSNA framework to authenticate an SU’s request consists
of 3 phases. They are:
1. Initialization Phase: In this phase, the network is set up according to
the system’s parameters. In this phase, it is assumed that initially, all
the nodes in the network are well behaved and fair. The parameters
which are input for each network in this phase are: the candidate node
number whose trust value is to be calculated, the number of nodes in the
network, the criteria number by which the candidate node’s behaviour
is observed for a certain period and trust is calculated depending on the
monitored behaviour. In this phase, two networks (secondary network as
‘Network 1’ and primary network as ‘Network 2’) are set up. ‘Network 1’
has 5 member nodes including the candidate node and one base station,
whereas ‘Network 2’ has 4 member nodes and one base station.
2. Calculation Phase: In this phase, the candidate node’s trust value is
calculated using the different types of calculation methods described in
Section 5.3. The member nodes in both ‘Network 1’ and ‘Network 2’ use
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the direct calculation method to assign trust values to the candidate
node to authenticate its request. Each member node calculates the
candidate node’s trust value for different criteria and sends these to the
corresponding base station. The corresponding base station calculates
the final trust value of the candidate node and sends the result to the
CA for record keeping purposes and the CA uses this value to solve the
biasing problem. The aim of this phase is to determine the candidate
node’s trust value according to the different criteria in the system.
3. Decision Phase: During this phase, the computed trust value of the
candidate node is compared with the system’s predefined threshold value.
In this simulation, the predefined threshold value is set to 0.6. If the
computed trust value is greater than the threshold value, the candidate
node’s request is authenticated, otherwise not. During this phase, the
biasing problem is solved by checking the candidate node’s trust value
and comparing it with the value received from the CA node.
5.7.2 Scenario 1: Authenticating the SU’s request
based on the trust value
In this scenario, the candidate node’s trust value is computed to determine
whether its request to use either the network resources from ‘Network 1’ or to
consider its request to use the PU’s spectrum from ‘Network 2’ is authenticated
by the corresponding base station and to avoid a malicious node’s behaviour
in the network. As mentioned earlier, if a candidate node sends a request to
use the PU’s free spectrum, the SUBS first calculates the candidate node’s
trust value and checks its authenticity. If the candidate node is selected as an
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authenticated user, the SUBS forwards its request to the PUBS. PUBS also
needs to check its authenticity to ensure that the request is coming from a
valid and trustworthy user. Verification results for different cases are shown
as follows:
5.7.2.1 Case 1: Candidate node’s request authentication process
in the secondary network (‘Network 1’)
For this case, the following steps are verified and the results are shown
accordingly.
1. Initialization Phase : The network environment is set up as shown
in Figure 5.11. Node 2 is selected as a ‘candidate node’ in ‘Network
1’. There are another four nodes and one base station (SUBS) in the
network.
SUBS
SU1
SU4
SU5
SU3
Candidate 
node (SU2)
PUBS
PU4
PU2
PU1
PU3
Network 1
Network 2
Figure 5.11: Snapshot Network Set-up
During this phase, it is assumed that all nodes in ‘Network 1’ are well
behaved nodes (fair nodes) and have not been biased by malicious users,
as shown in Table 5.3.
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Candidate Node Node number in ‘Network 1’ Type
Node 2 in ‘Network 1’
1 Fair
3 Fair
4 Fair
5 Fair
Table 5.3: Node initialization from ‘Network 1’
Figure 5.12 shows the network window for calculating the trust value of
the candidate node in ‘Network 1’.
Figure 5.12: Input for ‘Network 1’
2. Calculation Phase:
The member nodes in ‘Network 1’ assign a trust value to the candidate
node in different time periods using equation 5.1 for three different
criteria and sends it to the SUBS. So, four member nodes (SU1, SU3,
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SU4, and SU5) in ‘Network 1’ assign different trust values for each criteria
at different timed. The system runs 100 times and generates random
values for the success and failure for each time period for each criteria
and gives the trust value for the candidate node using equations 5.1 and
5.8.
The trust value of the candidate node from four nodes for different time
periods for criteria 1 in ‘Network 1’ is shown in Figure 5.13.
Figure 5.13: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from four nodes in
‘Network 1’ for criteria 1
Therefore, the average trust value of the candidate node for criteria 1 in
‘Network 1’ is : 0.81+0.32+0.76+0.99
4
= 0.72
Similarly, the trust values of the candidate node from four nodes for
different time periods for criteria 2 and 3 in ‘Network 1’ are shown in
Figure 5.14 and 5.15, respectively. Therefore, the average trust value of
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the candidate node for criteria 2 and 3 in ‘Network 1’ is 0.67 and 0.45,
respectively. The SUBS then computes the final trust value and sends
it to the CA for record keeping. The final trust value of the candidate
node calculated from the SUBS for three different criteria in ‘Network 1’
using equation 5.8 is :0.72+0.67+0.45
3
= 0.61, as shown in Figure 5.16.
Figure 5.14: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from four nodes in
‘Network 1’ for criteria 2
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Figure 5.15: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from four nodes in
‘Network 1’ for criteria 3
Figure 5.16: Candidate node’s final trust value computed by the SUBS in
‘Network 1’
3. Decision Phase: In this phase, the computed trust value from the above
step is compared with the trust threshold and the decision is made
based on this comparison, as shown in Table 5.4. In this verification,
it is assumed that the predefined threshold value is 0.6. Therefore, the
computed final trust value (0.61) is above the threshold (0.6) and as a
result, the SUBS authenticates the candidate node to accept its request
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to use the network resources or forwards its request to the ‘Network 2’,
as shown in Table 5.4.
Candidate
node
Trust Value of Candidate node Final trust
value
Threshold
value
Trust value ≥
threshold value
?
Decision
Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3
0.6 Request is
authenticated
Node 2
‘Network
1’
0.72 0.67 0.45 0.61 Yes or request is
forwarded to
‘Network 2’
Table 5.4: Trustworthiness comparison to decide to authenticate the candidate
node’s request in ‘Network 1’
5.7.2.2 Case 2: Candidate node’s request authentication process
in the primary network (‘Network 2’)
The candidate node’s request also needs to be authenticated for accessing the
resources in the primary network. Firstly, the candidate node’s trust value
is calculated from ‘Network 1’ and if it is above the threshold, only then is
its request to access the primary network resources forwarded to ‘Network 2’.
For this purpose, ‘Network 2’ calculates the candidate node’s final trust value
for further consideration and decides whether its request is authenticated to
be considered as a trustworthy user to use the primary network’s resources
(which is described in detail in Chapter 6). The steps to authenticate the SU’s
request in the primary network are as follows:
1. Initialization Phase : The candidate node’s trust value from ‘Network 1’
is calculated and checked from Table 5.4 and it shows that ‘Decision’ is
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‘Accepted’, so the candidate node’s request is forwarded to ‘Network 2’.
During this phase, it is assumed that all nodes in ‘Network 2’ are fair
and not biased by malicious users, as shown in Table 5.5.
Candidate Node Node number in ‘Network 2’ Type
Node 2 in ‘Network 1’
1 Fair
2 Fair
3 Fair
4 Fair
Table 5.5: Nodes initialization from ‘Network 2’
Figure 5.17 shows the network window for calculating the trust value of
the candidate node in ‘Network 2’.
Figure 5.17: Input for ‘Network 2’
2. Calculation Phase:
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The member nodes of ‘Network 2’ calculate the candidate node’s trust
value using the direct trust calculation.
The trust values of the candidate node from four nodes from different
time periods for criteria 1 in ‘Network 2’ is shown in Figure 5.18
Therefore, the average trust value of the candidate node for criteria 1 in
‘Network 2’ is : 0.59+0.95+0.76+0.93
4
= 0.81 Similarly, the trust values of the
candidate node from four nodes from different time periods for criteria
2 and 3 in ‘Network 2’ are shown in Figures 5.19 and 5.20, respectively.
Therefore, the average trust values for the candidate node for criteria
2 and 3 in ‘Network 2’ is 0.55 and 0.77, respectively. The base station
(PUBS) then computes the final trust value and sends it to the CA for
record keeping. The final trust value of the candidate node computed by
the PUBS from ‘Network 2’ is :0.81+0.55+0.77
3
= 0.71 as shown in Figure
5.21.
Figure 5.18: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from different nodes in
‘Network 2’ for criteria 1
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Figure 5.19: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from different nodes in
‘Network 2’ for criteria 2
Figure 5.20: Trustworthiness of the candidate node from different nodes in
‘Network 2’ for criteria 3
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Figure 5.21: Candidate node’s final trust value computed by the PUBS in
‘Network 2’
3. Decision Phase: In this phase, the computed trust value from the above
step is compared with the trust threshold and a decision is made based
on this comparison, as shown in Table 5.4. The computed final trust
value (0.71) is above the threshold (0.6) and as a result, the candidate
node’s request is authenticated in the primary network (‘Network 2’), as
shown in Table 5.6.
Candidate
node
Trust Value of Candidate node Final trust
value
Threshold
value
Trust value ≥
threshold value
?
Decision
Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3
0.6Node 2 in
‘Network 1’
0.81 0.55 0.77 0.71 Yes Request is
authenticated
Table 5.6: Trustworthiness comparison to decide to authenticate the candidate
node’s request in ‘Network 2’
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5.7.2.3 Case 3: Candidate node’s request is not authenticated
either in the ‘Network 1’ or in the ‘Network 2’
For this case, the same working phases are executed in a simulation
environment considering node number 4 in ‘Network 1’ is a candidate node.
After executing all the steps as above in ‘Case 1’, the decision table is shown
is Table 5.7 as follows:
Candidate
node
Trust Value of Candidate node Final trust
value
Threshold
value
Trust value ≥
threshold value
?
Decision
Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3
0.6 Declined to
Node 4 in
‘Network 1’
0.21 0.33 0.47 0.33 No authenticate
its request
Table 5.7: Trustworthiness comparison to decide to authenticate ‘node 4’ in
‘Network 1’
From Table 5.7, it is noticeable that the final trust value of the candidate
node is below the threshold value, so its request is not authenticated in the
‘Network 1’. In other words, the candidate node is not considered a valid and
trustworthy user in its own network, therefore, the SUBS does not forward the
candidate node’s request to access the primary network resources to ‘Network
2’ for further authentication checking.
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5.7.3 Scenario 2: Member nodes are biased by malicious
users to assign a biased trust value for the
candidate node and its solution
In this scenario, it is assumed that some member nodes are biased either by
malicious users or other member nodes to assign a biased trust value to the
candidate node. This scenario will be examined and solved by the SUBS by
comparing the computed trust value of the candidate node with the trust value
received from the CA node.
1. Initialization Phase: This phase is similar to the ‘initialization phase’ in
scenario 1, as discussed in Section 5.7.2.1. The network environment is
set up according to Figure 5.11. Here, node 3 in ‘Network 1’ is selected
as a candidate node. There are four other nodes and one base station in
every network. For this scenario, three different criteria are considered
to evaluate the trust value for the candidate node. Firstly, it is assumed
that all the nodes are fair in ‘Network 1’. After the candidate node’s final
trust evaluation and after being saved to the CA, some malicious nodes
intentionally bias the member nodes in ‘Network 1’ to assign a biased
trust value to the candidate node. Therefore, there is a need to calculate
the candidate node’s trust value twice: (1) before the biasing problem
happens in the network; and (2) after the biasing problem happens in
the network.
2. Calculation Phase:
• Before Biasing : Firstly, the candidate node’s trust value is
calculated by the member nodes in ‘Network 1’ and all member
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nodes are fair. For criteria 1, four nodes in ‘Network 1’ assign a
trust value to the candidate node accordingly, as shown in Figure
5.22
Figure 5.22: Trust value for the candidate node in ‘Network 1’ for criteria 1
Therefore, the average trust value of the candidate node for criteria
1 in ‘Network 1’ is : 0.8056
For criteria 2 and 3, four nodes in ‘Network 1’ assign trust value to
the candidate node accordingly, as shown in Figures 5.23 and 5.24,
respectively. Therefore, the average trust value of the candidate
node for criteria 2 and 3 in ‘Network 1’ is 0.7842 and 0.5032,
respectively. The final trust value for the candidate node computed
by the SUBS in ‘Network 1’ is 0.8056+0.7842+0.5032
3
= 0.6976
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Figure 5.23: Trust value for the candidate node in ‘Network 1’ for criteria 2
Figure 5.24: Trust value for the candidate node in ‘Network 1’ for criteria 3
The SUBS in ‘Network 1’ sends the computed results to the CA.
The CA stores this value in both repositories, as shown in Table
5.8.
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Node Number in ‘Network 1’ Private Value Public Value
3 0.6976 0.6976
.... .... ....
..... .... .....
Table 5.8: Saving trust value of candidate node in CA repository
• After Biasing:
After being biased by malicious nodes, the types of nodes in
‘Network 1’ are shown in Table 5.9.
Candidate node number in ‘Network 1’ Node number in ‘Network 1’ Type
3
1 Fair
2 Fair
4 Fair
5 Biased
Table 5.9: Nodes initialization in ‘Network1’
The member nodes which are biased by the malicious nodes assign
a false trust value to the candidate node. Following the same
steps of calculation in ‘Before Biasing’ step, the SUBS computes
the candidate node’s final trust value using the biased trust value
received from the biased member nodes. After the biasing problem,
the candidate node’s trust value computed by the SUBS is shown in
Table 5.10, which is different from the trust value computed before
the biasing problem happens.
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Candidate node Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3 Final Trust vale
Node 3 in ‘Network 1’ 0.69 0.93 0.57 0.80
Table 5.10: The candidate node’s trust value computed by the SUBS in
‘Network 1’ after the biasing problem
After receiving the query from the SUBS about the candidate node’s
trust value, the CA checks both repositories. If the trust values
in both repositories are the same as shown in Table 5.8, the CA
forwards this result to the SUBS in ‘Network 1’, as shown in Figure
5.25. If the trust value in both repositories is not the same, the
CA can be sure that public repository has been hacked by some
malicious users who have intentionally changed the trust value in
the public repository. To solve this problem, the CA copies all
the trust values for all member nodes in both networks in the
private repository and replaces them with the values in the public
repository. After solving this issue, the CA forwards the query result
to the SUBS in ‘Network 1’.
Figure 5.25: Query response for the candidate node’s trust value in ‘Network
1’
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After receiving the candidate node’s trust value from the CA, the
SUBS compares it with the computed result, as shown in Table
5.11.
Candidate node Trust value
received from
CA
Trust value computed by
the SUBS after biasing
Are they
similar?
Node 3 in ‘Network 1’ 0.69 0.80 No
Table 5.11: Comparison of candidate node’s trust value
If the received result from the CA and the computed result from the
SUBS is the same, the SUBS sends the result to the requesting node who
places a query to know the candidate node’s trust value. Whenever the
SUBS observes that it is not the same as shown in Table 5.11, it checks
the candidate node’s trust value assigned by every individual member
node for different criteria in ‘Network 1’, as shown in Table 5.12.
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Criteria Node number Trust value of the
candidate node before
biasing
Trust value of the
candidate node after
biasing
Similar Decision
1
Node 1 0.7016 0.7016 Yes Not biased
Node 2 0.9833 0.9833 Yes Not biased
Node 4 0.9737 0.9737 Yes Not biased
Node 5 0.5843 0.9999 No Biased
2
Node 1 0.9982 0.9982 Yes Not biased
Node 2 0.7866 0.7866 Yes Not biased
Node 4 0.9833 0.9833 Yes Not biased
Node 5 0.3760 0.9999 No Biased
3
Node 1 0.5554 0.5554 Yes Not biased
Node 2 0.5826 0.5826 Yes Not biased
Node 4 0.1822 0.1822 Yes Not biased
Node 5 0.7253 0.9999 No Biased
Table 5.12: Trust value comparison from every individual node for different
criteria in ‘Network 1’
Based on the data from Table 5.12, the SUBS observes that the trust
value of the candidate node from node 5 is not similar. Moreover, it
observes that node 5, being biased, always assigns a high trust value for
the candidate node as shown in Figure 5.26.
3. Decision Phase : After checking and comparing, the SUBS confirms that
node 5 in the ‘Network 1’ has been biased by either other member nodes
or malicious nodes to assign a biased trust value for the candidate node,
as shown in Table 5.13. So, the SUBS spreads the message to the other
member nodes in ‘Network 1’ about the biased node and advises them
not to communicate with the biased node as it is comprised. The SUBS
exclude the biased node from the network so that it cannot take part
further in any network communication.
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Biased node number in ‘Network 1’ Decision
5 Exclude from the network
Table 5.13: Decision by the SUBS based on the biasing value
Figure 5.26: Checking of the candidate node’s trust value assigned by each
individual member node in ‘Network 1’
5.8 Conclusion
In CRNs, some non-compliant cognitive radio users may create interference
and break down the normal network activity by unauthorized access to the
network resources. Such malicious users can seriously damage the whole
network performance, possibly resulting in the collapse of the CRN. Hence,
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the issue of secure communication in CRNs becomes more important than
for other conventional wireless networks. Therefore, in this chapter, a
trust-based framework is proposed for calculating trust between CR nodes
that authenticates the candidate node’s request to the CRN to make sure
that the request is coming from a valid, trustworthy node in the network to
ensure that the security of the network will not be compromised as a result of
that candidate node’s request authentication to access the network resources.
The CA is proposed in the framework for managing and maintaining a trust
repository in the proposed framework to solve the biasing problem in CRNs.
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Chapter 6
Mechanisms for Secure
Spectrum sharing in CRNs
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 5, whenever a secondary user (SU) wants to use a
primary user’s (PU’s) free spectrum, it sends a request to the secondary user
base station (SUBS). The SUBS authenticates the SU’s request, based on
its trust value by using the approach mentioned in Chapter 5 and sends it
to the PUBS, which also authenticates it. After passing the authentication
process, the next step is for the primary base station (PUBS) to calculate
the trustworthiness of the requesting SU and make a decision to assign the
spectrum to the SU. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is important for the PUBS
to make this decision based on trust apart from authenticating its request,
because authentication at best checks whether the request is coming from a
valid node in the network or not; but this does not confirm the past behaviours
or the adherence of the SU node to the cognitive radio network (CRN) policies,
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such as vacating the spectrum when the PU needs it, releasing the spectrum
whenever it does not need it, giving actual spectrum sensing results to the other
users when asked etc. This is done based on the level of the SU in adhering to
these tasks and thus, this should be the main criteria for the PUBS on which
it can make a decision. In order to assist the PUBS in ascertaining the level of
trust to allow an SU to access the spectrum, in this chapter, a Conjoint Trust
Assessment approach for Secure Spectrum Sharing (CTAS3) is proposed. The
proposed approach allows only the trustworthy authenticated SUs who will
behave properly according to CRN policies during spectrum sharing to use the
PU’s spectrum.
Once the spectrum is assigned to the requesting SU, according to the
working principles of CRN, it can use the spectrum for its communication
with other nodes in the network but must vacate it as soon as the PU needs it
back. In such scenarios, it is possible that an SU’s service is disrupted until it is
able to search and access another free spectrum from the PU. To minimize such
disruption in its service, a Service Continuity Enhancement (SCE) approach is
presented in this chapter. The SCE approach is a multi-state working approach
of an SU that ensures it experiences minimum service disruption when it needs
to vacate the spectrum for the PU during spectrum sharing in CRNs.
During the process when the SU has to vacate the PU’s spectrum, there
may also arise a worst case scenario in which SUs cannot find other users
free spectrum due to an imbalance in the number of SUs and PUs in the
network. Therefore, SUs are blocked and are not be able to continue their
communication due to the unavailability of PU’s free spectrum. To solve this
problem, in this chapter, an approach is proposed to balance the number of
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PUs and SUs in the CRN (B-CRN), so that SUs can gain access to use any
other PU’s spectrum in the CRN to continue their communication when they
have to vacate a PU’s spectrum.
The approaches proposed in this chapter for secure spectrum sharing in
CRNs are as follows:
• Approach 1: A stochastic model that defines the different states through
which an SU needs to go during spectrum sharing to minimize the
disruption to its service in the event of vacating a PU’s spectrum which
it was using.
• Approach 2: A conjoint trust assessment approach that assists the PUBS
for secure spectrum sharing, based on SU’s trust value calculated from
both primary and secondary networks in CRNs. This will solve the
security threats brought about by untrustworthy, selfish, and malicious
SUs.
• Approach 3: Balancing the number of PUs and SUs in the CRN so that
SUs can continue to engage in smooth communication without having
their service interrupted or blocked in the event of vacating a spectrum
to the PU when it needs it.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, the stochastic
model that shows the different working states through which an SU needs to
go to minimize its service disruption during spectrum sharing in the CRN is
presented. Section 6.3 describes the secure spectrum sharing scheme, based on
the conjoint level of trust so that no untrustworthy user can have access to the
spectrum. Section 6.4 proposes the algorithms for balancing the number of SUs
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according to the number of PUs and the sub-bands available in them in the
CRN to minimize the disruption in the SU’s service during spectrum sharing.
Section 6.5 shows the numerical results by verifying the three approaches
proposed in this chapter. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Service Continuity Enhancement (SCE)
Approach for Authenticated SUs During
Spectrum Sharing
In this section, the SCE model with a state transition diagram is proposed
that shows the different states through which an SU should go while accessing
and vacating the spectrum when needed. By following this model, each SU
can reduce the disruption in its service by further searching and accessing
the spectrum while it needs to vacate the spectrum to the returning PU. The
different states in the proposed model are explained in the next subsection.
6.2.1 Defining different working states to enhance an
SU’s service continuity
The five different states through which an SU needs to go to enhance its service
continuity during spectrum sharing are as follows:
Search state (S): The search state is the state in which an SU searches
for the free spectrum.
Access state (A): The access state is the state in which the spectrum
is assigned to the authenticated SUs. This is done after its trust value is
assessed by the PUBS through the conjoint trust assessment approach. The
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detailed working of conjoint trust assessment approach for spectrum sharing
is described in Section 6.3.
Interrupt state (I): The interrupt state is the state in which an SU
detects a PU’s reappearance and needs to vacate the spectrum for the PU.
Vacate state (V ): The vacate state is the state when an SU vacates the
spectrum on the PU’s reappearance.
Dropped state (D): The dropped state is the state where no spectrum
band is available for the SU to continue the communication.
The transition and working process between these states is as follows: at
first, the SU searches for the free spectrum through the Search (S) state.
Whenever it finds a free spectrum, it accesses it through the Access (A) state
and establishes connections with others for its communication. On the PU’s
appearance back to the network, the SU’s communication is interrupted. When
this occurs, the SU goes to the Interrupt (I) state and then to the Vacate (V)
state where it vacates the channel for the PU according to the CRNs policies.
After vacating the channel, the SU will go to the Search (S) state and tries to
search for that PU’s other free spectrum or any other free spectrum from other
PUs. If it is successful, then it will go to the Access state. On the other hand,
if it is unsuccessful, then its communication will be dropped and it enters the
Dropped (D) state. The flow of control between the different working states
for an SU during spectrum sharing is shown in Figure 6.1.
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`Search state’
If the spectrum is 
free?
Spectrum is assigned to  the 
authenticated users in 
`Access state’ 
If PU comes back?
Communication is 
interrupted and SU
goes to `interrupt 
state’
Vacates the 
spectrum and SU 
goes to `Vacate 
state’
Yes
Continues to use 
spectrum
Yes
No
No
Communication is 
dropped and SU goes 
to `Dropped state’
End
Start
Figure 6.1: Transition between different working states of an SU during
spectrum sharing
The main aim of defining these states and making sure that the SU goes
through them is to ensure minimum disruption to its service when it has to
vacate a spectrum to the PU and search for another spectrum. According to
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this model, the SU may not be able to continue with its service when it is in
Search, Vacate and Dropped states due to spectrum unavailability. By using
this model to reduce disruption in the SU’s service, the probability of an SU
being in each state can be determined and the different transition rates that
need to be across the defined states to minimize such level of disruption to its
service can be ascertained.
To determine the probability of an SU being in each state, in the proposed
transition diagram model, it is considered that an SU goes from one state to
another in the event of a transition. This transition shows the rate by which
the SU switches from one state to another during spectrum sharing which
will result in it having minimum service disruption. In the next sub-section,
the transition rates from one state to another are defined to calculate the
probability of an SU being in each working state in order to measure the
disruption in its service during spectrum sharing.
6.2.2 Defining the transition rates and probabilities of
an SU being in different states during spectrum
sharing
Transition rates are used to describe how quickly the transition happens
from one state to another in the state transition diagram of the proposed
model during spectrum sharing. The notation of transition rates used for this
approach is as follows:
Spectrum access rate: λA;
Interruption rate: λI ;
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Vacate rate: λV ;
Repair rate of Vacate state: µV ;
Dropping rate : λD;
Recovery rate of Dropped state: µD.
The Search state may change to the Access state with rate λA. In the
Access state, the SU establishes normal communication through the PU’s free
spectrum band. If the SU is interrupted by the PU, the state can change to
the Interrupt state (I) with rate λI . After interruption, the SU will go to the
Vacate state (V) with λV . After vacating the spectrum, the SU will go to
the Search state (S) with rate µV again and keeps on searching for the free
spectrum. If no PU’s free spectrum is available to access, then the SU will go
to the Dropped state (D) with a rate λD . The SU will keep trying to search
for free spectrum, so it goes to the Search state (S) again from the Dropped
state (D) with a rate µD. The state transition diagram with different transition
rates is depicted in Figure 6.2.
To calculate the probability of an SU being in each working state during
spectrum sharing, the transition rate from one state to the next state is used.
The probability of each state is assumed as follows:
Probability of Search State : piS ;
Probability of Active State : piA ;
Probability of Interrupt State : piI ;
Probability of Vacate State : piV ;
Probability of Dropped State : piD.
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Figure 6.2: Stochastic model for an SU’s activity.
Next the probability of an SU being in each working state at a point of
time is calculated. According to the Markov Chain mode in every state, the
incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate [128]. Using this principle, the
steady state balance equation for each state during spectrum sharing is used
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in order to compute the probability of the SU being in each state as follows:
S : piSλA + piSλD = piV µV + piDµD (6.1)
A : piSλA = piAλI (6.2)
I : piAλI = piIλV (6.3)
V : piIλV = piV µV (6.4)
D : piSλD = piDµD (6.5)
According to probability theory, the summation of all probabilities is equal
to 1. So
piS + piA + piI + piV + piD = 1 (6.6)
By solving the steady-state balance equations in 6.1-6.6, the following
expressions for the steady-state probabilities of an SU being in each state
are obtained.
piA =
λA
λI
piS (6.7)
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piI =
λA
λV
piS (6.8)
piV =
λA
µV
piS (6.9)
piD =
λD
µD
piS (6.10)
piS = (1 +
λA
λI
+
λA
λV
+
λA
µV
+
λD
µD
)−1 (6.11)
The continuity of a service refers to the continual functionality of the
expected service requested from an SU. As mentioned earlier, the spectrum
is not available for an SU’s usage when it is in the Vacate and Search states
and the continuity of its service is affected. Though in the Search state, the
spectrum is not available to continue its functionality, it is not considered to
measure the service continuity level as it is the non-functional and intermediate
state to go the Access state. Also, the continuity in the SU’s service is
affected when the SU is not successful in accessing another free spectrum
after searching, then it goes to the Dropped state and its service becomes
non-functional in this state. So, the continuity of the SU’s service during the
spectrum sharing mechanism in CRN is defined as follows:
Service continuity = 1−Non− availability of service
= 1− (piV + piD)
(6.12)
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Substituting the value of piV and piV in equation 6.12, the service continuity
of an SU is defined as:
Service continuity = 1− (
λA
µV
+
λD
µD
)piS (6.13)
Using equation 6.13, the service continuity level of an SU is evaluated
depending on different transition rates across the different states. As discussed
earlier, in the proposed approach, the service continuity of an SU is improved
by further searching and accessing the spectrum while it needs to give back the
spectrum to the PU. In the verification part in Section 6.5, it is shown how the
continuity of the SU’s service is improved by choosing different transition rates
across the different states during spectrum sharing. Having such a framework
improves the service of an SU while spectrum sharing over the normal working
principles of CRN.
In the next section, the CTAS3 framework is described in detail to allow
SUs to use PU’s free spectrum based on its trust value so that no untrustworthy
users can have access to the free spectrum. As pointed out in Section 6.1, this
process is done by the PUBS in the Access state.
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6.3 Conjoint Trust Assessment for Secure
Spectrum Sharing (CTAS3) Framework in
CRNs
The system architecture of the proposed CTAS3 model is as same as described
in Section 5.2.1 where there are two different networks, namely primary user
network (PUN) and secondary user network (SUN). Each network consists of
different member nodes and base stations, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: System architecture
Whenever an SU wants to gain access to a PU’s free spectrum in CRNs,
at first its request needs to be authenticated by both base stations, based
on its trust value, which indicates the validity of the requesting node. The
authentication process is described in detail in Chapter 5. After an SU’s
request has being authenticated by both networks, the next process is for both
networks to calculate the requesting SU node’s trust value. In this process,
the SUBS calculates the trust value of the requesting SU and sends it to the
PUBS. The PUBS also calculates the trust value from its network and then
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conjoins the trust value from both networks to calculate the requesting SU’s
final trust value to check its trustworthiness in order to make a decision as to
whether the SU can have access to the spectrum. As there are two networks in
CRNs and the requesting SU which is a member of secondary network, makes
a request to use the free spectrum from the primary network, it is important to
assess the requesting node’s trust value from both networks for the following
reasons:
1. Trust is assessed from the secondary network to obtain an overall
recommendation about the node and to have an idea about this node’s
behaviour in its own network.
2. Trust is assessed from the primary network to obtain the
recommendations from all the primary member nodes and to have an
idea about past interactions with the node.
3. After the level of trust from both the networks has been assessed, it is
conjoined to determine the overall recommendation about the requesting
node. As mentioned earlier, this level of trust is important for the PUBS
to ensure that the requesting SU is trustworthy enough to use its free
spectrum band and vacate the spectrum when the PU needs it and will
not hold the spectrum for a long time in order to break the network’s
performance.
6.3.1 Working of the proposed CTAS3 framework
In this section, the working of the proposed framework for secure spectrum
sharing in CRNs which solves the security threats brought about by
206
untrustworthy entities is presented. Figure 6.4 presents a flowchart diagram
of the working of the proposed CTAS3framework.
The sequence of the working steps in the proposed CTAS3 framework are
as follows:
• Trust calculation by the secondary network: Whenever an SU wants to
use a PU’s free spectrum, its request needs to be authenticated by both
networks (SUN and PUN) to confirm its validity in the network. This is
done by using the proposed approach in Chapter 5. If the level of trust
is above the defined threshold, the SUBS sends a request to all of its
member nodes to give a recommendation for the requesting node. All
member nodes give feedback to the base station which then calculates the
average trust value for the requesting user and forwards the requesting
node’s trust value to the PUBS.
• Trust calculation and aggregation in a primary network: The PUBS
receives the requesting node’s trust value from the SUBS. The PUBS
also sends a request to all its member nodes to give a recommendation
for the requesting node. All member nodes send the recommendations
to the PUBS. The PUBS then calculates the average trust value of the
requesting node received from its member nodes and then aggregates it
with the trust value received from the SUBS to calculate the requesting
node’s final trust value. If needed, a weighting value is used to justify
the importance of the trust value from each network
• Trust value checking in the primary network: The PUBS now compares
the aggregated final trust value of the requesting node with the system’s
predefined threshold value. If the aggregated value is higher than the
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threshold, then the requesting is permitted to use the PU’s free spectrum,
otherwise its request is rejected.
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Figure 6.4: Flowchart illustrating the steps performed by the CTAS3
framework
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The flowchart of the proposed model between the four different entities
(SU, SUBS, PU, PUBS) is depicted in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Flow of controls between different nodes in the CTAS3 framework
In the next section, the working of each phase defined in the proposed
framework is discussed in detail.
6.3.2 Trust calculation of the requesting node from the
secondary network
The working steps of this phase as shown in Figure 6.4 are as follows:
1. After a requesting SU’s request has been authenticated by both networks,
the SUBS asks all member nodes to send it the trust value for the
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requesting SU.
2. Each member node checks its cooperation record table with the
requesting node. This cooperation record table is different from the table
discussed in Chapter 5 although both record tables show the outcome
by success and failure. The record table for this purpose stores the
different past behaviours related to spectrum sharing such as vacating
the spectrum on the PU’s arrival, release the spectrum when it does
not need it etc. Each member node calculates the trust value of the
requesting node for the different services using equation 6.14 and sends
it to the SUBS.
Tsi =
T∑
j=1
(Tvalue(SUrequesting node, Sj , t, nj))
T
(6.14)
where Tsi denotes the trust value of the requesting secondary node from
ith member node in the secondary network,
Tvalue(SUrequesting node, Sj , t, nj) denotes the trust value of the secondary
requesting node (SUrequestingnode) of service j at t time period having n
interactions for the service and
T is total number of services that the recommender node has with the
requesting node.
For example, if a member node SU2 in Figure 6.3 has a cooperation
record for the requesting node (SU1) as shown in Table 6.1, then its
trust value is calculated as follows:
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Service 1 Service 2 Service 3
Time Interactions Outcome Value Time Interactions Outcome Value Time Interactions Outcome Value
T1
1 Success 1
T2
1 Success 1
T3
1 Failure 0
2 Success 1 2 Success 1 2 Failure 1
3 Failure 0 3 Success 1 3 Failure 0
4 Success 1 4 Failure 0 4 Success 1
5 Failure 0 5 Success 1 5 Success 1
Table 6.1: Cooperation record table of node 2 with requesting node
From the Table 6.1, it shows that SU1 has 3 services and 5 interactions
for each service with node SU2. Here, SU1 is the requesting node
(SUrequesting node).
Therefore, the trust value of SUrequesting node from node SU2 for service
1 at time period T1 for 5 interactions is :
Tvalue(SUrequesting node, 1, T1, 5)) =
number of success
number of success + number of failure
=
3
5
= 0.6
(6.15)
The trust value of SUrequesting node from node SU2 for service 2 at time
period T2 for 5 interactions is :
Tvalue(SUrequesting node, 1, T2, 5)) =
number of success
number of success + number of failure
=
4
5
= 0.8
(6.16)
The trust value of SUrequesting node from node SU2 for service 3 at time
period T3 for 5 interactions is :
Tvalue(SUrequesting node, 1, T3, 5)) =
number of success
number of success + number of failure
=
3
5
= 0.6
(6.17)
Therefore, the trust value of SU1 from node SU2 by using equation 6.14
211
is :
T12 =
0.6 + 0.8 + 0.6
3
= 0.66 (6.18)
Following the same process, it is assumed that the trust value of
SUrequesting node(SU1) from node SU3 for service 1, 2 and 3 is 0.4, 0.6,
and 0.4, respectively. Therefore, the trust value of node SU1 from node
SU3 using equation 6.14 is as follows:
T13 =
0.4 + 0.6 + 0.4
3
= 0.46 (6.19)
3. SUBS receives trust values from each member node and calculates the
average trust value of the requesting node using equation 6.20.
TS =
N∑
i=1
Tsi
N
(6.20)
where TS is the trust average value of the requesting node and
N is the total number of member nodes.
Therefore, by using equation 6.20, the average trust value of node
SUrequesting node(SU1) from the secondary network computed by the
SUBS, based on the trust values received from node SU2 and node SU3
in Figure 6.3 is as follows:
TS =
0.66 + 0.46
2
= 0.56 (6.21)
4. The SUBS forwards this average trust value of the requesting node (TS)
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to the PUBS.
6.3.3 Trust calculation of the requesting node from the
primary network
The working steps of this phase are as follows:
1. The PUBS receives the average trust value of the requesting node from
the SUBS as described in section 6.3.2 and asks all member nodes to
send it the trust value for the requesting SU.
2. Each member node in the primary network searches its cooperation
record table and calculates the trust value of the requesting node using
equation 6.22 and sends it to the PUBS.
Tpi =
T∑
j=1
(Tvalue(SUrequesting node, Sj, t, nj))
T
(6.22)
where Tpi denotes the trust value of the requesting node from ith member
node in the primary network
Tvalue(SUrequesting node, Sj , t, nj)) denotes the trust value of the requesting
node (SUrequesting node) of service j at t time period having n interactions
for the service and
T is the total number of services.
3. PUBS receives trust values from each member node and calculates the
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average trust value of the requesting node using equation 6.23.
TP =
N∑
i=1
Tpi
N
(6.23)
where TP is the average trust value of the requesting node and
N is the total number of member nodes.
Following the examples in Section 6.3.2 and using equations 6.22 and
6.23, the PUBS calculates the average trust value of the requesting node
TP in the primary network as 0.65.
4. The PUBS accumulates the received TS and TP from the secondary
network and primary network, respectively and aggregates them to
obtain the final recommended conjoint trust value (TR) for the requesting
SU, using equation 6.24. Therefore, the recommended final conjoint trust
value of the requesting node is:
TR = αTS + βTP (6.24)
where α and β is the weight used for the secondary network and the
primary network, respectively and α+ β = 1,
TR is the recommended conjoint trust value of the requesting node,
TS is the trust value of the requesting node from the secondary network
and
TP is the trust value of the requesting node from the primary network.
Continuing with the abovementioned example, the PUBS calculates the
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conjoint recommended trust value of the requesting node (SU1) using
equation 6.24 as follows:
TR = 0.5 ∗ 0.56 + 0.5 ∗ 0.65 = 0.60 (6.25)
6.3.4 Checking the trust value of the requesting node
for spectrum access
The PUBS compares the computed TR with a specific trust threshold T
(0.7)and makes a decision Dp using equation 6.26. If the TR is greater than
T , the requesting SU’s request is approved (AP) and is permitted to use the
PU’s free spectrum band, otherwise its request is not approved (NAP).
Dp =


AP if TR ≥ T
NAP if TR < T
(6.26)
Continuing the example mentioned in Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, the PUBS
calculates the conjoint average trust value of the requesting node (SU1) as 0.60
which is lower than the threshold value (0.7). So, the requesting SU’s request
is not approved in this scenario. In other words, in this scenario, the requesting
node is not trustworthy enough to use the PU’s free spectrum and the PUBS
does not have enough confidence that this node will vacate the PU’s spectrum
when the PU needs it and will not display any untrustworthy behaviours in
the network.
The algorithm 1 for the PUBS to calculate the recommended conjoint trust
value from both networks and make a decision to give access to the requesting
SU to use the PU’s spectrum is as follows:
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Algorithm 1 Conjoint Trust Calculation Algorithm
Input: number of SUs (N), number of PUs (M), trust value of the requesting secondary node
(Trequesting node) and initially set to zero, the trust value of the requesting node from each secondary
member node and primary member node (TSmember node), (Tpmember node), respectively, total trust value of
the requesting node in secondary network and primary network (TStotal ), (TPtotal ), respectively and initially
set to zero, number of services (l), the average trust value from the secondary network and primary network
(TS), (TP ), respectively, threshold value (Tthreshold), requesting node (SU).
Output: Spectrum sharing request approved(AP ) or not approved (NAP )
1: The SUBS sends a request for the recommendation of the SU to the other SUs in the CRNs and the
PUBS sends the request for the recommendation of the SU to the other PUs in the CRNs with which
the requesting SU has previously interacted.
2: The SUBS will receive Tvalue(s) for every node in the secondary network.
3: for i← 0 to i ≤ N do
4: for j ← 0 to j ≤ l do
5: Trequesting node = Trequesting node(SU, Sj , t, nj) + Trequesting node
6: end for
7: TSmember node =
Trequesting node
l
8: TStotal = TStotal + TSmember node
9: end for
10: The SUBS will calculate the total trust value received from all the SUs
TS =
TStotal
N
;
11: The PUBS will receive Trequesting node from every member node in the primary network.
12: for i← 0 to i ≤M do
13: for j ← 0 to j ≤ l do
14: Trequesting node = Trequesting node(SU, Sj , t, nj) + Trequesting node
15: end for
16: TPmember node =
Trequesting node
l
17: TPtotal = TPtotal + TPmember node
18: end for
19: The PUBS will calculate the total trust value received from all the PUs
TP =
TPtotal
M
;
20: The PUBS will calculate the recommended conjoint trust value (TR):
TR = TP + TS/2;
21: The PUBS will compare Tconjoint with Tthreshold
22: if TR ≥ Tthreshold then
23: The requesting SU’s spectrum request will be approved(AP );
24: else
25: The requesting SU’s spectrum request will not be approved(NAP );
26: end if
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By using the proposed approach, the requested authenticated trustworthy
SU can have access to the PU’s free spectrum. But a problem arises in
situations where there are many SUs in the CRN in comparison to PUs. In such
scenarios, some SUs, even though trustworthy, may not have any chance to use
the PU’s free spectrum due to the unavailability of the spectrum. Therefore,
in the next section, the B-CRN framework is proposed which aims to balance
the number of PUs and SUs for efficient spectrum sharing in the CRN.
6.4 B-CRN Framework for Multiple Users for
Efficient Spectrum Sharing in CRNs
As described in Section 6.2, an SU should vacate the spectrum by detecting
the reappearance of the PUs and searches for other free spectrum to maintain
smooth communication. To increase the chance of gaining access to another
free spectrum, one of the main factors is to ensure that there is a balance in the
number of PUs and SUs in CRNs, so that an SU can search and use another
free spectrum band instead of going to the Dropped state during spectrum
usage due to absence of available spectrum. In this section, a relation between
the number of PUs and SUs in a CRN for multiple PUs and SUs is proposed
during the basic spectrum sharing scheme so that network statistics, such as
the utilization ratio, blocking rate, deprivation rate etc. are at a standard level
in order to maintain smooth communication in CRNs.
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6.4.1 B-CRN system model and architecture
In the proposed B-CRN model, there are n number of PUs in the network such
as PU1 , PU2, PU3.....PUn. Each PU has its licensed spectrum. Therefore,
PU1 has licensed frequency bands of f1, PU2 has licensed bands of f2, .......and
PUn has licensed band of fn. Each band is divided into N sub-bands, as
shown in Figure 6.6 by means of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
technology. Therefore, in the proposed model, there are n×N = nN sub-bands
available to use for the SUs in parallel when the spectrum is not used by the
PUs. Therefore, nN SUs can use these sub-bands in parallel. If more than nN
SUs are allowed into the network, some SU’s communication will be always
blocked or dropped when all the sub-bands are occupied by either SUs or PUs.
By using these statistics, in the next subsection, a relation in the number of
the PUs and allowed SUs in CRN is proposed, for efficient spectrum sharing
between them.
F1  
f1 fN-2f3f2 fNfN-1
F2 FnPrimary System
Secondary System
Frequency
fN+1 f2N-2fN+3fN+2 f2Nf2N-1 f(n-1)N+1 f(n-1)N+2 f(n-1)N+3 fnNfnN-1fnN-2
Figure 6.6: Frequency band sharing in CRNs
6.4.2 Balancing the number of PUs and PUs in CRNs
By using the network values mentioned in the earlier subsection, the number
of SUs, PUs and the sub-bands in them is as follows:
S = n×N =⇒
S
n
= N (6.27)
From equation 6.27, it can be seen that if either the number of PUs or
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number of sub-bands in each licensed band increases, the number of SUs
increases to use the free spectrum. Therefore, the established relation between
PUs and SUs is as follows:
S ∝ n (6.28)
and
S ∝ N (6.29)
6.4.2.1 For a fixed sub-band network
The relation between the number of SUs and PUs where each PU’s spectrum
band is divided into a fixed number of sub-bands is expressed using equation
6.30.
S ∝ n =⇒ S = K.n =⇒
S
n
= K (6.30)
where K is a positive constant and represents the number of sub-bands in
each licensed band.
If S
n
≤ K; therefore, the network is in a balanced mode. This means, all
SUs can have access to the PU’s spectrum and continue their communication
while no PU is using it. Even when a PU comes back and needs its own
spectrum, they are successful in finding a band from another PU.
On the other hand, if S
n
> K; the network is not in a balanced mode, as not
all of the SUs can not gain access to the PU’s free spectrum. Some SUs will
be always deprived of accessing the free spectrum as the number of available
sub-bands is lower than the number of SUs.
Therefore, for a fixed sub-band network, the number of SUs depends on
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the number of PUs. If the number of PUs is increased, more SUs are allowed
to use the PU’s spectrum, based on the ratio in equation 6.30. Therefore, for
a fixed band PU, the network status is shown by
Network status =


Balanced if S
n
≤ K
Imbalanced if S
n
> K
(6.31)
6.4.2.2 For a fixed number of PUs in a network
The relation between the number of SUs and the sub-bands where each network
has a fixed number of PUs is expressed using equation 6.32.
S ∝ N =⇒ S = K.N =⇒
S
N
= K (6.32)
where K is a positive constant and represents the number of PUs in the
network.
If S
N
≤ K; therefore, the network is a balanced one. This means all
the SUs can have access to the PU’s spectrum and can continue with their
communication while no PU is using it.
On the other hand, if S
N
> K; the network is not a balanced one, as not all
of the SUs can gain access to the PU’s free spectrum. Therefore, the number of
SUs in a fixed PU network depends on the number of sub-bands in which each
band is divided. If the number of sub-bands is increased, the number of SUs
can also be increased in a balanced network. Therefore, for a fixed number of
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PUs, the network status is shown by
Network status =


Balanced S
N
≤ K
Imbalanced if S
N
> K
(6.33)
Therefore, the network balance depends on either the number of sub-bands
or the number of PUs. For example, if each PU’s licensed spectrum is fixed
into 2 sub-bands, then the ratio of the number of SUs and PUs for a balanced
network must be always 2. If the number of PUs is fixed to 2 in a network, then
the ratio of the number of SUs and the number of sub-bands for a balanced
network must be always 2.
The formed relationships between PUs, SUs and sub-bands in CRNs
enables the determination of the ideal maximum number of SUs that could
be in the CRN to ensure there is less call dropping and blocking for SUs.
Therefore, any CRN should follow the above relationship between PUs and
SUs to improve the network performance during spectrum sharing. In the
literature, a basic spectrum sharing scheme is proposed considering only one
and two PUs [76, 77] and multiple SUs in both cases. However, it is possible
that there are more than two PUs in the CRNs. For such scenarios, in
the next subsection, a basic spectrum sharing mechanism is demonstrated
between multiple PUs and SUs to improve network performance. The proposed
approach for spectrum sharing follows the following steps:
1. Determine the different states of the spectrum sharing mechanism
2. Determine the transition rates between the different states
3. Determine the probability of the model being in each state during
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spectrum sharing
6.4.3 Efficient spectrum sharing in the presence of
multiple PUs and SUs in CRNs
In this section, a basic spectrum sharing mechanism is described for multiple
PUs and SUs. The proposed spectrum sharing mechanism is extended with
n number of PUs and nN number of SUs. For this multi-user model, the
network parameters such as utilization ratio, blocking rate etc. are derived
to determine their effect on this model during spectrum sharing. Figure 6.7
shows the state transition diagram during spectrum sharing between multiple
PUs and SUs.
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Figure 6.7: State transition diagram of spectrum sharing for multiple users in
CRNs
To describe the basic spectrum sharing for multiple PUs and SUs model,
Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is used. The random variables used
to represent the inter-arrival times and services in the proposed model are
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easily represented by using the negative-exponential distribution of memory
less property of CTMC. In the next subsection, different states are defined to
describe the model.
6.4.3.1 Defining states during spectrum sharing for multiple SUs
and PUs
To describe the model using CTMC, the following different states are assumed:
1. X0 stands for the state when the spectrum is used by neither PU nor the
SU.
2. X1 is the state when one PU is exclusively uses one of n spectral bands.
3. X2 is the state when two PUs use two spectrum bands.
4. X3 is the state when three PUs use three spectrum bands.
5. Xn is the state n when PUs use all n spectrum bands.
6. Sj it the state when jth SU uses any of the spectrum band from the
PUs. Here, (j = 1, 2, 3, ......nN).
7. Z denotes the set of all states used in the model, i.e., Z =
X0, X1, X2, X3......Xn, S1, S2, ......SnN .
The proposed approach uses the same statistics in [77] and [76] to evaluate
different matrices for multiple PUs and SUs during spectrum sharing in a
balanced CRN. In the next subsection, the different transition rates are defined
to calculate the probability of the model being in each state.
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6.4.3.2 Defining transition rates during spectrum sharing for
multiple SUs and PUs
The following transition rates to calculate the probability of the model being
in each state during spectrum sharing are as follows:
1. The arrival rate of the PU to access the spectrum is λp. This rate is
used using the Poisson process. In other words, the inter accessing time
is negative-exponentially distributed with mean time 1
λp
(ms);
2. The time of the PU to occupy the spectrum is a random variable that
uses a negative exponential distribution with mean 1
µp
(ms);
3. The arrival rate of the SU to access the spectrum is λs. The inter-arrival
time of SUs accessing the spectrum is a random variable that obeys a
negative-exponentially distributed with mean time 1
λs
(ms);
4. The time of each SU using a radio band is a random variable obeying
negative-exponential distribution with mean 1
µs
(ms).
Apart from these assumptions, it is considered that one SU is able to use
any of the nN bands but is allowed to use only one band at each time. The time
for an SU to vacate the spectrum band on the detection of reappearance of PU
is ignored here as the time of SU’s using a band remains negative-exponentially
distributed having no impact whether the SUs are forced to stop by the PU
or not.
From Figure 6.7, it is clearly predictable that no more than nN number of
SUs can use the spectrum in the model as there are nN number of spectrum
sub-bands available for SUs. According to [77], the basic queueing theory
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is applied to CTMC to derive the balance equations using transition rates
from the model by which the probability of the model being in each state is
calculated. In the next subsection, the probability of the model being in each
state is calculated using the different transition rates in order to derive the
network statistics.
6.4.3.3 Probability of the model being in each state during
spectrum sharing for multiple SUs and PUs
The probability of the model being in each state is assumed as follows:
1. Πj represents the steady state probability of the state of SUs using the
spectrum in a state Si where j = 1, 2, 3.......nN .
2. ΠXi represents the steady state probability of PUs using the spectrum
in a state Xi where i = 0, 1, 2, 3.....n
The balance equations for every state are as follows:
For state Xn:
Πxnµp = Πxn−1λp +
nN∑
n=1
Πnλp (6.34)
For state Xn−1:
Πxn−1µp = Πxn−2λp +Πxnµp +
nN−1∑
n=1
Πnλp (6.35)
For state Xn−1:
Πxn−2µp = Πxn−3λp +Πxn−1µp +
nN−2∑
n=1
Πnλp (6.36)
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For state X3:
Πx3µp = Πx2λp +
nN∑
n=1
Πnλp (6.37)
For state X2:
Πx2µp = Πx1λp +
nN∑
n=1
Πnλp (6.38)
For state X1:
Πx1(λp + (N + 1)µp) = Πx0λp +Πx2µp (6.39)
For state X0:
Πx0(λp + λs) = Π1µs +Πx1µp (6.40)
For state S1
Π1(µs + λs + λp) = Π2µs +Πx0λs +Πx1µp (6.41)
For state S2
Π2(µs + λs + λp) = Π3µs +Π1λs +Πx1µp (6.42)
Therefore, the probability of the multi-user model being in state Sj during
spectrum sharing is expressed by the following equation for j = 1 to N .
Πj(µs + λs + λp) = Πj+1µs +Πj−1λs +Πx1µp (6.43)
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The probability of the multi-user model being in state Sj is expressed by
the following equation for j = N + 1 to nN − 1.
Πj(µs + λs + λp) = Πj+1µs +Πj−1λs (6.44)
For state SnN
ΠnN(µs + λp) = ΠnN−1λs (6.45)
It is known that the summation of all the probabilities in the model is equal
to 1, according to the probability property. Therefore,
nN∑
j=1
Πj +Πx0 +
n∑
i=1
Πxi = 1 (6.46)
Combining equations 6.44 and 6.46, it is obtained AΠ = B where Π =
(Π1,Π2,Π3.......ΠnN ,Πx0,Πx1......Πxn−1 ,Πxn, )
T and B = (1, 0, 0, 0.......)T and
A is a matrix as shown in equation 6.48. Thus, it is obtained from the model,
Π = A−1B (6.47)
Combining the probability of the model being in each state from the matrix,
in the next subsection, the different criteria to evaluate the performance
characteristics of the network are presented, consisting of multiple PUs and
SUs during spectrum sharing.
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A =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 λp λp λp .... λp λp .... λp λp λp 0 0 0 .... 0 0 λp −µp
0 λp λp λp .... λp λp .... λp λp 0 0 0 0 .... 0 λp −µp µp
0 λp λp λp .... λp λp .... λp 0 0 0 0 0 .... λp −µp µp 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
−(λp + λs) µs 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 0 µs 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
λs −(λp + λs + µs) µs 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 0 0 µp 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
0 λs −(λp + λs + µs) µs .... 0 0 .... 0 0 0 µp 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
0 0 λs −(λp + λs + µs) .... 0 0 .... 0 0 0 µp 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 .... λs −(λp + λs + µs) ..... 0 0 0 µp 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 .... 0 0 .... λs −(λp + λs + µs) µs 0 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 .... 0 0 .... 0 λs −(λp + µs) 0 0 0 .... 0 0 0 0


(6.48)
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6.4.4 Criteria to evaluate system performance for a
balanced multi-user network during spectrum
sharing
6.4.4.1 The mean number of SUs
The mean number of SUs refers to the available spectrum bands which are
used by the SUs to continue their service. For a balanced CRN, the mean
number of SUs should be lower or equal to the total sub-bands available in
the network. Therefore, the mean number of radio bands used by the SUs, i.e
the mean number of SUs accessing the spectrum, is expressed by the following
equation.
Mean number of SUs =
nN∑
j=1
jΠj (6.49)
6.4.4.2 Deprivation rate
For a balanced network, the deprivation rate is the rate at which an SU is forced
to vacate the band on the reappearance of the PU. Therefore, the deprivation
rate is related to the arrival rate of the PU (λp) to access the spectrum. The
deprivation rate of an SU for a system of one PU whose licensed band is divided
into N sub-bands is as follows.
Deprivation rate = λp
N∑
j=1
jΠj (6.50)
Therefore, the total deprivation rate of an SU for the proposed model of n
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PUs whose licensed band is divided into N sub-bands is as follows.
Deprivation rate = λp
nN∑
j=1
jΠj (6.51)
6.4.4.3 Blocking rate
When all the bands are occupied by either PUs or SUs, then the communication
of the SU is blocked. nN th SU have chance to be blocked on the arrival of
PUs while all the bands are used. Therefore, the blocking rate for the proposed
multi-user system is as follows:
Blocking rate = λsΠnN (6.52)
6.4.4.4 Utilization ratio
The utilization ratio is defined as the ratio of the radio bands that are used
by the PUs and SUs to the total number of radio bands that are available in
the system. In the proposed multi-user system, the utilization ratio is defined
as follows:
Utilization ratio =
Number of radio bands used by users
Total number of radio bands
=
n ∗
n∑
j=1
Πxn ∗N +
nN∑
j=1
jΠj
nN
=
n∑
j=1
Πxn +
1
nN
nN∑
j=1
jΠj
(6.53)
In the next section, the verified numerical results are shown for the
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approaches for spectrum sharing.
6.5 Verification and Numerical Results
In this section, the proposed three approaches in this chapter are verified and
the numerical results are shown accordingly.
6.5.1 Enhancing the SU’s service continuity through
the SCE framework
In order to demonstrate how the disruption to an SU’s service is minimized
when it needs to return the spectrum to the PU during spectrum sharing, a
simulation is performed using the random system-operation parameters defined
in [129] and shown in Table 6.2.
System operation parameter Values
λA 0, 1/15, 1/10, 1/5, 1/3 (per minute) Or
0, 0.0011, 0.0017, 0.0033, 0.0056 (per seconds)
λI 1 time/second
λV 1 time/second
µV 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 (per second)
µD 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 (per second)
λD 1 time/minute
Table 6.2: System operation oarameters.
The aim is now to choose different transition rates from the Table 6.2 to
determine its effect on SU’s service continuity.
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Here, λA = 1/15 means an SU accesses the spectrum once per 900 seconds;
λA = 1/10 means an SU accesses the spectrum once per 600 seconds;
λA = 1/5 means an SU accesses the spectrum once per 300 seconds;
λA = 1/3 means an SU accesses the spectrum once per 180 seconds.
The service continuity level of an SU varies depending on different access,
recovery and repair rates as follows. According to equation 6.13, the
probability of the SU being in the Search state (piS) needs to be calculated
for every case.
For λA = 0; µV and µD = 0.2, then
piS = (1 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
0.016
0.2
)−1 = (1 + 0.08)−1 = 0.925 (6.54)
and
Service Continuity = 1− (
0.016
0.2
) ∗ 0.925 = 1− 0.074 = 0.926 (6.55)
For λA = 1/15; µV and µD = 0.4, then
piS = (1 + 0.0011 + .0011 +
0.0011
0.4
+
0.016
0.4
)−1 = (1.04)−1 = 0.961 (6.56)
and
Service Continuity = 1− (
0.0011
0.4
+
0.0016
0.4
) ∗ 0.961 = 0.958 (6.57)
For λA = 1/10; µV and µD = 0.6, then
piS = (1 + 0.0017 + .0017 +
0.0017
0.6
+
0.016
0.6
)−1 = (1.032)−1 = 0.968 (6.58)
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and
Service Continuity = 1− (
0.0017
0.6
+
0.0016
0.6
) ∗ 0.968 = 0.972 (6.59)
For λA = 1/5; µV and µD = 0.8, then
piS = (1 + 0.0033 + .0033 +
0.0033
0.8
+
0.016
0.8
)−1 = (1.027)−1 = 0.973 (6.60)
and
Service Continuity = 1− (
0.0033
0.8
+
0.0016
0.8
) ∗ 0.973 = 0.976 (6.61)
For λA = 1/3; µV and µD = 1 then
piS = (1 + 0.0055 + .0055 + 0.0055 + 0.016)
−1 = (1.032)−1 = 0.968 (6.62)
and
Service Continuity = 1− (0.0055 + 0.0016) ∗ 0.973 = 0.979 (6.63)
The abovementioned results are shown in Table 6.3.
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Access rate (λA) Repair rate (µV ) Recovery rate (µD) Service Continuity level
0 0.2 0.2 0.926
0.0011 0.4 0.4 0.958
0.0017 0.6 0.6 0.972
0.0033 0.8 0.8 0.976
0.0056 1 1 0.979
Table 6.3: Service continuity level of the SU depending on various transition
rates
In this section, the effect of different transition rates on an SU’s service
continuity is discussed. The first state is the Access state. From Table 6.3, it
is shown that the service continuity level of an SU varies according to different
access rates, that is, how frequently the SU needs to access the free spectrum
to continue its service. In other words, Figure 6.8 shows that the service
continuity levels of the SU are enhanced by increasing the spectrum access
rate. The results indicate that an increase of access rate has a positive impact
on the increment of the service continuity of an SU. Therefore, an SU can
minimize the disruption in its service by increasing the access rate in the
model when it has to vacate the spectrum for the PU.
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Figure 6.8: Service continuity vs access rate
For the Vacate state, from Table 6.3, it is also seen that the service
continuity level of an SU depends on different repair rates. An increase in the
repair rate has a positive impact on the increase of service continuity. An SU
can minimize the disruption in its service by increasing its repair rate from the
vacate state. Therefore, the minimization of an SU’s service disruption depends
on how frequently the SU can search and access the other free spectrum after
vacating the spectrum for the PU.
For the Dropped state, from Table 6.3, it is also seen that the service
continuity level of an SU depends on different recovery rates. An increase in
the recovery rate has a positive impact on the increase of service continuity.
An SU can minimize the disruption in its service by increasing its recovery
rate from the Dropped state. Therefore, the minimization of an SU’s service
disruption depends on how frequently the SU can search and access the
other free spectrum from the Vacate state. It is clearly identified that the
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minimization of service continuity of an SU depends on the increment of access
rate, repair rate and recovery rate across the states during the spectrum sharing
mechanism in CRNs.
To summarize the observations, Table 6.3 shows that the service continuity
for SUs varies with the different variations in the state transition rates. If
the SU accesses the PU’s spectrum very frequently, its service continuity will
increase. This means that if the SU continues to search to obtain the free
spectrum instead of going to the Dropped state after vacating the spectrum
for the PU in the CRNs, the chance of obtaining the free spectrum is increased.
Whenever the SU cannot obtain any free spectrum, then its communication is
dropped and it goes to the Dropped state. If the SU searches for another free
spectrum as soon as possible after it goes to the Vacate state and the Dropped
state and obtains access to the spectrum, then it can repair and recover from
the Vacate state and Dropped state, respectively. If both the repair rate and
recovery rate increase, then the service continuity level also increases. So in this
section, it is shown that the service continuity of SUs depends on various state
transition rates for the different states throgh which it needs to go during the
spectrum sharing mechanism. Therefore, by controlling the different transition
rates in the SU’s working states, it is possible to minimize the disruption in
its service by continuously searching and accessing the spectrum in CRNs.
6.5.2 Secure spectrum sharing through CTAS3
framework
A system is made and programmed using the programming environment
described in Section 5.7 in order to verify the proposed CTAS3 framework.
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After achieving the trust values using the trust calculation method in
Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, the values are plotted using MATLAB programming
environment. The system is verified using two networks in CRNs. There
are 5 nodes in the primary network and 6 nodes in the secondary network.
Node 2 in the secondary network is used as a requesting node. Using the
proposed conjoint trust calculation approach in CRNs, firstly, 5 nodes from
the secondary network recommend the requesting node, then 5 different nodes
from the primary network recommend the requesting node.
6.5.2.1 Trust calculation from the secondary network
Every node in the secondary network assigns a trust value for 1000 services
to the requesting node. Therefore, 1000 trust values are obtained for the
requesting secondary node using equation 6.14. Figure 6.9 shows these 1000
trust values of the requesting node from 5 member nodes in the secondary
network.
Therefore, the trust value of the requesting node from each member node
in the secondary network is shown in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10: Average trust value of the requesting node from the other 5 nodes
in the secondary network
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Figure 6.9: Trust value of the requesting node from each member node in the
secondary network for 1000 services
Each member node in the secondary network sends the computed trust
value of the requesting node to the SUBS. The SUBS calculates the requesting
node’s trust value using Table 6.4.
Trust value of the requesting node
From node Value Trust value computed by the SUBS
Node 1 0.6531
0.6934
Node 3 0.9213
Node 4 0.7913
Node 5 0.7401
Node 6 0.3619
Table 6.4: Trust value of the requesting node from the secondary network
The SUBS sends this trust value (0.6934) to the PUBS.
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6.5.2.2 Trust calculation from the primary network
The PUBS receives the 1000 trust values of the requesting node from each
member node in the primary network using equation 6.22. Figure 6.11 shows
the 1000 trust values of the requesting node from each member node.
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Figure 6.11: Trust value of the requesting SU from each member node for the
1000 services in the primary network
The PUBS averages these trust values received from each member node in
the primary network. The average trust value of the requesting node in the
primary network is shown in Figure 6.12.
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Figure 6.12: Average trust value of the requesting node from the primary
network
Each member node in the primary network sends the computed trust value
of the requesting node to the PUBS. At first, the PUBS calculates the average
trust value of the requesting node based on the values received from each
member node and then the PUBS calculates the recommended conjoint trust
value using 6.24, as shown in Table 6.5.
Trust Value of the requesting node
From node Value Trust value received from the SUBS Conjoint trust value computed by the PUBS
Node 1 0.501
0.6934 0.64
Node 2 0.113
Node 3 0.891
Node 4 0.989
Node 5 0.501
Table 6.5: Trust value of the requesting node from the PUBS
The PUBS checks the conjoint trust values of the requesting node and it
observes that the trust value of the requesting node (0.64) is lower than the
trust threshold (0.7). In this case, the requesting node is not considered a
trustworthy node to assign spectrums and its request to use the spectrum is
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not approved (NAP).
6.5.3 Evaluation of network statistics for a B-CRN
framework
In this subsection, channel utilization and other important statistics are
evaluated during the spectrum sharing scheme for a balanced network.
Numerical results are shown using the parameters in [77], as mentioned in
the next subsection. In the numeric experiments for testing the feasibility of
the model, three cases are considered as follows:
• 1 PU with a total of 3 sub-bands
• 2 PUs with a total of 6 sub-bands
• 3 PUs with a total of 9 sub-bands
For one and two PUs in the system, a maximum of three and six SUs are
allowed to use the spectrum in the network, respectively. Similarly, for three
PUs in the system, a total of 9 sub-bands are available. Therefore, a maximum
of 9 SUs are allowed to use the spectrum in the network using equation 6.28.
6.5.3.1 Mean number of SUs analysis
For the mean number of SU analysis, the parameters are assumed as in Table
6.6.
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System Operation Parameter Values
λp 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 times per 10 minutes
µp 0.4
λs 0.6
µs 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8
Table 6.6: System operation parameters for mean number of SU analysis for
multiple users during spectrum sharing
The mean number of SUs for different arrival rates of PU (λp) for different
number of PUs is shown in Figure 6.13.
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Figure 6.13: Mean number of SUs vs. arrival rate of PUs (λp)
From Figure 6.13, it can be seen that the mean number of SUs using the
spectrum decreases with an increase of λp. Three case studies have been used
to show the numerical results, for n = 1, 2, 3. For one PU (n=1), the mean
number of SUs decreases from 3 to 1, 3.5 to 1, 4.5 to 1, and 6.5 to 1 for
µs = 0.8, 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2, respectively. This shows that if the arrival rate
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of the PU increases, the mean number of SUs decreases. Similar results are
obtained for n = 2 and n = 3. Therefore, if PUs access their own spectrum
very frequently, the mean number of SUs who are able to use the free spectrum
decreases as the PUs use their own spectrum. Therefore, if the PU’s arrival
rate to access their own spectrum increases, the mean number of SUs who are
able to access the spectrum decreases. All of these three cases show the same
results.
6.5.3.2 Deprivation rate analysis
For deprivation rate analysis, the parameters are assumed as shown in Table
6.7.
System Operation Parameter Values
λp 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 times per 10 minutes
µp 0.4
λs 0.6
µs 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8
Table 6.7: System operation parameters for deprivation rate analysis for
multiple users during spectrum sharing
The deprivation rate for different arrival rates of PUs (λp) for a different
number of PUs is shown in Figure 6.14.
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Figure 6.14: Deprivation rate vs. arrival rate of PUs (λp)
From Figure 6.14, it can be seen that for each arrival rate of the PU, the
deprivation rate increases with an increase of λp. Three case studies were
considered, for n = 1, 2, 3 to show the numerical results. For one PU (n = 1),
the deprivation rate is increased from 0 to 0.07, 0 to 0.15, 0 to 0.25 and 0 to
0.3 for µs = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively. This shows that if the rate of
PU’s arrival increases, the deprivation rate of the SU also increases. Similar
results are observed for n = 2 and n = 3. Therefore, if the arrival rate of PUs
increases in the system, the deprivation rate of SUs increases in CRNs. Thais
means that if the PUs come to use their own spectrum very frequently, the
SU’s call deprivation rate increases as they are forced to vacate the spectrum
band. The three cases show the same results.
6.5.3.3 Blocking rate analysis
For the blocking rate analysis, the parameters are assumed as shown in Table
6.8.
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System Operation Parameter Values
λs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 times per 10 minutes
µp 0.4
λs 0.6
µs 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8
Table 6.8: System operation parameters for blocking rate analysis for multiple
users during spectrum sharing
The blocking rate for different arrival rates of SUs (λs) for a different
number of PUs is shown in 6.15.
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Figure 6.15: Blocking rate vs. arrival rate of SUs (λs)
From Figure 6.15, it is observed that for one PU (n=1), the blocking rate is
increased from 0 to 0.03, 0 to 0.07, 0 to 0.14 and 0 to 0.17 for µs = 0.8, 0.6, 0.4
and 0.2, respectively. This shows that if the rate of SU’s arrival increases, other
SU’s blocking rate increases. Similar result are observed for n = 2 and n = 3.
Therefore, if the arrival rate of SUs increases in the system, the blocking rate
of SUs increases in CRNs due to the unavailability of the sub-bands. This
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means, if SUs come to use the PU’s free spectrum frequently, other SU’s call
blocking rate increases as all the available sub-bands are occupied by other
PUs. The three cases show the same results.
6.5.3.4 Utilization ratio analysis
For blocking rate analysis, the parameters are assumed as shown in Table 6.9.
System Operation Parameter Values
λs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 times per 10 minutes
µp 0.4
λs 0.6
µs 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8
Table 6.9: System operation parameters for utilization rate analysis for
multiple users during spectrum sharing
The blocking rate for different arrival rate of SU (λs) for different number
of PUs is shown in 6.16.
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Figure 6.16: Utilization ratio vs. arrival rate of SUs (λs)
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From 6.16, it is observed that for n = 1, the utilization ratio is increased
from 0.62 to 1, 0.55 to 0.83,0.45 to 0.73 and 0.42 to 0.65 for µs = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
and 0.8, respectively. This shows that if the rate of SU’s arrival increases
according to the channel availability, the utilization ratio increases. Similar
results are observed for n = 2 and n = 3. Therefore, if the arrival rate of SUs
increases in the system, the utilization ratio of the system increases. The three
cases show the same result.
6.6 Conclusion
Spectrum should be shared in a secure way in CRNs to avoid untrustworthy
user behavior in the network. Therefore, in this chapter, the conjoint trust
assessment approach is proposed to share the spectrum in a secure way. During
spectrum sharing, if a PU comes back to the network, the SU needs to vacate
the spectrum. In this case, the SU’s service is discontinued until it searches
and accesses other free spectrum. To minimize this service disruption of
the SU, a state transition diagram of the working states of SUs is proposed.
By controlling different transition rates in the state transition diagram, it is
possible to minimize SU’s service disruption during spectrum sharing. For
efficient spectrum sharing, there should be a balance in the number of SUs
and PUs so that the SUs’ communication is not blocked, nor are their calls
dropped when all SUs use the spectrum. Therefore, an approach is proposed
to balance the number of SUs and PUs in the network and a basic spectrum
sharing mechanism is also proposed for this multiple SUs and PUs model.
Different network statistics are derived to see the network performance during
spectrum sharing for multiple users in CRNs.
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Chapter 7
Mechanisms for Enhancing
System Availability of CRNs
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, a Certificate Authority (CA)-oriented trust-based framework
was proposed to authenticate a secondary user’s (SU’s) request to either
use network resources or access primary user’s (PU’s) free spectrum so that
malicious users cannot gain access to the network. The CA in the proposed
framework serves as the key node which is responsible for performing the
primary functions of the CRN and storing the trust values of all member
nodes in the network. However, as pointed out in Section 3.3.3, the aim of a
malicious node is to disrupt the security of the cognitive radio network (CRN),
and one of the ways by which it can do this is by becoming the CA to break all
the normal network activities. This, in turn, leads to the collapse of the whole
network. To address this limitation, in this chapter, a framework for selecting
the node as the CA is proposed that establishes a procedure for selecting the
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most trustworthy node as the CA and other trustworthy nodes as the backup
CAs (BCAs). The BCA is selected in the framework so that in the case of a
malicious attack on the CA, the responsibility of the CA can be transferred
to the BCA which can then act as the main CA to ensure the normal working
process of CRNs. Having such a framework enhances the availability and
reliability of the CRN.
Another way by which malicious users can disrupt the working of CRNs
is by joining the network by falsifying their identity with a target to inject
different security threats and jam the network. Another security threat occurs
in the network when a member node behaves maliciously by leaving the
network abnormally without informing any other member node in the network
and revealing all the data to the malicious user after leaving the network.
Thus, this abnormal leaving renders the whole network vulnerable to different
threats. In order to address this limitation, in this chapter, a framework for
secure node joining and leaving the network is proposed.
The proposed framework for the Node Selection as a CA and BCAs
and Secure node Joining and Leaving (NSSJL) aims to increase the system
availability of CRNs and maintains smooth and secure communication.
Therefore, the proposed framework provides solutions and sufficient proofs
for:
• selecting the most trustworthy node as the CA, and other nodes as the
BCA to provide continuous service to maintain smooth communication
in CRNs in case an error occurs in the CA.
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• proposing the node joining and leaving procedure in the CRN in a secure
way so that no malicious user can join the network and member nodes
cannot leave the network abnormally. These schemes update a node’s
trust value depending on their joining and leaving activities which, in
turn, cause the nodes to be selected as the CA and BCA in CRNs.
• demonstrating the increase in system availability and reliability by using
the proposed NSSJL framework in CRNs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.2, the
architecture and working of the proposed NSSJL framework for increasing
system availability is described. In Section 7.3, a detailed explanation of the
process of selecting a node as a CA and BCA is given with an example. The
process of secure node joining and leaving the network is described in Section
7.4 along with a description of how the successful joining and leaving processes
impact on the node’s trust update in the network. In Section 7.5, the proposed
NSSJL framework is modeled to show how it can improve the availability and
reliability of the CRN. The verification of the proposed framework is shown in
Section 7.6. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
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7.2 Proposed Framework for Node Selection
and Secure Node Joining and Leaving
(NSSJL) the Network to Increase the
System Availability
In this section, the proposed framework for selecting the most trustworthy
node and secure node joining and leaving the network to increase the system
availability is presented.
7.2.1 System model and architecture
The architecture of the proposed NSSJL framework, presented in Figure 7.1,
consists of four major components as follows:
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Figure 7.1: Proposed model using multiple BCAs in the NSSJL framework
• Base Station: As mentioned in Section 5.2, the base station is the
central point of contact between different nodes in the network.
• Certificate Authority (CA): As mentioned in Section 5.2, a CA is
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an authorized entity connected to both networks to perform the main
functions in the CRN.
• Back-up Certificate Authority (BCA): BCAs are those nodes which
have the capability to control the CRN when the CA is attacked by
malicious users.
• Trust Repository: As mentioned in Section 5.2, the trust repository in
a CA serves as the storage to store all the nodes’ trust values in CRNs.
7.2.2 Working steps of the NSSJL framework
In this section, the working of the proposed NSSJL framework to increase
the system availability is proposed. To increase availability, the proposed
framework aims to (a) select the most trustworthy nodes to work as the CA
and the BCA and (b) establish a secure node joining and leaving process in
the network. Figure 7.2 presents a flowchart diagram of the working of the
proposed framework, which is as follows:
1. Node Selection: In the proposed CRN architecture, the CA is responsible
for performing all the major functionalities and storing the trust values
of all the member nodes in the network. Therefore, after comparing the
trust values against the trust threshold value, the most trustworthy node
is selected as the CA so that it will not be easily compromised by the
malicious nodes. Then, after comparing the trust values with the trust
threshold, the second most trustworthy node is selected as the first BCA
to work as the main CA in the event of any error or attacks to the main
CA to ensure the system’s continuous service as expected. This process
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Figure 7.2: Flowchart illustrating the steps performed by the NSSJL
framework
253
is repeated for all nodes whose trustworthiness value is above the trust
threshold and they are selected as the nth BCA, where n is the number
of BCAs.
2. Secure Node Joining the Network: If a new node wants to join the CRN,
then it broadcasts a message to the network and goes through the secure
joining process. If the process it follows to join the network is successful,
then the node is considered a trustworthy node and its trust value is
increased for its good behaviour which, in turn, results in the joined
node to be selected as a CA.
3. Secure Node Leaving the Network: If a member wants to leave the
network, it sends a message to the respective base station before leaving
the network according to the secure leaving process policy. The node
should go through the secure leaving process. If the process it follows to
leave the network is normal, then the node’s trust value is increased for
its good behaviour which, in turn, helps the leaving node to join another
network.
In the next section, the working of each of these steps is defined in the
proposed NSSJL framework which will be discussed in detail.
7.3 Trustworthy Node Selection to Work as a
CA and BCA
In this section, the process of selecting a node as the CA and BCA is presented.
As all member nodes may always have a high opinion of their respective base
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stations, the base stations may always receive the highest trust value. To avoid
this, in the proposed framework, base stations do not take part in CA and BCA
selection. As a result, the CA and BCAs are selected from the member nodes
in the CRNs. Figure 7.3 illustrates the steps in the node selection phase in the
proposed framework. The steps are as follows:
• The trust calculation process is carried out at the secondary network and
the primary network
• At first, the available node’s trust value from both networks in CRNs
is calculated, depending on its trust relationship between the different
nodes in CRNs. Every node in the network finds its 1-hop neighbors and
calculates their trust values depending on various activities and sends
these to their corresponding base stations. Both base stations also assign
trust values for its 1-hop member nodes.
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Figure 7.3: Working steps for the node selection phase in the NSSJL framework
Following Chang et al. [119] it is assumed that each CR node is aware of
its 1-hop neighbor nodes and assigns a trust value for it, using the trust
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calculation method 7.3.1. The 1-hop neighbor of node i is denoted by
N1(i). For instance, from Figure 7.4, it can be seen that the CR node
PU1’s 1-hop neighbors, N1(PU1) , are SU2, SU3 and SU1.
N1(PU1)
one hop neighbour
> SU2, SU3, SU1 (7.1)
Figure 7.4: Communication between CR Nodes
After receiving each member node’s 1-hop neighbor’s trust value, both
base stations store these trust values and calculate the average trust value
of each node. First, SUBS calculates the average trust value of all the
nodes for which it receives a recommendation from its member nodes.
PUBS also calculates the average trust value of each node for which it
receives a recommendation from its member nodes. SUBS then forwards
all nodes’ trust values to the PUBS.
• After receiving the trust values from SUBS, PUBS calculates every node’s
final trust value in the CRN. If there is more than one trust value
for a node calculated from SUBS and PUBS, then its average value is
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considered as the final trust value.
• If a node has the highest trust value and its trust value is above or equal
to the trust threshold, PUBS selects this node as the CA. If a node has
the second highest trust value and its trust value is above or equal to
the trust threshold, PUBS selects this node as the first candidate for the
BCA and so on. If the node has a trust value which is below the trust
threshold, then it works as a normal node.
• The first candidate for the BCA takes charge as the CA if any error
occurs in the CA and the second candidate for the BCA takes the role
of the first BCA and so on.
From the above working steps, node selection has two sub-processes as
follows:
• Trust calculation method for each node
• Selection of the CA and BCA based on the trust values
In the next subsection, the node’s trust calculation method is described in
detail.
7.3.1 Trust calculation method
A node has a trust relationship with other nodes in the CRN depending
on its performance in complying with various activities such as vacating the
PU’s spectrum band on its arrival, normal joining or leaving the CRN, and
appropriate spectrum sensing. A node that has high compliance in all these
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activities will have a high trust value. The trust value of a node is evaluated
by other nodes and is represented by TVi(j), where TVi(j) represents the trust
value of node j evaluated by node i. The range for representing one node’s
trust value is from 0 to 1.
TVi(j) =
n∑
k=1
TV ki (j)
n
(7.2)
where k is an activity that node i has with node j and
n is the total number of activities.
When there is more than one node that evaluates the trust value of a
cognitive radio node, then the cumulative trust value is represented by:
TV (j) =
|RR|∑
i=1
TVi(j)
|RR|
(7.3)
where |RR| denotes the number of nodes of the network region R. An example
is illustrated in Figure 7.5 to explain this calculation method using equations
7.2 and 7.3.
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Figure 7.5: Example to illustrate the trust calculation method
Node 1 has three past activities (activity numbers: a, b, c) with node 2,
and for each of these activities, node 1 is assigned a certain trust value by node
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2. Therefore, node 1’s trust value is evaluated by node 2 using equation 7.2 :
TV2(1) =
TV a2 (1) + TV
b
2 (1) + TV
c
2 (1)
3
=
0.3 + 0.5 + 0.5
3
= 0.43 (7.4)
Accordingly, node 1’s trust values as evaluated by node 3, node 4 and node
5 are 0.5, 0.4 and 0.37, respectively.
There are four nodes which evaluate node 1’s trust value. Therefore, node
1’s final trust value is calculated using equation 7.3.
TV (1) =
TV21 + TV31 + TV41 + TV51
4
=
0.43 + 0.5 + 0.4 + 0.37
4
= 0.42
(7.5)
Using this trust calculation method, every node in Figure 7.4 calculates its
1-hop neighbor’s trust value and sends this to the corresponding base station.
For instance, node SU3’s trust value evaluated by PU1 is denoted by TV SU3PU1 =
0.6 and PU1 sends the evaluated trust value of SU3 to the PUBS. Different
nodes evaluate the same node’s trust value and may have different results
because of their findings and experiences. Each secondary node calculates its
1-hop neighbor’s trust value and sends it to the SUBS, as shown in Table 7.1.
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The trust value received by the SUBS
From node For node Value
SU1 PU1 0.7
SU2
PUBS 0.9
SUBS 0.8
PU1 0.7
SU3
SUBS 0.9
PU1 0.6
PU2 0.6
SU4
PU3 0.5
PU4 0.6
SUBS
SU2 0.3
SU3 0.5
Table 7.1: The trust value received by the SUBS for the CR node
Each primary node calculates its 1-hop neighbor’s trust value and sends it
to the PUBS, as shown in Table 7.2. SUBS forwards each node’s average trust
value to the PUBS. Finally, PUBS calculates each node’s final trust value.
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Trust value received by the PUBS
From node For node Value
PU1
SU2 0.5
SU3 0.6
SU1 0.3
PU2
PUBS 0.9
SU3 0.6
PU3
SU4 0.3
PUBS 0.8
PU4
PUBS 0.9
SU4 0.5
PUBS
PU4 0.3
PU3 0.4
SU2 0.2
PU2 0.4
Table 7.2: The trust value received by the PUBS for the CR node
SUBS calculates the average trust value of each node for which it receives
a trust value from its member node, as shown in Table 7.3 and sends these
trust values to PUBS.
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The average trust value calculated by the SUBS
Node Value
PU1 0.66
PU2 0.6
PU3 0.5
PU4 0.6
SU2 0.3
SU3 0.5
Table 7.3: The average trust value of nodes calculated by the SUBS
PUBS calculates the average trust value of each node for which it receives
a trust value from its member node, as shown in Table 7.4.
The average trust value calculated by the PUBS
Node Value
SU2 0.35
SU3 0.6
SU1 0.3
SU4 0.4
PU4 0.3
PU2 0.4
PU3 0.4
Table 7.4: The average trust value of nodes calculated by the PUBS
After receiving the trust values from the SUBS, the PUBS calculates the
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final trust value of each node using equation 7.3 and stores this in itself, as
shown in Table 7.5.
Node Number Node name, j TV (j)
1 PU1 0.66
2 PU2 0.5
3 PU3 0.45
4 PU4 0.45
5 SU4 0.4
6 SU3 0.56
7 SU1 0.3
8 SU2 0.33
Table 7.5: Local trust relationship table stored in the PUBS
7.3.2 Selection of CA and BCA based on the trust value
Each node’s final trust value is calculated and stored in PUBS using the trust
calculation method described in Section 7.3.1 as shown in Table 7.5. From
Table 7.5, the possible CA and BCA candidates will be selected by the PUBS,
depending on their trust value. The PUBS checks each member node’s trust
value. If a node has the highest trust value and it is above or equal to the
trust threshold (0.5, in this approach), it is selected as the CA. If a node has
the second highest trust value and it is above or equal to the trust threshold,
then the node is selected as the first candidate of the BCA and takes the role
of the CA if any errors occur in the main CA. If a node has the third highest
trust value and it is above or equal to the trust threshold, then the node is
selected as the second candidate of the BCA. The node whose trust value is
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lower than the threshold, works as a normal node in the network. Table 7.6
shows the candidate list for the CA and BCAs. Using the flowchart in Figure
7.3, from Table 7.6, the PU1 node is selected to act as the CA as it achieves
the highest trust value of all the nodes and its trust value is above 0.5. SU3 is
selected as the first BCA as it achieves the second highest trust value in the
network and its trust value is above 0.5. PU2 is selected as second BCA as it
has third highest trust value and its trust value is equal to 0.5. Nodes PU4,
PU3, SU4 work as normal nodes in the network.
Node Number Trust value
CA candidate PU1 0.66 (highest trust value and is above the threshold)
First BCA candidate SU3 0.56 (second highest trust value and is above the threshold)
Second BCA candidate PU2 0.5 (third highest trust value and is equal to the threshold)
Normal node PU4, PU3 0.45 (trust value is lower than the threshold)
Normal node SU4 0.4 (trust value is lower than the threshold)
Table 7.6: Candidate list for CA and BCA selection
It is possible that there may be more than one node with the same trust
value and which is above the trust threshold and is therefore eligible to be
selected as either the CA or the BCAs. In such scenarios, these member nodes
of CRNs will compete to be selected as either a CA or BCA as explained in
the next sub-section.
7.3.3 Selection of CA and BCA node when there is more
than one possible node
When there is more than one possible node which can be selected as either a
CA or BCA, then an election process is held. During the election process, the
selection of the nodes is done according to the following priorities:
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1. Priority 1: The node is a current CA or BCA.
2. Priority 2: The node is from the primary network.
7.3.3.1 CA Selection Process
In the selection process, if a potential CA candidate either currently works as a
CA of the network or is from the primary network and its trust value is greater
than all the potential CA nodes, then it is selected as the CA. Otherwise,
the CA is chosen from the potential candidates. The selection procedure is
described through Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 CA Competition Algorithm
Input: Trust table in primary user base station (PUBS), number of CA competitors (n), system defined
trust threshold (Tthreshold)
Output: CA selection
1: PUBS will search the trust table for the list of CA competitors and see the current trust value of each
competitor (Tcurrent).
2: for j ← 1 to j ≤ n do
3: if Tcurrent ≥ Tthreshold then
4: if the CA competitor is current the CA then
5: this node will be selected as the jth CA
6: else
7: if the CA competitor is from the primary node then
8: this node will be selected as the jth CA
9: Tcurrent = Tcurrent + 0.05
10: else
11: Not selected as a CA and will take part in the next election procedure.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
As the CA node should be more trustworthy than the BCA, if a node
successfully wins the competition as the CA, its trust value will be incremented
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by 0.05 as a reward for winning the competition. Specifically, the CA node
is responsible for managing the authority and authentication processes within
the CRN group.
7.3.3.2 BCA Selection Process
As in the CA selection process, if a potential BCA node is currently a BCA of
the network and its trust value is greater than all the potential BCA nodes,
then it is given a higher priority and is selected as the BCA. Otherwise,
the BCA is chosen from the potential candidates. The selection process is
described through Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 BCA Competition Algorithm
Input: Trust table in primary user base station (PUBS), number of BCA competitors (n), system defined
trust threshold (Tthreshold)
Output: BCA selection winner
1: PUBS will search the trust table for the list of BCA competitors and see the current trust (Tcurrent) of
each competitor.
2: for j ← 1 to j ≤ n do
3: if Tcurrent ≥ Tthreshold then
4: if the BCA competitor is the current BCA then
5: this node will be selected as the jth CA
6: else
7: if the BCA competitor is from the primary node then
8: this node will be selected as the jth CA
9: Tcurrent = Tcurrent + 0.05
10: else
11: Not selected as BCA and will take part in the next election procedure.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
If a node wins the BCA competition, its trust value will be incremented by
0.05 as a reward for winning the competition. From Table 7.7, an example is
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demonstrated to select the CA/BCA when there is more than one candidate.
Node Current status Trust value stored to the PUBS
PU1 CA candidate 0.68
PU2 1st BCA candidate 0.6
SU1 CA candidate and works as CA 0.68
SU2 2nd BCA candidate and works as BCA 0.5
SU3 2nd BCA candidate 0.5
SU4 Works as normal node 0.4
Table 7.7: Example when both nodes have the same trust value
From Table 7.7, it can be clearly seen that SU1 and PU1 both have the
highest trust value of 0.68 which is higher than the threshold value (0.5).
Therefore, both are selected as a CA candidate. But currently, SU1 is working
as the CA. Therefore, SU1 is selected as the CA according to Algorithm 2 and
PU1 takes part in the next CA selection process, which by this time, it may
have received a trust increment for its good behaviour in the network which,
in turn, makes its trust value the highest which means it is selected as the CA.
If SU1 was not working as the current CA, then PU1 is selected as the CA as
it is a node from the primary network. On the other hand, SU2 and SU3 have
the same trust value of 0.5 which is equal to the threshold. In this particular
case, SU2 is selected as the second BCA as it is currently working as a BCA
and SU3 takes part in the next BCA competition. In the next competition,
there is a chance of a new updated trust value for SU3.
In the next section, the secure node joining and leaving process in the
network is described which has an effect on the node’s trust value update and,
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in turn, results in the nodes taking part in the CA/BCA selection process.
7.4 Process of Secure Node Joining and
Leaving the CRN and its Effect on Trust
Value
In this section, the steps involved in the process of node joining and leaving
the network in a secure way are described.
7.4.1 Secure joining the network and its effect on a
node’s trust value
The working steps in the secure process of joining the network and its effect
on a node’s trust value is as follows:
1. If a new node wants to join the CRN, it broadcasts a message to the
network and waits until it receives a response, which is considered to be
a normal joining event.
2. The new node produces its certificate using cryptography techniques and
generates a random number and sends them to all member nodes in the
network.
3. The new node’s certificate is verified by all member nodes and the base
station in order to give authorization for it to join the network.
4. After obtaining authorization from all the trusted member nodes and the
base station, the new node joins the network, otherwise it cannot join
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the network.
5. After successful joining the network, the joining node achieves some trust
increment for its good and normal behaviour in the joining process.
6. If the new node sends many messages within a short period in order to
join the network, this is an abnormal joining event as the broadcasting
of numerous messages might result in the breakdown of normal network
activity. If one node wants to join abnormally without following the
policies of the joining process, the node’s trust value is decreased by a
certain amount.
The working steps of the joining process, including its effect on a node’s
trust value update is shown in Figure 7.6.
In order to explain the authentication process to join the network, the
framework uses the following symbols:
New node’s Certificate: CN
Random Number generated by new node: RN
Base Station’s Certificate: CBS
Random Number generated by new node: RN
Numerical signature of Base Station to ‘JOIN’ message: SBS(JOIN)
Numerical signature of New Node to message: SN(JOIN)
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Figure 7.6: Working steps of the secure joining process in the NSSJL
framework
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In order to pass the authentication procedure for joining the CRNs, the
following steps are followed by the new node:
1. The new node broadcasts its certificate and random number to all
member nodes in the network as well as to its base station.
New Node Broadcast > Node[All] : CN ‖ RN
2. The base station and the member nodes verify the validity of the new
node’s certificate.
3. The base station then produces random number RBS, calculates the
signature to RN and sends it to all nodes.
BaseStation Broadcast > Node[All] : CBS ‖ RBS ‖ SBS(RN )
4. A new node examines the validity of the base station’s certificate CBS
and calculates the numerical signature SBS(RN) for RN and sends this
to all member nodes.
NewNodeBroadcast > Node[All] : SN (RBS)
5. The base station and other member nodes verify the numerical signature
to RN and broadcast the result to each other.
6. If the result from the base station node and the member nodes is same,
each member node sends the message to the base station which informs
the trust evidence of the new node as a trust value of 0.01.
7. The trust evidence indicates that the node is authenticated by the
member nodes and the base station to join the network. The base station
then calculates the trust value of the new node, depending on the trust
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evidence assigned by each member node. In this way, the new node
passes the authentication process to join the network. The joining node
joins the network with an initial trust value using the following equation
7.6.
Tnew node(p) =
{
1
u
u∑
i=1
Ti (p)
}
(7.6)
where u is the total number of member nodes in the network.
After successfully joining the network, the node’s trust value is
incremented by 0.05 according to the following equation 7.7 by the
base station for its good behaviour, as shown in Table 7.8. This trust
increment for successful joining will work for five consecutive joining
process. Therefore, after that this particular node is considered as a
highly trustworthy node to join the network securely and hence no further
trust increment is required.
Tnode(p) = Tnew node(p) + 0.05 (7.7)
Complying behaviour Trust increment
value
Uncomplying behaviour Trust decrement
value
Normal Joining 0.05 Abnormal Joining 0.05
Normal Leaving 0.05 Abnormal Leaving 0.05
Table 7.8: Behaviour-based event table
8. If the verification result of the numerical signature to RN is not same
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from the member nodes and the base station, then the member node and
the base station relay the message to each other which informs that the
total trust evidence of the new node is not authenticated enough to join
the network.
The flow of the secure joining process between different nodes in the
network is shown in Figure 7.7
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Figure 7.7: Flow of the secure joining process between different nodes in the
network in the NSSJL framework
7.4.2 Secure leaving process from the network and its
effect on the node’s trust value
The working steps of the secure leaving process from the network and its effect
on the node’s trust value is as follows:
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1. If a member sends a message to the base station before leaving the
network, this is marked as a normal leaving event.
2. After verifying the leaving node’s message, the leaving node is allowed
to leave the network by the base station.
3. The base station sends a message to all of its member nodes not to
communicate with the leaving node so that the leaving node cannot
obtain any network information after it leaves the network.
4. The leaving node is given a trust increment for its good behaviour during
the normal leaving process.
5. If the member node leaves the network without sending a prior message,
this is an abnormal leaving event. If the node leaves the network
abnormally, its trust value is decreased by a certain amount.
The working steps of the leaving process are shown in Figure 7.8.
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Figure 7.8: Working steps of the secure leaving process in the NSSJL
framework
In order to explain the secure leaving process from the network to avoid
any malicious behaviour, the framework uses the following steps:
1. The leaving member node signs its departing message and broadcasts
the leaving information to all other member nodes and the base station.
2. The base station verifies the departing message from the leaving node and
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if it is a valid departing message, the base station broadcasts a message
to all other member nodes to revoke all the certificates issued to it and
to stop communication with the leaving node.
3. The broadcast message from the base station will be authenticated by
each member node.
4. The base station produces a new group key by using a key distribution
algorithm and distributes it to all members. All member nodes use
this new group key to communicate between themselves so that the
leaving node cannot obtain any information later. After a node leaves the
network, no valid certificate is attached to it any more. Hence, backward
security is guaranteed.
Node[All]
Stop sharing keys > Leaving Node
Base Station new group key > Node[All]
5. If the CA is a departing node, then the BCA will take on the role of the
CA and sends about this new role to all member nodes. Then the new
CA produces a new group shared key which is distributed to all base
stations and other member nodes.
BCATake Charge of CA > Node[All]
New CA Shared New Group Key > Node[All] and Base Stations
6. If these steps are followed by the leaving node, then the leaving node
successfully leaves the network and is rewarded for its good behaviour.
Therefore, its trust value is incremented by 0.05 by the base station for its
complying behaviour; otherwise, its trust value is decremented by 0.05.
The corresponding base station stores and informs the other member
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nodes about this updated trust value of the leaving node. As a result of
the trust increment for good behaviour, the leaving node can join other
networks after leaving and can take part in the CA and BCA selection
procedure. This trust increment for successful leaving will work for five
consecutive leaving process. Therefore, after that this particular node
is considered as a highly trustworthy node to leave the network securely
and hence no further trust increment is required.
The flow of the secure node leaving process from the network is shown in
Figure 7.9
Leaving 
member node
Base Station
Broadcasts leaving 
message
Other member 
nodes
Broadcasts  message not 
to communicate with the 
leaving node
Produces new group key 
and shares to all member 
nodes
Broadcasts leaving 
message
Authentication to base 
station’s message
Trust value is updated
Figure 7.9: Flow of the secure node leaving process in the NSSJL framework
7.5 Enhancing the Availability of the CRN
System using the NSSJL Framework
In this section, how the proposed NSSJL framework can enhance the
availability and reliability of the system is explained. As described in Section
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7.3, the system with a CA and multiple BCAs switches from the CA to the
first BCA in response to the detection of an error to the CA or if the CA is
biased by any other malicious nodes or is under attack, which thereby ensures
continuous service for smooth communication in CRNs. Whenever a CA is
under attack and its functionality is handed over to the BCA, the CA is
considered a malicious CA and some reconfiguration techniques are applied
to correct it. If the reconfiguration techniques work well for the CA, then the
CA is reinstated from the BCA; otherwise, the CA has no more functionality
in the network. This scenario is depicted in Figure 7.10. In this model, the
multiple BCA system has one CA and a multiple BCA option.
To assist in the transition process from one CA to another BCA, it is
assumed that each CA contains two extra functionalities: one for monitoring
and the other for software reconfiguration. Furthermore, each CA has
multi-states which facilitate the transition of the main CA to the BCA, once
an error in the main CA has been detected. In order to enhance the availability
of the system, each CA goes through different working states to hand over its
functionality to another CA (BCA). In the next subsection, the different states
in the framework of the proposed model are described.
281
CA works properly
Does an error occur in 
the CA ?
1
st
  BCA takes role 
of CA
Reconfiguration 
takes place in CA
Yes
No
No
CA continues to 
work
Is reconfiguration 
successful?
Takes over the 
role of CA
Yes
 Is there a BCA 
       option ?
Yes
No
System fails
End
2
nd
  BCA takes role of 1
st
  
BCA
No more 
functionality
N=number of Backup 
Certificate Authority ( BCA)
 Nth  BCA takes 
role of (N-1) th  
BCA
Start
Figure 7.10: CA and BCA’s cooperation to maintain smooth communication
in CRNs
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7.5.1 Defining multi-states in a CA and the transition
between them
The five different states that a CA goes through in a multiple BCA framework
are as follows:
Healthy state (Hi): A healthy state is one in which a CA is working as
expected.
Unstable state (Ui): An unstable state is one in which a degradation in
the performance of the CA has been detected.
Switchover state (Si): The switchover state is one that exists before the
reconfiguration process of the affected CA takes place.
Reconfiguration state (Ri): The reconfiguration state is one in which
an attempt is made to restore the operation of the affected CA to its normal
working state.
Failure state (H0): If the reconfiguration process of the affected CA is
unsuccessful, it enters the failure state.
It is assumed that at first, the main CA and the BCAs in the system
are in the healthy state. If any error is detected in the main CA by the
IDS (Intrusion Detection System), then its state will shift to the unstable
state. The CA that has been affected and is under-performing is treated as
a malicious CA. From the unstable state, the malicious CA will go to the
switchover state to hand over the current functionalities to the first backup
CA as shown in Figure 7.11. From the switchover state, the malicious CA
will go to the reconfiguration state where an attempt is made to reconfigure
it. If the reconfiguration techniques work well for the malicious CA, it will
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take over from the BCA as the main CA; otherwise, the CA’s activities will
be performed by the BCA which now becomes the main CA and the malicious
CA goes to the failure state. Algorithm 4 shows the transition process of the
main CA from one state to another in the face of an error occurs in the CA
for a multi-BCA-based framework.
Active 
CA
1st Backup CA
BC1
2
nd
 Backup CA
BC2
nth
Backup CA
BCn
Normal
Reconfiguration
Switchover state
Previous main
CA
Present main  CA 
(Acting)
BC1
2
nd
 Backup CA
BC2
nth
Backup CA
BCn
Main CA 2
nd
 Backup CA
BC2
(n-1)th
Backup CA
BCn-1
Successful
Not successful
Error is detected (Unstable 
state)
1st Backup CA
BC1
Figure 7.11: Multiple BCAs framework
In the proposed approach, it is assumed that the CA goes from one state
to another when an event occurs. In the next subsection, to demonstrate the
improvement in availability and reliability of CRN, the transition rates are
defined to show how quickly the transition happens from one state to another
which will cause the CA to change its state from the current one to another,
accordingly.
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Algorithm 4 State Transition Algorithm for the multiple BCA System
Input: Number of BCAs (n)
Output: Stable and secure system
The system counts the number of CAs.
if n = 1 then
3: if CA functions properly then
the system is secured and available
Go to ‘Healthy state’
6: else
Go to ‘Failure state’
end if
9: end if
if n => 2 then
for j ← 2 to j ≤ n do
12: if the jth backup functions properly then
the system is available
else
15: Go to ‘Unstable state’
end if
Unstable state:
18: if n 6= 1 then
Go to ‘Switchover state’
else
21: Go to step ‘Reconfigure state’
end if
Switchover state:
24: j = j + 1
All active functions are transferred to jth BCA and
the system performs properly
27: Failure state:
The system does not perform any function
Reconfigure state:
30: if the system is reconfigured then
Go to ‘Healthy state’
else
33: Go to ‘Failure state’
end if
Healthy state:
36: The system performs properly
end for
end if
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7.5.2 Defining the transition rates and probabilities of
CAs being in different states
The transition rates that will change the state of the CA in the proposed model
from the current one to another are: failure rate (λ), repair rate (µ), unstable
rate (λu), and reconfiguration rate (λr). As the proposed model goes through
many transitions from one state to another, it follows the Markov Chain model.
The Markov chain model is a memoryless system with different possible states
in which the future state of the system depends only on its present state
and behaves accordingly. The change of a CA/BCA’s state in the proposed
model from one to another is clearly suitable to follow the Markov model.
The Markov Chain state transition diagram with the multi-BCA framework
is shown in Figure 7.12. In this model, it is assumed that there are n number
BCAs and the system will transit from nth BCA to n − 1th BCA and so on
until to the first BCA.
According to the Markov Chain, the sojourn time in a state is always
distributed exponentially. In the proposed multi-BCA framework, it is
assumed that the main CA and all BCAs at first are in a healthy state (Hi),
but the main CA could become malicious. At that time, the main CA’s state
may change from the healthy state to the unstable state at a rate of (i ∗ λu).
In the unstable state, the main CA performance is degraded and it has to
be reconfigured. When the CA is about to be reconfigured, the state of the
malicious CA may change from the unstable state to the switchover state at a
rate of (i × λs). In this state, the first BCA will take on the role of the main
CA and continue to perform the required computations of the system. The
malicious CA may change from the unstable state to the reconfiguration state
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Figure 7.12: Multi-BCA model using Markov Chain
at a rate of (i× λr).
The steady-state probability which shows the probability of the proposed
model being in each state is as follows:
Probability of being in the healthy state (Hi):
n∑
i=1
PHi
Probability of being in the unstable state (Ui):
n∑
i=1
PUi
Probability of being in the reconfiguration state (Ri):
n∑
i=1
PRi
Probability of being in the switchover state (Si):
n∑
i=2
PSi
Probability of being in the failure state (H0): PH0
where n is the number of BCAs.
Based on the steady-state probabilities, it is possible to determine the
probability of being in each state for the model with the CA and multiple
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BCAs. The probability of being in each state is measured by using the
transition rates from one state to another state in the proposed multiple BCAs
framework. For every state, the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate
according to the Markov chain model. The steady state balance equation for
the CA and each BCA of the proposed model being in a healthy state is as
follows:
For state H0, the incoming rate equals the outgoing rate as follows:
µPHo = λPU1 (7.8)
For state H1, the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate as follows:
(µ+ λU)PH1 = λsPs2 + µrPR1 + µPHo (7.9)
For state H2, the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate as follows:
(µ+ 2λU)PH2 = λsPs4 + µrPR2 + µPH1 (7.10)
For state H3, the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate as follows:
(µ+ 3λU)PH3 = λsPs4 + µrPR3 + µPH2 (7.11)
For state Hi (i = 2, 3, . . . . . . ..n− 1)(n ≥ 3), the incoming rate is equal to
the outgoing rate as follows:
(µ+ iλU)PHi = λsPsi+1 + µrPRi + µPi−1 (7.12)
The steady state balance equation for the CA and each BCA of the proposed
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model being in an unstable state is as follows:
For state Ui (i = 1, 2, 3, ......n), the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing
rate as follows:
iλUPHi = (iλ + iλr)PUi = (λ+ λr)PUi (7.13)
The steady state balance equation for the CA and each BCA of the
proposed model being in a switchover state is as follows:
For state Si (i = 2, 3, ..n), the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing rate
as follows:
λsPsi = iλPUi (7.14)
The steady state balance equation for the CA and each BCA of the
proposed model being in a reconfiguration state is as follows:
For state Ri (i = 1, 2, 3, ..n), the incoming rate is equal to the outgoing
rate as follows:
µrPRi = iλrPUi (7.15)
The conservation equation is obtained by summing all the probabilities of
every state in the system and the summation is equal to 1.
n∑
i=0
PHi +
n∑
i=0
PUi +
n∑
i=0
PRi +
n∑
i=0
PSi = 1 (7.16)
Combining this conservation equation with the balanced equations above,
and solving them, the closed-form solutions are obtained being in a healthy
state in one-CA and multi-BCA models. In the next subsection, using the
Markov Chain transition diagram, the probability of the proposed model
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being in a healthy state when there are multiple BCAs compared to when
there is one CA is determined.
7.5.3 Determining the probability of the system being
in a healthy state
7.5.3.1 Probability of the system being in a healthy state in a
single-CA system (n = 1)
In this system, only one CA exists and performs the system’s required
functionalities as shown in Figure 7.13. As there are no backup CAs, the
switchover state is not represented.
 
H1 U1 H0
µ
λu
λr
R1
λ
µr
Figure 7.13: Single-CA system
The probability of a single-CA system entering a healthy state is:
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PH1 =
[
1 +
λu
λ+ λr
(1 +
λr
µr
+
λ
µ
)
]−1
(7.17)
7.5.3.2 Probability of the system being in a healthy state in a
multi-BCA System (n >= 2)
The multi-BCA system consists of the active CA and the (n-1) backup CAs.
PHn = [A+B + C +D + E]
−1 (7.18)
where
A = n!{
n∑
i=1
1
i!
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n−i
B =
λu
λ+ λr
n∑
i=1
1
i!
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n−i
C =
λr
µr
λu
λ+ λr
n∑
i=1
1
(i− 1)!
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n−i
D =
λ
λs
λu
λ+ λr
n∑
i=1
1
(i− 1)!
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n−i
E =
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n
The probability of a multi-BCA system entering a healthy state is:
PHi =
n!
i!
(
λ
µ
λu
λ+ λr
)n−i
PHn, (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ..n) , (7.19)
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The probability of a multi-BCA system entering an unstable state is:
PUi =
(
λu
λ+ λr
)
PHn (i = 1, 2, . . . ..n) , (7.20)
The probability of a multi-BCA system entering a reconfiguration state is:
PRi =
iλr
µr
λu
λ+ λr
PHn (i = 1, 2, . . . ..n) , (7.21)
The probability of a multi-BCA system entering a switchover state is:
PSi =
iλ
λs
λu
λ+ λr
PHn (i = 2, 3, . . . ..n) , (7.22)
The probability of being in a healthy state is much higher in a multi-BCA
system than a single CA system. Therefore, the system with multi-BCAs is
more available than a system with a single CA. The different metrics which
are utilized for measuring the improvement in the performance of the system
using the multi-BCA framework is described in the next subsection.
7.5.4 Criteria to evaluate the availability of the CRN
7.5.4.1 Availability
Availability refers to the system’s continual functionality. With the proposed
approach, availability is ensured by having multiple BCAs. Whenever the
main CA is not performing as required, the first BCA will take on the role of
the main CA. In this way, the whole system is available even though the main
CA is not functioning. In the proposed model, service from the system is not
available in the reconfiguration state (R1) or the failure state (H0). Therefore,
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system availability in the steady-state is determined as follows:
Availability(A) = 1− Unavailability = 1− (PHo + PR1) (7.23)
7.5.4.2 Downtime and downtime cost
When the system goes down, no service is provided and no output is received;
this situation is termed ‘downtime’. With the proposed multi-BCA model
depicted in Figure 7.1, whenever a CA is not performing as expected, there
will inevitably be some business costs due to the service being unavailable
during downtime and during the reconfiguration of the system. If the main
CA is suddenly turned off due to service failure, there will be a cost which is
higher than the anticipated shutdown cost. (Cf) is the unit cost of CA for an
unexpected shutdown and (Cr) is the cost due to reconfiguration when the CA
is not available to provide the service. Therefore, the expected downtime and
downtime cost are determined as follows:
Downtime = (PHo + PR1)× T (7.24)
Downtime Cost = (PHo × Cf + PR1 × Cr)× T (7.25)
where T is the operational time.
7.5.4.3 Reliability
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system can perform its task
at a given point of time. According to the proposed approach, reliability is
maintained by using multiple BCAs because it can then provide continuous
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service by having multiple BCA options. In the proposed model depicted in
Figure 7.1, the system is able to provide continuous service until it enters the
failure state, so reliability is defined as :
Reliability = (1− PH0) (7.26)
7.5.4.4 Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is defined as a function of reliability and availability of a
system. If a system has high reliability and high availability, then it is called a
trustworthy system. According to the proposed approach, high reliability and
high availability is maintained by using multiple BCAs because it can then
provide continuous service by having multiple BCA options. Therefore, the
trustworthiness of a system is defined as :
Trustworthiness of a system, T = f(A,R) = A ∗R (7.27)
where A represents the availability and
R represents the reliability.
In the next section, first the verification of the NSSJL framework is
demonstrated to select the CA and BCA nodes and then different criteria are
evaluated to show how the proposed NSSJL framework can enhance system
availability and reliability and decrease the downtime cost.
7.6 Verification Results and Discussion
In this section, the verification results are categorized into three sections:
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1. Firstly, the proposed NSSJL framework is verified to select the CA and
BCA nodes in the CRN.
2. Secondly, the proposed NSSJL framework is verified to show the effect
of secure node joining and leaving the network which, in turn, causes the
nodes to be selected as the CA and the BCA as a result of their trust
increment depending on their good behaviour.
3. Thirdly, different criteria are verified to show how the NSSJL framework
can enhance system availability and reliability.
For verification purposes, a system is made using the NSSJL framework and is
programmed using the same programming environment as discussed in Section
5.7. Later on, the MATLAB programming tool is used to evaluate the results
using the trust data generated from the JAVA environment. For verification
purposes, two networks (the primary network and the secondary network) have
been considered in CRNs and each network has three member nodes and their
corresponding base station. Therefore, there are six member nodes (SU1, SU2,
SU3, PU1, PU2, PU3) and two base stations in the network. It is assumed
that all the member nodes are distributed according to the 1-hop fashion.
Each node calculates its 1-hop neighbor node’s trust value and sends it to the
PUBS. Thus, the process of trust calculation is computed only by the PUBS.
The verification steps are as follows:
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7.6.1 Selection of the CA and BCA from the member
nodes in CRNs
Each node has different activities with other nodes. First, the trust value of
each member node from the other five member nodes is calculated using the
trust calculation method described in Section 7.3.1 for 100 different activities.
Suppose node 1 has 100 activities with node 2, node 3, node 4, node 5 and
node 6. Therefore, node 2 assigns 100 trust values for node 1. In the same
way, node 2, node 3, node 4, node 5, and node 6 assign 100 trust values for
node 1. So, 100 trust values are produced for one node for 100 activities from
the five other nodes. Figure 7.14 shows 100 different trust values of node 1 for
100 different activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.14: Node 1’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
Figure 7.15 shows 100 different trust values of node 2 for 100 different
activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.15: Node 2’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
Figure 7.16 shows 100 different trust values of node 3 for 100 different
activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.16: Node 3’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
Figure 7.17 shows 100 different trust values of node 4 for 100 different
activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.17: Node 4’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
Figure 7.18 shows 100 different trust values of node 5 for 100 different
activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.18: Node 5’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
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Figure 7.19 shows 100 different trust values of node 6 for 100 different
activities with the other five nodes in the network.
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Figure 7.19: Node 6’s trust value with the other five nodes in the NSSJL
framework
Each node’s trust value is evaluated by the other five member nodes
depending on these 100 activities and the node’s final trust value in the
framework using equations 7.2 and 7.3, respectively, is summarized in Table
7.9. In this table, ‘0’ represents the node’s trust value computed by itself as a
node cannot compute its own trust value.
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Node Number
Evaluated by
Final trust Decision from
Node 1
(SU1)
Node 2
(SU2)
Node 3
(SU3)
Node 4
(PU1)
Node 5
(PU2)
Node 6
(PU3)
value PUBS
Node 1 (SU1) 0 0.2187 0.89932 0.6135 0.44821 0.1875 0.473 Normal node
Node 2 (SU2) 0.6759 0 0.3671 0.630116 0.1994 0.9255 0.55 3rd BCA
Node 3 (SU3) 0.3267 0.5130 0 0.8824 0.5155 0.9250 0.63 1st BCA
Node 4 (PU1) 0.8986 0.2945 0.7403 0 0.4331 0.9351 0.66 CA
Node 5 (PU2) 0.9722 0.5266 0.3824 0.2813 0 0.3071 0.38 Normal node
Node 6(PU3) 0.5387 0.6412 0.5202 0.4782 0.7928 0 0.59 2nd BCA
Table 7.9: Each member node’s trust value
From Table 7.9, it can be seen that node 4’s final trust value in the network
is 0.66 and it is above the threshold (0.5), therefore this node is selected as the
CA by the PUBS. For node 3 and node 6, their trust values are 0.63 (the second
highest trust value) and 0.59 (the third highest trust value), respectively and
both are above the threshold value, so node 3 is selected as the first BCA and
node 6 is selected as the second BCA. For the case of node 1 and node 5, both
of their trust value is below the threshold value, so they work as normal nodes
in the network.
7.6.2 Secure node joining and leaving process which
affects the node’s trust value
It is assumed that one joins the network after successfully passing the
authentication process described in Section 7.4. In this verification, only the
node’s trust value updates after secure node joining is shown. In other words,
it is shown how the trust value of a new joining node is updated for its normal
behaviour. It is assumed that node 7 wants to join the network as an SU. The
trust evidence calculated by the SUBS from the successful joining process is
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0.03, as there are three member nodes in the secondary network and each node
assigns 0.01 as a trust evidence to the new node for passing the authentication
to join the network. So, the new node is authenticated from the base station
and member nodes to join the network as an initial trust value of 0.03 as shown
in Figure 7.20 and after joining its trust value is incremented by 0.05 for its
good complying behaviour as shown in Figure 7.21. Therefore, after joining,
the new node’s trust value is 0.08 (0.03+0.05=0.08).
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Figure 7.20: Trust value of member nodes during the joining process to the
network
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Figure 7.21: Trust value of member nodes after new node’s trust value is
updated for the successful joining of the NSSJL framework
In relation to secure leaving process verification, it is shown that the trust
value of the leaving node is updated according to its normal or abnormal
behaviour. It is assumed that node 4 wants to leave the network using the
abovementioned leaving process. So, after leaving the network, its trust value
is incremented as shown in Figure 7.22. From this figure, it can seen that node
4’s trust value is increased from 0.66 to 0.71 as it receives a trust increment of
0.05 after successfully leaving, due to its good behaviour.
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Figure 7.22: Trust value increased after normal leaving in the NSSJL
framework
Node 2 wants to leave the network but it did not send any message.
Rather, it simply left the network without informing to any other member
node. Therefore, its trust value is decreased from 0.55 to 0.50 as it receives a
trust decrement of 0.05 for its abnormal behaviour as shown in Figure 7.23.
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Figure 7.23: Trust value decreased after abnormal leaving in the NSSJL
framework
7.6.3 System availability and reliability enhancement in
CRNs using the NSSJL framework
In this subsection, examples are given to show the applicability of the NSSJL
framework for enhancing system availability, reliability and other parameters.
A good estimate value for a range of model parameters is used from [46], [130]
to demonstrate the framework. It is assumed that the system using the NSSJL
framework is operated for two months, continuously. The mean time between
two consecutive failures is two months and the repair rate is two hours. A
healthy CA becomes unstable once every seven days. The reconfiguration time
and switchover time are 2 minutes and 1 minute, respectively. The number of
operational CAs varies from simplex (n=1) to multiplex (n=4). In a single-CA
system, there is one active CA. In a system with more than one CA, there is
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one active CA and the others are backup CAs and it is called a multi-BCA
system. One CA in the system means that there is only one CA in the system
and no BCA option. Two CAs in the system means that there is one CA and 1
BCA in the system. Three CAs in the system means that there is one CA and
two BCAs. Four CAs in the system means that there is 1 CA and 3 BCAs.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the unexpected downtime cost per unit is 100
times greater than the anticipated reconfiguration cost.
7.6.3.1 Availability analysis
The change in the availability of the system with different numbers of CAs
and the number of times it has been reconfigured (reconfiguration rate) when
the main CA goes to the unstable state, is plotted in Figure 7.24.
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that a healthy CA becomes unstable
once a week and reconfiguration techniques are applied to it as soon as it enters
the unstable state. However, it is possible that even after the reconfiguration
process is applied, the availability of the system may not increase to the
required level. So, reconfiguration is repeated to the malicious CA to see
the effect on the system’s availability.
It is observed that for a single-CA system, whenever the system enters
the unstable state once a week, it is necessary to reconfigure the system four
times to obtain high availability. As there is only one active CA, during the
reconfiguration state, the system’s service may be unavailable, so a low level
of availability (zero availability) of the system is achieved at first as shown
in 7.24. By performing repeated reconfiguration, it is observed that system
availability increases if the malicious CA is not forced offline and is performing
in a degraded mode.
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For a multi-BCA system, whenever the main CA goes to an unstable state
and reconfiguration takes place within the main CA, the system’s operation
is performed by the first BCA. So, the system availability is always higher
compared to that of a single-CA model. It is also observed that in a multi-BCA
system, the availability of the system increases with an increase in the number
of reconfigurations.
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Figure 7.24: Availability vs. different reconfiguration rates for different
numbers of CAs
Reconfiguration time (i.e. the time it takes to reconfigure) also has
an effect on the availability of the system, as shown in Figure 7.25. The
figure shows that if the system is removed from an unstable state with a
short reconfiguration time, the availability of the system is increased. For
a single-CA system, the system’s service is temporarily unavailable whenever
the CA is reconfigured, and if it takes a long time to reconfigure, the system’s
service is unavailable until reconfiguration is completed. It can be clearly seen
that if the reconfiguration time for a single CA system is increased, the system’s
availability is decreased. By contrast, when the main CA in a multi-BCA
system is reconfigured, the system’s functionalities are transferred to the BCA.
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The system’s service is always available in a multi-BCA system even when the
reconfiguration of a CA takes a long time, because the service is performed by
the BCA.
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Figure 7.25: Availability vs. different reconfiguration time for different
numbers of CAs
From Figures 7.24 and 7.25, it is noticeable that the increment in the level
of availability from one CA to two CAs is significant, compared to having two
CAs to three CAs. Clearly, if more than one CA is as BCA, the availability
of the system increases sharply. In Figure 7.26, the steady-state availability of
the system, based on the number of failures and the reconfiguration applied
to it per week is plotted. The parameters that are used are λ (failure rate)=
2 time/week and λ = 3 time/week, and note that with an increased number
of reconfigurations with rate λr=0 (no reconfiguration ) to λr=5 in a week,
the availability of the system increased. The result shows that, if the failure
rate is high, reconfiguration should be performed frequently so that the system
remains in a healthy state.
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7.6.3.2 Downtime cost analysis
Figure 7.27 shows the plot of downtime cost versus different reconfiguration
rates and the different numbers of CAs. Here, it is assumed that the average
cost of downtime due to failure (Cf) and reconfiguration (Cr) are 100 units
and 50 units, respectively. If the main CA is suddenly offline due to service
failure or an attack, the cost will be higher than the planned shutdown cost.
The downtime cost is calculated using equation 7.25 for an operation time of 1
month = (30*24*60) mins= 43200 mins. This figure demonstrates that if only
one CA is used for the proposed system, the downtime cost is high because if
the CA is suddenly turned off, the whole system will fail and a high level of
reconfiguration cost will be incurred. If there is more more than one CA in the
system like the multiple BCA system, however, and a malfunction is detected,
all operations will be shifted to the BCA and the main CA will be shut down.
In this case, the affected CA can be taken offline according to a plan whereby
the cost will be much less than if it were to unexpectedly go offline with no
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backup.
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Figure 7.27: Downtime cost vs. different reconfiguration rates for different
numbers of CAs
7.6.3.3 Reliability analysis
From Figure 7.28, it can be seen that if more than one CA is used, the system’s
reliability increases. If there is only one CA in the system, the system is not
available while the reconfiguration takes place. Moreover, if there is a sudden
computing failure in the main CA before reconfiguration takes place, the whole
system will collapse and the system’s reliability will decrease. In contrast,
if there is more than one CA in the system like the multiple BCA system,
the BCAs always provide service to the system though the main CA goes
for reconfiguration. So, the system with multiple BCAs is always available
because if malfunction is detected in the main CA, the system’s operation
is transferred to the BCA and the system is able to give continuous service
without any interruption. In this case, the system is more reliable.
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Figure 7.28: Reliability vs. different reconfiguration rates
7.6.3.4 Trustworthiness analysis
From Figure 7.29, it can be seen that if more than one CA is used, the system’s
trustworthiness increases. If there is only one CA in the system and there is a
sudden computing failure in the main CA before reconfiguration takes place,
the whole system will be unavailable and the system’s reliability will be low.
Therefore, the system’s trustworthiness will be low. In contrast, if there is
more than one CA in the system like the multiple BCA system, the system
is more trustworthy because if a malfunction is detected in the main CA, the
system’s operation is transferred to the BCA to provide continuous service. In
this case, the system is always available. Similarly, if a system has more than
one CA, it is more reliable. Eventually, the system with multiple BCAs always
achieves a high level of trustworthiness.
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From the numerical results, it can be concluded that if more than one CA
is used as BCAs in the system, the system will be more available and reliable,
thereby reducing downtime costs.
7.7 Conclusion
According to CRN architecture, there are certain key nodes which are
responsible for performing the major tasks in the network, such as maintaining
and updating the trust values of all member nodes. However, if a malicious
node is successful in becoming the key node, it can easily break down normal
network performance by exposing it to different threats. Furthermore, if
a malicious node joins the network and injects different threats, the whole
network will be vulnerable. Also, if a member node leaves the network
abnormally, it reveals the key and other information on the network to
the malicious users after becoming compromised by them. To avoid these
unwanted situations, in this chapter, a framework for node selection and secure
node joining and leaving (NSSJL) the network is proposed to select the most
trustworthy node to work as the CA to perform the key functionalities and
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will not be compromised easily by the malicious users and the BCA takes the
role of the CA if an error occurs in the CA. Having such a framework increases
the whole CRN system’s availability and reliability by providing continuous
service to the network. This framework also proposed a secure node joining
process so that no malicious users can join the network abnormally in order to
paralyze the network. At the same time, this framework ensures the member
node’s normal leaving process in order to protect the network from exposing
its data outside the network.
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Chapter 8
Recapitulation and Future Work
8.1 Introduction
In the existing literature, cryptographic-based solutions have been proposed
in secure routing and for authenticating the primary user’s (PU’s) signal
in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). However, such approaches fail to
provide a complete solution for detecting security threats brought about by
untrustworthy entities, such as selfish, malicious and faulty nodes and to
ensure secure communication in CRNs. This is particularly important where
untrustworthy, malicious nodes may join and access the free spectrum to inhibit
CR nodes to continue their communication using the PU’s free spectrum and
break down the normal network functionality. In such situations, ‘trust’ is an
important concept to defend against soft security threats in CRNs, especially
when authentication has to be achieved to ensure secure communication on
the basis of believing that a secondary user (SU), using the PU’s spectrum,
will not cause interference to the PU.
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In order to overcome these problems and ensure secure communication
in CRNs by using the notion of trust, six major research issues have been
identified and addressed in this thesis. Section 8.2 recapitulates these research
issues and in Section 8.3, the contributions made by this thesis to the literature
by successfully addressing these research issues are highlighted. In Section 8.4,
areas for future work are identified and in Section 8.5 the chapter is concluded.
8.2 Recapitulation of Research Issues
CRNs are more flexible and exposed to wireless networks compared to other
traditional radio networks. Hence, there are many security threats to CRNs
because of their special characteristics, such as intelligence functionality and
dynamic spectrum access application etc. more so than other traditional
radio environments. These security issues in CRNs threaten the security of
communication and deprive the CRN users of being able to utilize the spectrum
in an opportunistic way. Although some cryptographic-based techniques have
been proposed to ensure security in CRNs, most only detect if the signal is
coming from the primary user (PU) and do not focus on the issue of detecting
and stopping malicious users from affecting the performance of the CRNs.
Moreover, they require a large amount of processing power and memory for
computation.
One way by which the abovementioned problem has been addressed in the
area of security in CRNs is by using the notion of ‘trust’. However, most of
the trust-based approaches proposed in the literature focus on ensuring secure
routing in CRNs. There is no complete methodology in the existing literature
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to establish trust between different nodes in CRNs so that untrustworthy
users can be stopped from accessing the spectrum and paralyzing network
functionality. So, in the course of the research documented in this thesis,
a broad issue was addressed i.e. the design and development of a generic
framework for trust establishment in CRNs. Such a trust-based framework
can be used to authenticate only valid users to access and share the network
resources, such as spectrum, in a secure way, select the key nodes of the CRNs
based on the label of trust and perform the major responsibilities for enhanced
system availability. Several sub-problems were identified to solve the broad
issue as follows:
1. to propose a methodology to establish trust between different CR nodes
in the network for authentication purposes so that it can effectively
prevent malicious and selfish users from interacting in the network.
2. to propose a methodology to detect and solve the problem of biasing
when a node’s actual trust value is being solicited by other users. This
will help the requesting node to gain the candidate node’s actual trust
value in CRNs.
3. to propose a methodology to minimize disruption to the SUs’ service
when they need to vacate the spectrum for the PUs.
4. to propose a secure spectrum sharing mechanism to solve the security
threats brought about by untrustworthy entities during spectrum sharing
in CRNs and ensure secure communication.
5. to propose a methodology to balance the number of SUs and PUs for
efficient spectrum sharing when an SU has to vacate a PU’s spectrum.
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6. to propose a methodology to select the key nodes in CRNs to perform
the major system functionalities.
7. to propose a methodology for secure node joining and leaving the
network.
8. to propose a methodology to enhance system availability and reliability
in CRNs in the case of an attack on the key nodes of the network.
9. To validate the proposed approaches to improve security in CRNs by
using simulation experiments.
8.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The major contribution of this thesis to the literature is the proposal of a
trust-based framework in CRNs which establishes trust between different CR
nodes to authenticate only valid users to share spectrum in CRN and selects
the most trustworthy nodes as the key nodes (main and backup) to enhance
system availability and reliability in CRNs. The contributions of this thesis
are as follows:
1. to propose a methodology to establish trust between different CR nodes
in the network by three different ways of trust calculation namely: direct,
indirect and integrated trust calculation. This computed trust value is
used to authenticate a node’s request to check whether it is coming from
a valid node or from an unknown/malicious node.
2. to propose a methodology to detect and solve the biasing problem while
soliciting the recommendations of a node by introducing a Certificate
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Authority (CA) node in the CRN architecture which maintains the trust
repository.
3. to propose an approach with a state transition diagram of the different
working states through which an SU needs to go to minimize the
disruption to its service when it needs to vacate the spectrum for the
PU during spectrum sharing.
4. to propose a methodology that ascertains the trust value of a requesting
node conjointly from the secondary network and primary network to
share the spectrum securely in a CRN and solves the security threats
brought about by untrustworthy entities.
5. to propose a methodology to balance the number of PUs and SUs in a
CRN. The proposed approach considers the number of PUs, SUs and the
sub-bands into which each licensed band of PU is divided and determines
the relationship between them to ascertain the maximum number of SUs
which are allowed for efficient spectrum sharing. This is to ensure that
the SUs do not need to wait for a long time to access the spectrum.
6. to propose a methodology to select the key nodes of the CRN to perform
the major functionalities based on their level of trust.
7. to propose a secure node joining and leaving process in CRNs so that
malicious users cannot join and leave the network abnormally and break
down the network functionality.
8. to propose a methodology to enhance the availability and reliability of
the CRNs by having multiple backup key nodes which can take charge of
the network in the event of an error or attack on the current key node.
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9. to demonstrate the application of each proposed methodology to ensure
secure communication in CRNs.
In the following, a brief explanation of the contributions which this thesis
has made to the existing literature is given.
8.3.1 Contribution 1: Methodology to establish trust
between different CR nodes to authenticate the
node’s request
The first contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it proposes
a methodology to establish trust between different nodes in CRNs to make a
decision to authenticate a node’s request. The main features of the proposed
methodology which are discussed in Chapter 5 are as follows:
• When an SU node sends a request to access either the network resources
or the free spectrum from the primary network, its trust value is
calculated based on any of the three different trust calculation methods
namely: direct, indirect and integrated trust calculation.
• After the calculation process, the decision is made by the corresponding
base station to authenticate the request by comparing the computed
trust value of the requesting node with the defined trust threshold.
To the best of my knowledge, trust has been discussed in the CRN literature
for security such as secure routing, detecting attacks etc., but it has not been
used to authenticate a user’s request to share network resources, as is discussed
in this thesis.
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8.3.2 Contribution 2: Methodology to solve the biasing
problem to obtain the node’s actual trust value
The second contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it
proposes a methodology to solve the biasing problem brought by either biased
nodes or malicious nodes in CRNs. The main features of the proposed
methodology which are discussed in Chapter 5 are as follows:
• Whenever a node wants to know another member node’s trust value in
the network, it sends a request to the SUBS.
• The SUBS calculates the candidate node’s trust value and compares it
to the value stored by the CA.
• If both results are not similar, the SUBS is assured that the member
node’s trust value is being compromised by a selfish node who assigns a
biased trust value to the candidate node. The SUBS detects the biased
node and excludes it from the network for further communication. If
both results are similar, the SUBS is assured that no biasing problem
has occured in the network.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no methodological approach in the
literature where the biasing problem is addressed by using trust in CRNs to
obtain the node’s actual trust value.
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8.3.3 Contribution 3: Methodology to propose different
working states of an SU to minimize the
disruption to its service when it needs to vacate
the spectrum for the PU in CRNs
The third contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it proposes
an approach regarding the different working states through which an SU needs
to go during spectrum sharing to minimize disruption to its service when it
needs to return the spectrum to the PU. The main features of the proposed
methodology which are discussed in Chapter 6 are as follows:
• A state transition diagram with the five working states through which
an SU should go during spectrum sharing, namely: Search State, Access
State, Interrupt State, Vacate State and Dropped State is modelled.
• The disruption to an SU’s service is measured when it goes to the Vacate
state to return the spectrum to the PU and also when it goes to the
Dropped state in the absence of free available spectrum surrounding it.
It can minimize the disruption to its service while being in these states
by again searching and accessing other free spectrum.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no methodological approach in the
literature which defines the working states through which an SU in a CRN
needs to go to minimize the disruption to its service.
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8.3.4 Contribution 4: Methodology for a conjoint trust
assessment to share the spectrum securely in
CRNs
The fourth contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it
proposes a conjoint trust assessment approach to share the spectrum only
to authenticated trustworthy SUs to avoid the selfish threats brought by
untrustworthy users in CRNs. The main features of the proposed methodology
which are discussed in Chapter 6 are as follows:
• Whenever an SU sends a request to the SUBS to share the spectrum
from the primary network, at first its request is authenticated by both
networks as discussed in the first contribution in Section 8.3.1 to check
whether the request is coming from a valid node.
• The requesting node’s trustworthiness is calculated by both networks
and then finally the PUBS makes a decision as to whether the spectrum
should be shared with the requesting node or not.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no methodological approach in
the literature where a conjoint trust assessment approach is used for secure
spectrum sharing in CRNs to avoid untrustworthy user’s behaviour in the
network.
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8.3.5 Contribution 5: Methodology for balancing the
number of PUs and SUs for efficient spectrum
sharing in CRNs
The fifth contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it proposes
an approach to balance the number of secondary users and PUs to avoid the
blocking probability of SUs in CRNs. The main features of the proposed
methodology which are discussed in Chapter 6 are as follows:
• By taking the number of SUs, PUs and the sub-bands into which each
licensed band is divided, the proposed methodology allows the maximum
identified number of SUs for spectrum sharing in CRNs to avoid the call
blocking probability when all the sub-bands are occupied by the SUs.
• Proposing a state transition diagram for spectrum sharing which cater for
multiple PUs and SUs in a balanced network and analyzes the different
network statistics such as call dropping, call blocking, mean number of
SUs and utilization ratio.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no methodological approach in
the existing literature which establishes the relation between the number of
PUs and SUs in CRNs for efficient spectrum sharing and no basic spectrum
sharing scheme has been proposed between multiple PUs and SUs, although
a methodological approach in the literature for spectrum sharing is used for
only one and two PUs. This is the first attempt to share spectrum for multiple
PUs and SUs considering the balanced network properties.
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8.3.6 Contribution 6: Methodology for selecting the key
nodes to perform the major functionalities
The sixth contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it proposes
an approach to select the key nodes as a certificate authority (CA) and back
up certificate authority (BCA) based on trust so that it can perform the major
functionalities and will not be compromised easily in CRNs. The main features
of the proposed methodology which are discussed in Chapter 7 are as follows:
• To calculate the trust value of each node in the network. The most
trustworthy node whose trust value is above or equal to the trust
threshold is selected as the CA to perform the major functionalities in
CRNs.
• The second most trustworthy node whose trust value is above or equal
to the trust threshold is selected as the first BCA and this process is
repeated for each node whose trust value is above or equal to the trust
threshold.
• In the case where more than one node has the same trust value which is
above or equal to the trust threshold, an election process is required to
select the key nodes.
Several approaches have been proposed to select the CA in wireless
networks but no methodological approach has been proposed to select the
key nodes as the CA and BCA in CRNs to perform the major functionalities
which cannot be compromised easily by malicious users.
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8.3.7 Contribution 7: Methodology for proposing a
secure node joining and leaving process in CRNs
The seventh contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it
proposes a process for secure node joining and leaving in the network so that
malicious nodes which want to either join or leave the network abnormally
are identified and denied from doing so. The main features of the proposed
methodology which are discussed in Chapter 7 are as follows:
• to propose a secure node joining process through which a node should
go whenever it wants to join the network. The node’s trust value is
incremented by a certain range as a reward after it successfully joins the
network.
• to propose a secure leaving process through which a node should go
whenever it wants to leave the network so that it cannot reveal network
keys to the malicious user after leaving the network. The node’s trust
value is incremented by a certain range as a reward after it successfully
leaves the network.
In the literature, different cryptographic-based approaches have been
proposed for node joining and leaving, however none showed the effect on
the trust value in CRNs which helps the nodes to be selected as the key nodes.
8.3.8 Contribution 8: Methodology for system
availability and reliability enhancement in CRNs
The eighth contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it
proposes a methodology for enhancing the system’s availability and reliability
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by introducing the multiple BCA framework in the system. The main features
of the proposed methodology which are discussed in Chapter 7 are as follows:
• to propose a system that has multiple BCAs, and can switch from a CA
to a BCA in response to the detection of an error in a CA or in the case
where a CA is biased and under attack by other malicious nodes. In
this scenario, the first BCA takes charge of the CA and the second BCA
takes charge of the first BCA and so on.
• to propose different working states in the working of a CA and BCA in a
multiple BCA through which they need to go according to their present
state in order to enhance system availability.
• to evaluate the effect of the solution on system availability and
reliability enhancement using different metrics such as downtime cost,
trustworthiness etc.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no proposed generic framework in
the literature on key node selection which enhances system availability and
reliability by reducing downtime and failure.
8.4 Future Work
This thesis has demonstrated that it has sufficiently achieved the research
objectives for secure communication by using the notion of trust in CRNs.
However, there is some suggested future work for further investigation in order
to strengthen the proposed framework to provide more intuitive results to
support trust-based secure communication in CRNs. The possible areas which
could be explored further in this area are as follows:
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• Consider the dynamic behaviours of CR nodes to obtain the most
updated trust value
• Extend the proposed framework for multi-hop CRNs
• Consider soft encryption-based techniques during message transmission
in CRNs
• Establish certificate-based trust to ensure the integrity and authenticity
of information for the candidate node in CRNs
• Consider communication overheads for cryptography techniques and
huge data in the co-operation record table
8.4.1 Consider the dynamic behaviours of CR nodes to
obtain the most recent trust value
As discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the proposed framework for trust
establishment between different nodes in CRNs uses a reputation-based model
where trust management depends on the behavior of each node in the network.
In this methodology, a co-operation record of past behaviours is used to
calculate the node’s trust value. In the co-operation record, there is no
consideration of the dynamic behavior of a node such as delay through a path,
number of packets dropped during transmission etc. In such scenarios, it is
possible that the most recent trust value of a node is not determined. Moreover,
the proposed methodology works well for the specification of a small network
with a low number of nodes, however, if the number of nodes increases, the
amount of information of past behaviours in the record increases which requires
more processing power for computation and memory for storage.
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This triggers the need to consider the dynamic behaviours of nodes in CRNs
and to introduce the helper node in the network for storing and updating the
record table for a large network. Each member node can access the record
table from the helper node and process the information. The strength of
considering dynamic behaviours and introducing a helper node can then be
used to compute one node’s current updated trust value by the member node
which only needs a small amount of processing power to compute.
8.4.2 Extend the proposed framework for multi-hop
CRNs
As discussed in Chapter 7, the proposed framework for key node selection
considers only a one-hop network infrastructure during trust calculation
between different nodes in CRNs. However, the proposed framework is
inadequate for a large network where a multi-hop CRN infrastructure exists.
Therefore, the proposed trust-based framework can be extended to the theory
and design of multi-hop CRNs. One of the ways to measure a trusted
relationship in a multi-hop CRN is by using graph theory where connections
and hyper connections are used for a node’s behaviour in the network.
This triggers the need to consider the trust relationship based on graph
theory for multi-hop CRNs. The strength of considering the trust relationship
for multi-hop CRNs makes the framework more applicable.
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8.4.3 Consider soft encryption-based techniques during
message transmission in CRNs
As discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the proposed framework did not consider
security during message transmission for communicating between different
nodes, for example, in the scenario where the trust value of a node needs to be
transmitted to other nodes as a message. Though the proposed frameworks
are able to ensure security by trust-based authentication checking, secure
spectrum sharing and enhancement of system availability through trusted key
node selection, soft encryption techniques can be applied on top of it during
message transmission through which the trust value of a node is transmitted
to other nodes in the network, which can reduce the computational overhead
over conventional encryption techniques.
This triggers the need to consider soft encryption techniques during
the trust value as a message transmission between different nodes through
multipath techniques which are more trustworthy [131] in the CRNs. The
strength of considering these soft encryption techniques in the proposed
frameworks will enhance the security of communication in CRNs.
8.4.4 Establish certificate-based trust to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of the trust value for
the candidate node in CRNs
As discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, the proposed frameworks establish trust
for different nodes in the CRNs based on past behaviours stored in the
co-operation record. Malicious users attempt to access the co-operation record
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and change the behavior status which ascertains a candidate node’s false trust
value. Therefore, digital certificate-based schemes can be applied to establish
trust to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the computed trust value
through the assistance of a trusted third party between different nodes in
CRNs.
This triggers the need to consider a certificate-based trust establishment
between different nodes in CRNs to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the
candidate node’s trust value. The strength of considering this certificate-based
trust establishment makes communication in CRNs more secure and reliable.
8.4.5 Consider communication overheads for
cryptography techniques and huge data in the
co-operation record table
As mentioned in Section 1.7, the proposed methodologies are lightweight as
there is no extra overhead on the resources while computing the trust value
for small CRNs to ensure secure communication. For large network, the
node needs more processing power and memory to store and also the case
for certificate-based trust calculation to ensure more secure communication as
cryptography techniques such as key management requires computational cost.
This triggers the need to consider communication overhead such as
computational, time complexity and memory overhead for considering such
large network to make trust-based secure communication in CRNs more
practical.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the work that has been undertaken and documented in
this thesis has been recapitulated and the issues addressed in the literature
which prompted the work in this thesis have been highlighted. The different
contributions to the literature as the result of the outcome of the work done in
this thesis have also been highlighted. A brief description of the further work
that is intended to be undertaken in order to extend the approaches developed
in this thesis were then provided.
The work that was undertaken in this thesis has been published extensively
as a part of the proceedings in peer-reviewed international journals and
conferences. Selected publications are provided in Appendix A. A complete
list of all the publications arising as a result of the work and related to this
work documented in this thesis is given at the beginning of the thesis.
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